Historical documents
Memorandum WASHINGTON, 5 June 1940 [1]
SECRET
It is necessary to put down the background of affairs of the last
week or so in order to knit together the cables that I have sent
to Australia and repeated to SMB. [2]
For the first two or three days of the invasion of Holland and
Belgium, I experienced a feeling of depression and foreboding, but
this passed, and after that I spent a fair proportion of my time
in putting heart into people-Allied and neutral.
It needs all the self-command one possesses not to be bitter and
recriminatory towards this country-but one has, at any cost, to
put this out of one's mind.
I had arranged, a month or so in advance, a trip to Chicago,
Madison, Milwaukee and Minneapolis for the period 21st-29th May,
and many speaking and other engagements had been arranged. As the
time approached, I feared that I would have to cancel the whole
trip. I consulted the British Consul-General at Chicago [3], Mr.
Adolf Berle [4], and others-and I was advised by them all to carry
on with the arrangements if it was humanly possible. No one from
our side had been in the northern middle west for a long time and
it was thought necessary to show the flag and to say one's say-
besides the necessity of avoiding breaking faith when large
numbers of invitations had been issued. I was assured that, even
in the circumstances relating to the invasion of Holland and
Belgium, cancellation of arrangements would be misunderstood or
much resented. So that, with some reluctance, I carried through
with the trip, although cutting down to the extent of cancelling
the arrangements for 21st and 22nd May. I left Washington on the
early morning of 23rd May-and went through with the trip until the
morning of Monday, 27th, when by reason of cables that had come to
me at Washington [5] I decided to cancel the trip to Minneapolis
and return at once to Washington, where I arrived on Tuesday, 28th
May, at lunchtime.
The above Chicago-Madison-Milwaukee trip was, I believe, quite
useful. I spoke publicly six times and broadcast once-and have
received a great many letters etc. since-besides getting good
press publicity. I also met the leading people in Chicago etc.
under good circumstances.
I saw the President in the early afternoon of Tuesday, 28th May.
[6] He had been away from Washington from Sunday evening until
Monday evening. On Sunday afternoon the 26th, he was completely
absorbed in putting together his nation-wide broadcast and was not
available to anyone. An interview with the President tends to be a
monologue. It is not easy to get an opportunity to express
oneself. You have to hop in while he's pausing for breath. In any
event, on the 28th May he was prepared to speak freely on the
subject on which I had called to talk to him. What he had to say
was unpleasant to hear, but it was definite and to the point. I
did not, at the time, appreciate the significance of what he had
to say about the urgent importance of the preservation of the
British Navy at all costs.
On Wednesday morning (29th) and Thursday morning (30th), I
received long cables from SMB about the European situation. [7] I
discussed the situation with Lothian [8] on each morning-and
sought and had an important talk to Sumner Welles, after seeing
Lothian and the Service Attaches, at noon on Thursday 30th. The
last paragraph of Bruce's cable No. 365 suggested to me the line
that I should take ('self interest').
My talk with Sumner Welles was reported on May 30th, in my cable
No. 106 to Canberra and my No. 29 to London. [9]
It had not been possible, before this, to speak in such terms to
any senior member of the U.S. Administration. Indeed I have been
at a loss to know what attitude to take. They are apparently quite
unmoved (or perhaps it is more correct to say that they steadily
refuse to take any action designed to awaken the American people
to the grim prospects ahead) at the prospect of France and then
Britain being over-run. One can almost hear them say to
themselves-'Well, well, fancy Britain going down-too bad.'
The President is the only person who could set American public
opinion on fire-and he apparently won't do it. His broadcast
speech on Sunday evening (26th May) was flat and full of domestic
politics-and given at a time, in fact at the exact moment, when he
might have given a high lead to the country.
'Self interest' is the only lever-and it was not clear to me (or
to Lothian) until Thursday morning (30th) how to arouse this
motive. I believe the facts to be that America can stand idly by
and see Britain and France battered to death-('Just too bad')-and
not move a finger to help. But when it is suggested that the
British fleet will fight to the last, they cry-'Oh! but that is
illogical-you should send the British fleet over to America. Let
them put up a reasonable sort of a fight if you like-but save the
fleet at all costs-as we need it to save ourselves having to
declare war.'
They realize that it has been the British fleet that has, in
reality, been protecting them all for years, and that if the
British fleet were to disappear, they'd have to set about
defending themselves-which is unthinkable. They might even have to
stand up to the German and Italian fleets-or what would be left of
them. They might even be asked by the South American Republics how
they proposed to see that the Monroe Doctrine was maintained.
