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200 Mr R. G. Casey, Minister to the United States, to Department of External Affairs

Cablegram 379 WASHINGTON, 15 November 1940, 11.49 p.m.

MOST SECRET

Repeated to London 114.

I called on Berle [1] today. I started by advancing argument in
the penultimate paragraph of my telegram No. 358 repeated to
London 109. [2]

After referring appreciatively to the economic and other action
taken by the Administration before the election and to the
understandable pre-election reluctance to pursue Staff
Conversations proposal, I said for our part we were now most
anxious to revive the Staff Conversations proposal originally made
by the Secretary of State [3] and also to pursue any lines
designed to deter Japanese from further attempt to expand.

In latter regard it would seem that preventive dispositions of
available forces presented most useful line. I repeated without
quoting the Secretary of the Navy substance of his 'preventive'
view reported in my telegram 358. [4]

I reminded him also that it was the President [5] who had first
suggested the visit of United States fleet units to Australia,
Singapore etc. and said that we looked forward to the moment when
this proposal should be revived. Such a visit would be warmly
prized in Australia by the Government and the people.

As regards Staff Conversations I said Ghormley's [6] talks in
London, Singapore meeting and Burrell's [7] visit here appeared to
me to be nibbling at separate bites of the main problem which was
that of all embracing discussions between sufficiently senior and
informed Service officers on how to apply armed strength and
resources so as to avoid war in the Far East and win the war in
Europe.

Berle received all this with understanding and said that he found
little in what I had said with which he disagreed. In the absence
of the President and the Secretary of State he would discuss the
battle cruiser squadron with Welles [8] at once. He agreed that
these matters might turn out to have some urgency following on the
recent Russian-German meeting.

CASEY

1 U.S. Assistant Secretary of State.

2 Dispatched 4 November. See file AA:A3300, 11. The paragraph
read: 'I thought it wise to feed the flames by saying that our
advice was that the predominant Japanese view now appeared to be
that America might well enter a Far Eastern conflict but that they
would come in hesitatingly and too late. This meant that if Japan
acted it would be with speed and decision so that both we and
America would be faced with a fait accompli.'
3 Cordell Hull.

4 Colonel Franklin Knox's 'preventive' strategy was the deployment
of U.S., U.K., Netherlands and Australian warships in the Pacific
to deter Japan from going to war. In particular he wanted a
substantial U.S. naval force to visit Singapore.

5 Franklin D. Roosevelt.

6 U. S. special naval observer in London.

7 Director of Plans, R.A.N.

8 U.S. Under-Secretary of State.


[AA:A981, FAR EAST 26A]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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