War Cabinet today gave consideration to cablegrams Nos. 49 and 50
of the 28th January from the United Kingdom Government dealing
with report of Singapore Conference in event of war with Japan.

[1] In latter cable suggestion made that we might agree not to
insist on total Commonwealth and New Zealand Naval Forces
returning to Australian waters, reasons being-
(A) Major expedition against Commonwealth and New Zealand can be
ruled out initially.

(B) Main defence in Far East is maintenance of the security of
Singapore and sea communications from Singapore through Indian
Ocean to the United Kingdom.

(C) Latter communications also vital to us as regards supplies and
maintenance our troops in Middle East.

Government has replied emphasizing among other things necessity
protection Tasman Sea area as vital to both Australian and New
Zealand interests and emphasizing the importance of giving effect
to conclusions of Singapore Conference that minimum naval forces
considered necessary in Australian and New Zealand waters can be
provided only by the return of all Australian and New Zealand
naval forces now serving overseas.

Government also expressed concern as to the naval strength in the
Far East and has asked for full statement both as to naval
strength at present available and the action proposed to augment
it in the event of hostilities with Japan. We suggest you should
also press for this information.

I have not furnished you with the full text of these cables as you
can obtain them when you arrive in London, but my main reason for
cabling you is to express the concern of the Government in regard
to the present Japanese position and the lack of information in
our possession as to the intentions of the United Kingdom
Government to counter any move she may make. We feel that as a
partner in Empire affairs with a brigade of our troops in the
forward danger area that we should know in advance what hostile
actions on the part of Japan are likely to be regarded by the
United Kingdom authorities as a casus belli.

We suggest that you press for a frank appreciation from the United
Kingdom Government as to the probable actions of Japan in the
immediate future that would be looked upon as a casus belli and
the possible moves that she might make which would be countered by
other means. The areas of particular interest are Hong Kong,
penetration into Thailand and Indo-China and irritation tactics
generally in the southern area apart from direct attack on Malaya
or Netherlands East Indies which would result in immediate
hostilities. The extent [2], if any, that America or Netherlands
East Indies might be expected to take in these measures should
also be indicated.