What, in fact, might be decided in respect of the British fleet is
another matter.
I impress on everyone in sight that it is essential, in our own
interests, not to show any bitterness. One's mind has to accept
the fact that the reality that has to be faced is American public
opinion. It is moving-even though the speed of movement is, to us,
most irritatingly slow.
I am sure that my telegram No. 107 to Australia (No. 31 to London)
[10] is the path of wisdom. It was put together after long
discussion with Earl Newsom [11] whom I had asked to come to
Washington from New York. He very kindly did so and we had a most
useful talk.
I believe that no one other than Americans can say or do anything
that is going appreciably to speed things up-and an incautious
word (or even what might be interpreted as going an inch too far)
might get wide and devastating publicity.
However, I have gone so far in my recent public talks that
actually very little is left to the imagination.
There are, to my mind, only two Americans who can help-the
President and Sumner Welles.
I have given a lot of thought to what I can usefully say publicly
since I have been in this country. I have consulted selected
Americans who are well disposed and who have political sense.
There is a great deal that I can say-and I have been saying it in
public speeches and in my N.B.C. broadcast. There is, however, a
limit beyond which one must not go. An inch over the limit and one
runs the risk of being 'written down' by some ill-disposed
columnist with a big following. I can ten them the point of view
of Australia about the war, and what we believe is behind the war-
but I must be extremely careful not to lay myself open to the
charge that I am telling the American people publicly what to do
and advocating their active intervention in the war. I have
observed the above rules in my talks to:- National Press Club
(Washington), University Club (New York), Economic Club (New
York), English-Speaking Union (Washington), Overseas Writers
(Washington), International House (Chicago), Women's Press Club
(Washington), American Society International Law (Washington),
English-Speaking Union (Chicago), Daughters of British Empire
(Chicago), English-Speaking Union (Milwaukee) and National
Broadcasting Company broadcast.
As time has gone on, and as events in Europe have become more
serious, the limits to what I can say have progressively advanced.
Even after taking the politics of the situation into account, I
can find no adequate explanation of why the President does not
tell the country the truth. By 'the truth' I mean the following:-
'The security of the Americas-indeed even of North America-
necessitates two fleets. Up to the present this has been achieved
by the American fleet plus the fact that Great Britain has been
historically sympathetic to the Americas being kept free of
European incursions-so that the existence of the British fleet has
in effect provided the necessary additional sea-power to
supplement the U.S. Navy.
In today's situation, France and Britain-and so the British fleet-
is gravely menaced. Apart from the broader issue that democracy
throughout the world is, in consequence, menaced-it means, to the
Americas, that their security, their ability to deny their shores
to invaders from East and West-is also gravely menaced.
So, whether we like it or not, Britain's fight is our fight-and
Time is the factor of real importance. Help given now is worth ten
times the amount given later. It is just possible to save
democracy-and Britain and her fleet-now. It may, before long, not
be possible to do so.'
Why can't the above be said? Would it lose the election? Anyhow,
if it is not said, the war may be lost before the election-and
then what does the election matter?
It may be that the President realizes that, even if they
intervened in the war, they have no fighting services to fight
with-outside the Navy that is virtually stuck in the Pacific.
However, the moral force and prestige of the U.S.A. is great-and
this would influence Italy (or might have done, had it been
exerted in time) and hearten Britain and France. And they could
send a few Divisions, a few dozen destroyers, a fair tonnage of
merchant shipping, a few squadrons of aircraft, and could help
with equipment far faster than they are now doing as neutrals.
If one may give oneself the luxury of a moment's retrospect-to
think of the evil influence of Borah on the history of the world.
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee-and had refused
resolutely ever to go out of the United States. Definitely one of
a small group who will have to bear the grave responsibility for
the lives of millions of men. Just one small instance-if the
neutrality legislation had been amended in June 1939 instead of in
October 1939-is it not possible that the war would not have come
about? possibly yes-or no. Such a move was beaten in the Senate by
one vote. Small-minded, provincial, without any conception of the
issues involved or their implications for the future of mankind-or
even the United States-it looks as if Borah was one of the really
evil influences of the times. He was most important because the
people of the United States believed in him-just as the people of
Britain believed in Baldwin! [12]
[AA: A981, USA 78, v]