Your telegram 1st December No. 627. [1]

Following for the Prime Minister [2], personal from the Prime
Minister [3]-
1. I am most grateful for your promised help at Singapore in
respect both of troops and of equipment and ammunition and hope
that you will make these available as proposed. If so, we will
arrange to relieve your troops in May by equivalent of a Division
from India.

2. The danger of Japan going to war with British Empire is in my
opinion definitely less than it was in June after the collapse of
France. Since then we have beaten off attacks of German Air Force,
deterred invader by our ever-growing land strength, and gained a
decisive victory in Libya. Since then the Italians have shown
their weakness by sea, land and air, and we no longer doubt our
ability to defend the delta and canal until or unless Germany
makes her way through Turkey, Syria and Palestine. This would be a
long term affair. Our position in the Eastern Mediterranean is
enormously improved by the possession of Crete, where we are
making at Suda Bay a second Scapa, and also by our victories and
those of the Greeks, and facilities we now have for building up
strong air bases in Greece from which the Italians can be
attacked.

3. The naval and military successes in the Mediterranean and our
growing advantages there by land, sea and air will not be lost
upon Japan. It is quite impossible for our fleet to leave the
Mediterranean at the present juncture without throwing away
irretrievably all that has been gained there and all prospects for
the future. On the other hand, with every weakening of the Italian
naval power, the mobility of our Mediterranean fleet [?is]
becoming potentially greater, and, should the Italian fleet be
knocked out as a factor, and Italy herself broken as a combatant,
as she may be, we could send strong naval forces to Singapore
without suffering any serious disadvantage. We must try to bear
our Eastern anxieties patiently and doggedly until this result is
achieved, it always being understood that if Australia is
seriously threatened by invasion we should not hesitate to
compromise or sacrifice the Mediterranean position for the sake of
our kith and kin.

4. Apart from the Mediterranean, the naval strain has considerably
increased. When BISMARCK and TIRPITZ join the German fleet, which
they may have done already, the Germans will once again be able to
form a line of battle. The KING GEORGE V is ready but we do not
get PRINCE OF WALES for several months, nor the DUKE OF YORK till
mid-summer, nor the ANSON till the end of the year 1941. For the
next six months we must keep more concentrated at Scapa Flow than
has been necessary so far. The appearance of a raider pocket
battleship in the Atlantic has forced us to provide battleship
escort again for our convoys and we are forming hunting-groups for
raiders in the South Atlantic and if necessary in the Indian
Ocean. We have always to consider the possibility of undamaged
portion of the French fleet being betrayed by Darlan [4] to
Germany.

5. For all these reasons we are at the fullest naval strain I have
seen either in this or former war. The only way in which a naval
squadron could be found for Singapore would be by ruining the
Mediterranean situation. This, I am sure, you would not wish us to
do unless or until the Japanese danger becomes far more menacing
than at present. I am also persuaded that if Japan should enter
into the war, the United States will come in on our side, which
will put the naval boot very much on the other leg, and be a
deliverance from many perils.

6. As regards air reinforcements for Malaya, the Conference at
Singapore recommended the despatch of considerable numbers of
aircraft; it is difficult to commit ourselves to precise number of
aircraft which we can make available Singapore, and we certainly
could not spare flying boats to lie about idle there on the remote
chance of a Japanese attack when they ought to be playing their
part in the deadly struggle on the North-Western approaches.

Broadly speaking, our policy is to build up as large as possible a
fleet, army and air force in the Middle East and keep this in a
fluid condition, either to prosecute the war in Libya, Greece and
presently Thrace, or reinforce Singapore, should the Japanese
attitude change for the worse. In this way foci of the forces will
be avoided, and victory will give its own far-reaching protection
in many directions.

7. I must tell you finally that we are sending convoys of troops
and munitions to the Middle East and we shall have nearly 300,000
men there by February. This again entails heavy escort duties. But
great objects are at stake and risks must be run in every quarter
of the globe, if we are to emerge from all our dangers as I am
sure we shall.

8. I am arranging details as regards shipping and equipment etc.

to be taken up direct between the War Office and Army
Headquarters, Melbourne.

With all good wishes.