Repeated to London No. 7, repeated to Tokyo No. 7.

I saw Hornbeck [1] yesterday. State Department have no evidence
that Japan intends early southward action. He believes it more
than probable that they will consolidate Indo-China and prepare
springboards for future use against possibly Netherlands East
Indies and/or Singapore probably after Germany has demonstrated
that she has reasonable prospects of success against Britain in
the spring.

Hornbeck is so well disposed that I asked him what he advised us
to do or say now. He believes that we would be well advised to
emphasize continually to those in high places here the vital
importance of Singapore and global aspect of the war effort
against the Axis, stressing the fact that the integrity of
Singapore is second only to the integrity of Britain itself, and
that if Singapore were to fall to Japan, cohesion of the British
Commonwealth war effort and of the Chinese resistance would be
most seriously affected.

Following on the above, the British Ambassador [2] and I saw the
Secretary of State [3] this morning.

The Secretary of State began by describing the initial interview
between the President [4], the Secretary of State and the new
Japanese Ambassador [5] yesterday. It was made clear to the
Japanese Ambassador that American public opinion was greatly and
increasingly disturbed by information of the Japanese policy of
aggression in the Far East, and that it would not take a great
deal more to inflame American opinion over the Far Eastern
questions. The President took the aggressive attitude and the
Japanese Ambassador was put on the defensive. The latter was most
profuse in his professions that he was one of the individuals who
hoped for and was working for peace.

The Secretary of State told us that he was not convinced that the
Japanese Ambassador was sincere in the above expressions and that
he proposes to say to him at the next interview that it was deeds
not words that counted. The Secretary of State believes that
sending a Japanese Ambassador professing love of peace to
Washington is a smoke-screen behind which the extremists will work
just as actively as before. Every opportunity will be taken to
ensure that the Japanese Ambassador has plenty of material to
report to his Government that will agitate them, and cause them
apprehension as to the American attitude.

I said that it was difficult to over-emphasize the importance of
Singapore in the eyes of Australia, New Zealand and India, and I
believed also, China. If Singapore fell, the war effort of all
these countries would be vitally affected. The Secretary of State
said that I need not develop this point of view further as there
was no one more convinced than himself of the supreme importance
of Singapore to all those who were opposed to the Axis Powers and
that he was constantly pressing this on the President and all
others concerned. On our enquiring what further deterrent action
the United States had in mind, the Secretary of State said that he
was not at the moment in a position to inform us but that
something worth while was under discussion, and that it was
something more than bluff
British Ambassador left with the Secretary of State copy of a
powerful and closely argued memorandum on the importance of
Singapore in the global aspect of the British war effort in which
it was more than hinted that should Singapore be jeopardised it
was not impossible that the Mediterranean might have to be
abandoned in favour of the defence of Singapore with the obvious
setback to the British war effort against Germany and Italy in the
main theatres of war.

I feel that the interview was a useful one, not the least of its
usefulness being that it marks the resumption of a series of joint
talks begun in the period of the late British Ambassador. [6]

By chance the Netherlands Minister [7] saw the Secretary of State
immediately after our interview and the American press has already
featured both interviews.

CASEY