Your 365 and 366. [1] I have had no views yet from the United
Kingdom on your memorandum. In meantime Casey [2] has personally
communicated my appeal to the President [3] whose views have been
sent to you and Churchill. [4] We have now received from Casey
record of important talk with Sumner Welles on 30th May. [5] Casey
emphasised our point of view of possibility of French collapse
especially if Italy intervened, then threat to Britain of
overwhelming air and land attack, and grave danger to United
States by elimination or capitulation of British Navy. Casey
stated he firmly believed time when material assistance from
United States would be of use was passing and that declaration by
United States soon would be the only thing that could save the
world.

Welles said logic of situation was that British Fleet ceasing to
exist was against vital interests of the Dominions, that Casey had
painted graver future than he had conceived. Eventually he
accepted as genuine views of Casey and agreed to speak to the
President at once. He said in present trend of public opinion a
week could produce great changes. The reports of Casey confirm the
view that the disposal of British Navy is the consideration which
most profoundly weighs in the minds of the administration.

They have only recently realised Navy has been protecting the
United States and Monroe Doctrine last hundred years. Consequently
we should continue to emphasise the impossible position the United
States would be in if she had to meet ultimately and alone a
combination of German and Italian Fleets supplemented by remnants
of British and French Navies on the one side, and the Japanese
Navy on the other.

Therefore it is suggested that Lothian [6] be asked to put the
views of the United Kingdom Government to the President,
emphasising these pregnant possibilities, and reinforcing the
recent appeal which we understand Churchill made on the question
of supply of aircraft.

I suggest further, that Mackenzie King [7], who is I understand on
very close and friendly terms with Roosevelt, might be asked if he
would be prepared personally to visit the President with view to
advancing vital necessity of early declaration or intervention by
the United States.

You must not treat this cable as an indication that we have a
defeatist point of view, quite the contrary, but we do feel that
if action by America is to be sufficiently early to keep Italy
out, to re-animate the French and to disturb the German civil
population, the very strongest case based on America's fears about
her own position should be developed in the shortest possible
time.