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296 Mr A. S. Watt, First Secretary of the Legation in Washington, to Lt Col W. R. Hodgson, Secretary of Department of External Affairs

Cablegram 120 WASHINGTON, 13 February 1941, 5.46 p.m.

IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET PERSONAL FOR HODGSON FROM WATT

Reference my telegram No. 114. [1]

(1) For what they are worth my purely personal comments are as
follows:

(a) No man (not excluding President Roosevelt) can foretell
precisely how American opinion will react to Japanese attacks on
Malaya, Australia or New Zealand.

(b) Sympathetic interest in Australia and Australian prestige,
particularly since the Libyan campaign, has never been higher
here.

(c) Opinion in the State Department is divided on the question of
American action in the Pacific. One school of opinion
substantiates the strongest British viewpoint. It is very
significant that Ambassador Grew [2] has come down on the side of
early action to keep Singapore in British hands.

(2) Reports from Australia, published in American press, of
warning issued yesterday by War Advisory Council [3] have been
given considerable prominence here and have suggested an immediate
crisis not quite supported by other news items from the Far East.

We have had numerous press requests for information prompted by
the statement issued in Australia. You no doubt have considered
fully the risk of Japan interpreting such warnings as indicating
that Australia believes that war is inevitable and of Japan
deciding therefore to move sooner than she may otherwise have
planned.

(3) Minister [4] is expected to arrive in Washington 10 p.m.

tonight. [5]

1 Document 292.

2 U.S. Ambassador to Japan.

3 See Document 289.

4 R. G. Casey, who had been recovering from an illness.

5 On 14 February Sir Frederick Stewart, Minister for External
Affairs, replied to this cablegram as follows: 'No scare statement
was made. Statement issued following normal meeting of War
Advisory Council. Purpose of statement is to bring home to
industrial organisations and the people generally the seriousness
of situation and to weld all sections of community in the common
cause thus preventing strikes and threats of further industrial
unrest.' The same day Casey asked the External Affairs Dept to
inform him urgently of the reasons for expecting early Japanese
action southward. On 15 February Stewart replied in part: 'We have
had no special information beyond that which has no doubt been
available in Washington of which important part was communication
from Eden [U.K. Foreign Secretary] to Halifax [U.K. Ambassador to
the United States] referred to in your telegram No. 101 [see
Document 277, note 6].' See Stewart's cablegram 361 on file
AA:A981, Japan 101, iii and Stewart's 362 and Casey's 121 on file
AA:A981, Japan 185B, i.


[AA:A981, JAPAN 185B, i]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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