With reference to my telegram 113. [1]

(2) Summary of interview between Halifax [2] and the President.

[3]

(3) Halifax gave the President summary of the latest British
information concerning Japanese plans, and the President said much
of it corresponded with his own information which suggested that
the date for Japanese action was 10th February or 18th February.

(4) President said he had been anxiously considering what action
the United States could take if Japan attacked Netherlands East
Indies, Thailand or Singapore. While the United States Government
would declare war on Japan if latter were to attack American
possessions he did not think that country would approve this
action if Japan only attacked the Netherlands East Indies or
British possessions.

Moreover, even if the United States were to be involved in war
with Japan he felt that to fight a war in the Pacific would mean a
dangerous diversion of forces and material from the main theatre
of operations which in his view was the Atlantic and Great
Britain. Therefore, should the United States become involved in
war he thought they would have to fight a 'holding war' in the
Pacific.

(5) President said he had thought hard about possible deterrent to
Japan-for instance the sending of naval forces to Aleutian
Islands. [4] The Navy Office did not consider this practicable and
in any case they could not send strong enough force anywhere to
have much effect. He said he was 'through with bluffing' and had
little doubt that the Japanese knew the limitations of American
action.

(6) President showed Halifax telegram from United States
Ambassador, Tokyo [5], stating the problem with great force on
much the same lines as British experts. He stressed the vital
necessity of Singapore because of its importance to the general
British war effort and disastrous effect of the fall of Singapore
upon Chinese resistance. President commented that Ambassador had
stated the problem but not supplied the answer.

(7) Halifax said it was difficult to exaggerate the importance of
Singapore to the general British war effort and pointed out that
if Great Britain should ever have to fall back from its Middle
East position this would affect British blockade and permit the
free passage of Russian and Rumanian oil to Germany by sea. Japan
might already have decided to enter the war anyhow, but, if not,
action by the United States might have great effect, as had been
illustrated by the withdrawal of the Americans from the Far East.

(8) President agreed and mentioned other possibilities which had
occurred to him:

(a) further warning to American nationals to evacuate.

(b) Six or eight more submarines to Manila.

(c) Interview with new Japanese Ambassador [6] during which the
President could 'speak very seriously to him, saying he hoped that
rumours of further Japanese action were not true since it would be
a pity if the Ambassador had to leave Washington almost at once.'
(d) United States might take up with Japan the question of
Spratley Island and inquire 'why the Japanese were apparently
settling down there for good.'
(9) Halifax said cumulative effect of several small things might
be great and in conclusion emphasised the urgency of very early
American action. [7]