INTERNATIONAL SITUATION-FEBRUARY 11TH, 1941

(Previous reference-Minute No. (125) [1]).

(The Minister for Supply and Development [2] was present for the
discussion of this subject).

The statement on the international situation prepared by the
Department of External Affairs, dated 11th February, 1941 [3], was
read and noted by the Advisory War Council.

Dominions Office cablegram Z.43 of 11th February [4] and
Australian Legation cablegram No. 106 of 10th February [5], on the
Far Eastern situation were also read to the Council. A general
discussion took place during which the following questions were
raised:-

(i)Japanese Nationals. The information contained in the statement
in regard to the warning of Japanese nationals in Australia was
confirmed by the Minister for the Army. [6]

(ii) Thailand. Mr. Beasley [7] suggested that the statements in
paragraph 6 indicated that Thailand was playing a double game. The
Minister for the Army stated that as a result of his visit to
Thailand he had reported to Cabinet that Thailand had found
herself literally forced into the hands of the Japanese, in that
she received very little support elsewhere and the Japanese in
consequence had exercised a tremendous influence on Thailand,
which we were now endeavouring to counteract.

(iii) Discussions with Netherlands East Indies. Mr. Beasley made
reference to the statements in the External Affairs appreciation
and also in the outline of the recent defence measures, to
discussions now taking place, and suggested that they had been
left to rather a late period. The Minister for the Army stated
that a complete change of opinion had taken place in the
Netherlands East Indies in the last few weeks and it was only
within that period that the Governor-General of the Netherlands
East Indies [8] had agreed to the conversations. The victories of
the British Forces in North Africa had probably brought about this
result.

(iv) Attack on Hong Kong. Mr. Curtin [9] made reference to
cablegrams which were read from which it could be inferred that
the possible Japanese movements would be by an attack on Hong Kong
with gradual penetration southward. By refraining from a forceful
attack further south, Japan could hope to save herself from
American intervention for the time being and by indicating her
intention of dominating the foreign areas adjacent to Japan and
withdrawing her attack from Communistic [sic] China might placate
and strengthen her relations with Russia.

He thought that eventual American intervention was probable, but
should the war show signs of going against us she might, in the
first instance, concentrate on strengthening the United Kingdom in
the Atlantic and help to get back the outposts of the Empire
later.

The transfer of American Naval Forces from the Pacific to the
Atlantic would be disastrous to Australia. He suggested that there
were two questions which required immediate attention, viz:

(a) the strengthening, if possible, of the Naval Forces at
Singapore;

(b) ensuring the utmost efficiency of the Australian Air Defences
to counter air attack which, in the early stages, would possibly
be sporadic but nevertheless have serious results.

It was clear in his mind that if we were drawn in we must stand
alone for the time being. Even if America intervened immediate
assistance would not be available.

(v) Mobilization Plans. Mr. Curtin referred to the attitude of
neutral European nations before they had been invaded, that no
action must be taken of a provocative nature, and he felt to some
extent there was reluctance in the same direction in Australia.

There should be no emulation of the attitude of the neutral
European nations of the fear of provocative action.

He doubted whether any advantage could be obtained by hesitancy,
and suggested that we should mass our forces for our own defence
and issue orders immediately for a test mobilization. This would
not hasten enemy action, as undoubtedly they had full plans
completed and it was only a question of time as to when they would
put them into effect.

Whatever the cost, strain or provocation, a test mobilization
would show our determination to withstand the enemy, and all
sections of the community would stand fully behind the Government
if such action were taken.

A test mobilization would be costly and would immediately affect
the output of industry, but its eventual result would be a
stimulation of all industrial output while its immediate advantage
would be the test of our war machinery and the rectification of
deficiencies found to exist therein. Cost must not be regarded as
a factor.

Mr. Spender stated that he already had plans in hand for a partial
test mobilization but did not propose that a full mobilization
should be carried out because of its effect on industry. The
latter test, however, Mr. Curtin suggested, was of great
importance for the reason stated previously that such a test would
show what was required in industry to remedy deficiencies. If a
full test mobilization proved that industry could not carry on,
then a similar outcome would result from mobilization under war
conditions.

Mr. Curtin therefore recommended to War Cabinet 'that Australia be
put on a war footing now because of the following factors:-

(1) The sense of expectation by the people of some such action and
its psychological effect on the public in bringing them to a full
realisation of the position.

(2) Deficiencies would be laid bare and steps would be taken to
rectify them.

(3) It would result in training not only the fighting forces but
also the civil population, showing them the role they should fill
under war conditions.

(4) It would bring the civil population to some realisation of the
danger of air attack on cities (particularly Sydney) by high
explosive and incendiary bombing and gas.

(5) It would bring to light the paucity of our anti-aircraft
protection. In this connection Mr. Beasley had suggested that
anti-aircraft guns should be mounted in Australia instead of being
despatched abroad, and that if such defences were provided at
Newcastle, he felt that, apart from its defence value, its
psychological effect would be such as to bring the dispute to a
rapid conclusion. Mr. Spender referred to the deficiency of
predictors which prevented the mounting of new anti-aircraft
batteries to a great extent in Australia, and stated that our
surplus of anti-aircraft guns output was at present being sent to
Singapore, where it could be used to the greatest advantage.'
(vi) Industrial Problems. Mr. Curtin stated that while the
dissemination of information made available during the morning to
the Advisory War Council was not advisable, he thought
consideration might be given to leaders of industry, both
employers and employees being called together to be given
information which would clearly bring home to their minds the
seriousness of the situation. There would be some leakage even
with censorship, but the results would not by any means be more
serious than the present Fifth Columnists' activities. If the
leaders of industry could be given the facts the results would be
effective.

