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245 Lord Cranborne, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, to Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, U.K. High Commissioner in Australia

Cablegram 4 LONDON, 3 January 1941, 11.30 p.m.

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

My telegram of 11th December, Circular Z.407. [1]

Please give the following information, which is of the highest
degree of secrecy, to the Prime Minister [2] for his most secret
and personal information. BEGINS.

1. Staff conversations with officers of the Netherlands East
Indies took place at Singapore 26th-28th November.

2. Dutch expressed themselves as ready to co-operate with us in
joint plan to meet the contingency of war with Japan on the
understanding that this does not imply any political commitment on
either side. Plans were made with particular reference to a
Japanese attack on Malaya, Borneo or the Netherlands East Indies,
which would appear to be among their most probable courses of
action.

3. Dutch representatives were in agreement with our views
regarding the role of their forces in the event of war as stated
in paragraph 37 of summary of Chiefs of Staff, Far East,
appreciation contained in my telegram of 12th August, Z.214 [3],
and in paragraph 1 (j) of my telegram of 16th October, Z.308. [4]

4. It was agreed that the only practicable form of co-operation by
re-distribution of forces must in present circumstances be limited
to air forces. No mutual re-distribution was recommended regarding
naval and land forces presumably owing to the necessity of
retaining limited forces available for local defence of Dutch
territory. In the event of attack on Borneo Dutch might move
certain bomber squadrons there, in which event the R.A.F. might
take over air operations south of Singapore and west of Borneo
operating from aerodromes in Sumatra and West Borneo. In the event
of attack on Malaya Dutch squadrons which could be spared from
local defence might operate in Malaya. British squadrons might
operate from Dutch bases in Northern Sumatra in these
circumstances. Each command would retain power to recall any
reinforcements lent in this manner.

5. Arrangements for command envisaged in paragraph 4 of my
telegram Z.308 were agreed. Areas of responsibility for
reconnaissance were also agreed.

6. It was recommended that liaison officers (one from each
service) should be exchanged as soon as possible between ourselves
and the Netherlands East Indies. This matter is being taken up
with the Netherlands Government in London and we are despatching
suitable officers to take up duties as soon as the necessary
formalities are completed.

7. Preparation and issue of inter-allied code was recommended.

Improved naval code for inter-communication between British and
Netherlands naval authorities in the Far East is now under
preparation. Separate War Office code will not be required. Air
Ministry are considering advisability of preparing code for air
forces.

8. Conference also recommended that facilities should be provided
(including provision of bombs, preferably spares, fuel etc.) to
enable R.A.F. and R.A.A.F. aircraft to operate from certain Dutch
aerodromes and Dutch aircraft to operate from certain British
aerodromes in Malay Peninsula and Borneo. Agreement of Netherlands
Government to provision of these mutual facilities is being sought
here. Netherlands East Indies representatives stated that they
could provide adequate landing grounds and refuelling stations
between Timor Sea and Malaya. They added that ample releases of
suitable aviation fuel can be made available at all operational
aerodromes and seaplane bases in the Netherlands East Indies.

9. It was also proposed that an attempt should be made to define
what action by Japanese forces should be regarded as an act of
war. This has been considered here but it is felt that action by
Japan which would constitute an act of war could only be decided
by H.M. Governments in the light of circumstances at the time and
that planning should be conducted on the assumption that war might
break out as a result of some hostile act by Japan, the precise
form of which cannot at present be foreseen.

10. Conference reported that duration of Dutch resistance to
Japanese would be limited by their existing shortage of armaments
and munitions and recommend that everything possible should be
done to secure delivery of material already ordered for the
Netherlands East Indies from the United States of America and the
British Empire. This recommendation is accepted and steps are
being taken to investigate means whereby this may be accomplished.

11. Netherlands East Indies representatives asked for information
regarding arrangements for controlling Japanese at Tawao Si Amil
(north of Tarakan) and Malaya. This matter is under urgent
consideration here.

12. Netherlands East Indies representatives also asked if we could
influence the Portuguese Government with a view to preventing
further concessions to the Japanese in Portuguese Timor. This
proposal is being taken up with the Portuguese Government.

13. In the course of the conversations the following information
was also elicited:-

(a) Denial of Dutch oilfields. As regards plans for demolition of
Dutch oilfields see my telegram of 14th December, Z.411. [5]

(b) Dutch air reconnaissance. Regular flights of mails made over
northern approaches to Netherlands East Indies, the west coast of
Sumatra and Sunda Straits.

(c) Dutch Air Force dispositions. General intention of Netherlands
East Indies authorities is to re-distribute squadrons as necessary
to meet any threat that may develop. They intend stationing some
flying units in East Borneo to protect Tarakan and Balikpapan
oilfields.

14. Full information regarding defence and resources of the
Netherlands East Indies was also given by the Netherlands East
Indies representatives. This included plan for employment of Dutch
naval forces, facilities for laying minefields.

15. Netherlands East Indies representatives asked for information
regarding control in the event of war of Torres Straits, and were
informed that this question was under active consideration by the
Commonwealth authorities.

16. The fact that these conversations have taken place should be
regarded as most secret and on no account be divulged even to
representatives of the Netherlands East Indies in the Commonwealth
or New Zealand. ENDS. [6]

1 On file AA:A1608, AA27/1/1. It reported that, following a
request by the Commander-in-Chief in the Netherlands East Indies,
Lt Gen J. van Berenschot, arrangements had been made to hold
discussions between Netherlands and U.K. staff officers at
Singapore.

2 R. G. Menzies.

3 Document 66.

4 Document 178. The cablegram was in fact dispatched on 19
October.

5 On file AA:A1608, A41/1/1, xvi.

6 For reactions to this report by the Joint Planning Committee of
the Defence Dept and the Chiefs of Staff see file AA:A816,
58/301/79. See also Document 259.


[AA:A1608, E41/1/1]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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