You are receiving from Dominions Office a cable regarding proposed
military assistance to Greece. [1] Matter is of great moment to us
because the forces initially contemplated are 2 Australian
divisions, 1 New Zealand division, the better part of a new
British armoured division, substantial supporting artillery and
air reinforcements to bring up air strength to 14 or 16 squadrons.

I attended the War Cabinet when this matter was discussed and the
feeling here is unanimously in favour of the enterprise. Dill [2]
and Wavell [3] who have recommended this are both able and
cautious, and after examination on the spot consider there is a
reasonable prospect of successfully holding up a German advance. I
have been much exercised about the action. The military arguments
are fairly well balanced, though I am much impressed by the danger
of abandoning Greece and so providing Germany with naval and air
bases from which to threaten the whole of our position in Eastern
Mediterranean. Politically the argument is, I think, strongly in
favour of the undertaking. The prospect of Yugoslavia and Turkey
moving is not very great though Eden [4] is at present in Turkey
making a special effort. But the prospects would entirely
disappear if Greece were abandoned to a German move through
Bulgaria which it is thought will happen very soon. A bold move
into Greece might possibly bring Yugoslavia and Turkey in with the
result that a strong Balkan front could be established. I cannot
think that an abandoned Greece should therefore do anything other
than weaken our position in world opinion, scare Turkey and
greatly hurry the Japanese. You will of course have in mind that
the enterprise is risky.

Appears that it will involve real shipping difficulties and
deplete the efforts of our forces in North Africa, and that in the
event of our forces in Greece being driven back an evacuation
might have to occur. I have discussed all these matters fully with
Churchill and subsequently with the War Cabinet. The Prime
Minister has offered the view that even if the enterprise failed
the loss would primarily be one of material and that the bulk of
the men could be got back to Egypt where new equipment could by
then be provided. If this proposal was only a forlorn hope I would
not like it and I so informed the War Cabinet. But the view of
Dill and Wavell is clearly that it is much more than a forlorn
hope. I specifically reserved all rights of the Australian
Government but you will understand that the matter is most urgent
and that your view should therefore be communicated promptly. I
should add two things, it is clearly understood that no Australian
division is to be adventured in this zone without adequate modern
equipment. Second, die effect on American opinion of our pursuing
this bold course will unquestionably be great. I saw the American
unofficial Ambassador, Colonel Donovan, in Cairo after his return
from the Balkans and he has stressed to the President of the
United States the importance of the formation of a Balkan front.

It may help you in your discussion if I tell you most secretly
that I spent the entire week-end with Churchill, that he has been
in closest communication with Roosevelt through Hopkins. [5] (He
is emphatically optimistic about the quite dramatic action by the
President after the passage of the Lease and Lend Bill.) He goes
on to offer the positive view that if Japan goes to war against us
America will unquestionably come in and has reiterated to me that
should Australia be attacked and America be not in, adequate naval
reinforcements would at once be despatched to Australian waters. I
think his view must be a little discounted but at the same time
the risk of American intervention should be sufficiently great to
deter Japan. As to diverting Naval reinforcements from the
Mediterranean, this Greek adventure must involve a substantial
naval commitment in Eastern Mediterranean unless troops are to be
abandoned, which is unthinkable. But allowing for all these things
though with some anxiety my own recommendation to my colleagues is
that we should concur. My information acquired along the route and
since my arrival shows that the supply of tanks, guns, ammunition
and aircraft in the Middle East is being built up rapidly and
satisfactorily, while notwithstanding the difficulties under the
circumstances, everything at this end is going so well that I am
now assured that even in point of numbers the British now have at
least equality in fighting aircraft, the deficiency being in
bombers.

MENZIES