The Acting Prime Minister [10] stated that he would hesitate, on
the information at present before the Government, either to direct
a general mobilization or to call the leaders of industry in
conference on the lines suggested unless Parliament were first
called together and had been taken into his confidence.

(vii) Army Plans. The Minister for the Army stated that plans for
mobilization must take into consideration whether such should
cover the whole of Australia or, in the first instance only, those
areas which would be vital to Australia and, therefore, where the
greatest danger would lie. This, he thought, could be looked upon
as the requirements for first mobilization and thereafter units
would be mobilized step by step in accordance with the capacity to
provide for them both in the way of accommodation and equipment.

Plans on these lines were already being drawn up and he hoped that
the Chief of the General Staff [11] would be in a position in the
morning to give the War Cabinet the framework of the proposals.

Many aspects had to be taken into consideration, not only in
regard to the effect on industry, but the capacity of the present
machinery to meet the situation, including transportation. He
appreciated that an immediate attack on Australia would bring
about the necessity for a complete mobilization, but under present
circumstances he considered it was undesirable knowingly to strain
our machinery to the breaking point to carry out a full test
mobilization.

Mr. Beasley sugested that the lines on which the Minister for the
Army proposed to operate were convincing. If Parliament were
called together, plans on which action must be taken should be
complete and decisive action should immediately result.

DECISION
Note was taken of the report of the Minister for the Army that
plans were at present under review for partial mobilization, and
it was recommended to War Cabinet that, in view of the serious
international situation and the menacing attitude of Japan, plans
for a mobilization of the Armed Forces of Australia should be
taken in hand so that Australia could be put on a war footing
immediately the necessity should arise.

WARNING REGARDING SECRECY
The Acting Prime Minister stated that, in view of the very secret
nature of the information that had been made available, during the
course of the discussion on this subject, members should refrain
from making any of the information available to the press. An
official announcement would be made in the name of the Council in
a prepared statement.

DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT
Mr. Curtin submitted the following draft as a suggested press
statement:-

'The War Council tells the people of Australia that the war has
moved to a new stage involving the utmost gravity. A complete
review was made of the situation and its implications. These can
only be described as of the most serious import. Measures have
been taken to prepare for all contingencies. The Chiefs of the
Services will meet the War Cabinet and the War Council tomorrow.

The people of the Commonwealth are advised that the maximum
preparations are in train and that these are being made with the
maximum speed. We have been at war for more than a year. Our sea,
land and air forces have been gallantly and effectively engaged in
various theatres of this crucial conflict. They have proved their
mettle incontestably. Events now widen the area of the general
conflict; they bring it closer to our shores. What the future has
in store is today not precisely clear. But what is clear is that
Australia's safety makes necessary that there be neither delay nor
doubt regarding the need for the greatest effort at preparedness
the country has ever made.'
After discussion it was agreed that the draft statement might
create a panic and it was suggested that the Acting Prime Minister
and Mr. Curtin should confer and decide on the statement to be
issued.

(Mr. Spender, Mr. Hughes [12] and Mr. Beasley were not present
during final discussion of the press statement).

APPROVED PRESS STATEMENT
The following statement was finally agreed upon and was released
to the press on the evening of the 13th February:-

'When the Advisory War Council adjourned early this afternoon, the
Acting Prime Minister (Mr. Fadden), the Leader of the Opposition
(Mr. Curtin) and the Leader of the Non-Communist Labour Party (Mr.

Beasley) issued the following statement:-

"The Advisory War Council, at its meeting today, considered
certain cable messages received by the Government dealing with
recent developments in the international situation. The nature of
these messages led the Council to decide to adjourn until tomorrow
afternoon because in the meantime the position will be reviewed by
the War Cabinet in consultation with the Chiefs of Staff of the
Services.

"The Chiefs of Staff have been asked to come to Sydney to attend a
special meeting of the War Cabinet tomorrow morning.

"As the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in the Far East (Sir
Robert Brooke-Popham) is now in Australia, he has been invited to
be present.

"The Advisory War Council will meet later in the day and the
Chiefs of Staff will be invited to discuss the present situation.

"We think we should tell the people of Australia," the statement
added, "that it is the considered opinion of the War Council that
the war has moved to a new stage involving the utmost gravity. At
the meeting today a complete review was made of the existing
situation and its implications. These can only be described as of
a most serious import.

"It is necessary to say that various contingencies of the next few
weeks have been taken into account and effective preparatory
measures have been taken.

"Australia has been at war now for more than a year. Our sea, land
and air forces each have been gallantly and effectively engaged in
various theatres of war in this crucial conflict. Each arm of the
Service has proved its mettle incontestably.

"What the future has in store is at present not precisely clear.

What is clear is that Australia's safety makes it essential that
there should be neither delay nor doubt about the clamant need for
the greatest effort of preparedness this country has ever made." '
[13]