Cablegram 435 LONDON, 17 June 1940, 11.04 p.m.
MOST SECRET FOR THE PRIME MINISTER
Following is memorandum referred to in No. 434. [1]
1. Before declaration [2] was prepared the decision was that
United Kingdom should relieve France from her obligation not to
seek a separate peace provided that position of French fleet was
safeguarded.
2. I feel that it would be more than a mistake to revert to that
decision now that the change of Government has prevented
acceptance of declaration.
3. I believe the right course would be to hold French to their
obligation and publish to French people and to the world
immediately the term[s] of the declaration showing what we were
prepared to do and how far we were prepared to go [to] help the
French.
4. If we do this making clear declaration was prepared at the
request and with the assent of leader of the French, it would
rally the stalwarts of France and possibly lead to some further
delay by resistance in Southern France, giving time for
transference of troops and equipment to North Africa, the
preservation of the fleet and continuance of resistance in
Colonies.
5. If we assent even with a safeguard on the fleet which would be
doubtful of realisation Frenchmen who may still desire to hold out
will be compelled to come into line. We will be accused of
deserting French or at all events that their collapse was due to
our lack of support. Having acquiesced we will also have weakened
our position if and when we have to impose grave sufferings on
French by our blockade and bombing of their country.
BRUCE
[FA: A3195, 1.4379]