As the occupation by the Germans of the Channel Ports is a
definite possibility [1] it is necessary to consider the position
which would face us in such event.

It will almost certainly be followed by an intensive air offensive
against United Kingdom which while being extremely unpleasant and
possibly tragic will probably only strengthen the determination of
the people. It may however by destruction of factories and general
slowing up of production seriously reduce output of aeroplanes.

As our reply to German air attacks must be prompt retaliation by
sustained air offensive against Germany this most serious.

In fact if necessary supplies of Bombers for this purpose and of
fighters to meet German attacks upon United Kingdom cannot be
maintained it is impossible to forecast what position might
develop here.

The only source from which these supplies can be obtained with
sufficient rapidity is from America and then only by the United
States of America handing over planes already delivered to and
planes coming to hand in the near future for their own Air Force.

In view of the prospect of the Germans at the Channel Ports and
the not inconceivable possibility of a French collapse under
further successful pressure by the Germans it seems to me that the
time has come when the possibilities in their naked hideousness
will have to be put to Roosevelt.

I understand that Prime Minister [2] has been in personal
communication with Roosevelt but I gather to date without
convincing him of the vital necessity of immediate U.S.A.

assistance even to the point of drawing on their own defence
equipment. I suggest that the urgency of the position might be
brought home to him if you and Smuts [3] added your support to the
efforts the Prime Minister is already making. There is no doubt
the young democratic Dominions have an appeal of their own both to
Roosevelt and the American people.

The following are some of the points that would have to be put to
Roosevelt:-

That the French may be militarily defeated.

That in such event our power to resist and eventually defeat the
enemy will depend on the continued exercise of our sea power and
our ability to prevent the air domination of the United Kingdom by
Germany.

Our capacity to do these things is dependent on our having
adequate air strength. Starting with a numerical inferiority that
strength might be so reduced by attrition and interference with
our production and capacity to replace as to render us incapable
of either exercising our sea power successfully or preventing the
air domination of the United Kingdom by Germany.

In such event the possibility of our either (1) having to move the
seat of Government from and ceasing to base the British Fleet on
the United Kingdom or (2) having to come to terms with the Germans
cannot be ignored.

An examination of (1) reveals grave problems with regard to the
British Fleet apart from the difficulties of adequate bases for
maintaining refitting etc. The primary value of the Fleet is to
deny to the enemy vital and necessary supplies by its control of
the seas. With the whole of Europe under German domination the
only vital supplies we could deny her would be food and oil. With
regard to the former a serious blockade would probably mean
starvation not for the Germans but for the unfortunate country she
has invaded. With regard to the latter all her needs could be met
by over-running Iran and Irak an operation notwithstanding the
possibility of opposition by Russia and/or Turkey she would
probably be in a position successfully to undertake. It is
therefore difficult to see how the continuance of the struggle by
the removal of the seat of Government and of the British Fleet
would advantage the United Kingdom. It would preserve the rest of
the Empire but at a hideous cost to the United Kingdom.

On the other hand the prevention of the British Fleet falling in
to German hands is of vital importance to the United States of
America.

It therefore seems to me that the position should be put to
Roosevelt without any toning down of its darker shades and he
should be made to realise that unless assistance is given
immediately with aeroplanes there is grave danger of the position
so developing that the British Government will be compelled to
come to terms with the Germans who would demand as the basis of
any agreement the surrender of the British Fleet and the handing
over of the West Indian Islands.

On the other hand the picture should be drawn of our capacity to
meet all attacks against the United Kingdom, to undermine the
morale of the German people and to inflict such material damage
particularly on oil supplies and oil production plants by
continuous air offensives as to bring about the defeat of the
enemy provided the U.S.A. is prepared to supply the additional
aeroplanes required.

In my view in handling the U.S.A. it will be necessary to make
clear our preparedness while safeguarding the future against
further aggression to face the problems of social and economic
reconstruction in a spirit of liberal and generous co-operation.

The suggestions above as to possible future war developments are
of course not a forecast of what I believe will happen but are
only an appreciation of possibilities which we would be unwise to
ignore. [4]

If any of above thoughts appeal to you I suggest your immediately
communicating with Prime Minister here and Smuts as to
desirability of approach to Roosevelt and whether communications
should be joint or several. [5]

BRUCE