Cablegram 15 NOUMEA, 8 September 1940, 6.45 p.m.
IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET
Your telegrams. [1] Am holding all messages for the present. [2]
Recipient (3) received message on 6th September in similar terms
direct from de Gaulle, following which he is forming de Gaulle
Committee with press publicity. Understand some leaders preparing
to go to the New Hebrides to consult Sautot. [3]
This crystallises problem.
On the one hand the impossibility of reconciling loyalty to Vichy
with carrying out the wishes of the population caused the fall of
the late Governor. [4] Increasingly clear that the present
Governor [5] will execute Vichy orders. He rejected the idea of
referendum on Tahiti model. [6] Only wants to preserve and extend
the Colony's trade to obtain funds for local necessities. I do not
believe he will consent to carrying on the war in any sense. Fear
hope of obtaining complaisant Vichy Governor cannot be realized.
On the other hand the population overwhelmingly, though not
unanimously, [in] favour of continuing the war and recoil from
idea even of nominal allegiance to Vichy which to them means
German dictation. Present shipping position seen as concrete
example of this. Continuation of war effort seems to them the sole
hope of restoration of France. Tahiti decision and New Hebrides
strengthen their feeling. I believe sooner or later they will get
their way.
Leaders at present holding rank and file in check and situation
superficially calm but an incident is bound to happen which will
again provoke excitement.
If disorder occurred, Japanese keen competitors of labourers,
small shopkeepers, etc. may possibly suffer.
(a) If a Governor appointed by de Gaulle arrived I believe he
would be welcomed and followed.
(b) If I let it be known that Australia definitely wants only
trade relations with New Caledonia, that might deflate the popular
movement (with consequent resentment against Australia).
The present position only compromise which will lead either to
full war co-operation under a non-Vichy authority or to
strengthening of official position, cooling of enthusiasm and
possibly alienation of the colony.
Some risk of disorder in either alternative (a) and (b) above, but
much less in alternative (a) especially if French warship goes
away.
But for your telegram 13 [7] I would have suggested as possible
means of reconciling Government and people that Australia
tactfully specify the kind of co-operation other than economic
that it desires and that attempt be made to induce the Governor to
go that far and the people to accept it as maximum.
If this failed, which would not surprise me, I believe alternative
(a) or something like it will occur.
Would be grateful of early guidance on policy in the light of the
above.
BALLARD
[AA:A981, NEW CALEDONIA 37]