LONDON, 17 April 1940

More southern operation in Norway now well under way and
developing. If successful results would be regarded as most
satisfactory. This was the only information we obtained with
regard to the contemplated move in Norway. As it was felt it was a
military operation it was undesirable to press for further
details.

The Foreign Secretary [1] has seen the Swedish Minister [2] and
found him in a much more robust frame of mind. At the moment the
Swedes appear quite determined to resist any German action. This
information was confirmed in telegrams which have been received
from Mallet [3] and from Gie [4] in Stockholm.

We had some discussion with regard to the Netherlands East Indies
position in the event of Germans going into Holland and I was
given a cablegram from the Prime Minister of Australia which had
just been received [5], sent in response to my telegram of last
night. [6] The suggestion of full consultation with the U.S.A.

Government has been accepted and Lothian [7] has, been instructed
to take the matter up.

We went through a long file of non-distribution cables, all of
which were with regard to the reactions in different countries to
the present position.

From Rome there were somewhat conflicting reports but I still feel
that Mussolini is contemplating a move.

We then had a considerable discussion as to what the Allies'
action should be in the event of a move by Mussolini. This
discussion arose out of cables from Paris indicating that the
French War Cabinet had been considering the position.

I urged the importance of the question and asked whether the
necessary political and military decisions had been taken in
anticipation of such a move.

Eden's [8] reply was that no political decisions had been taken
but that the subject had been the matter of consideration by the
Chiefs of Staff ever since the war started.

I urged that the political decision ought to have been taken
already; ought to have been discussed and agreed with the French
and our Military plans all ought to have been revised and had the
final approval put upon them so that we were ready to act at a
moment's notice.

Eden's argument was that you could not do that until you knew what
the Turkish attitude was going to be and generally how the Balkan
Entente would react to an attack by Italy.

I replied that you could not act until you knew all those things
but there was no possible reason why you could not decide how you
were going to act under any given set of circumstances.

The substance of what I said was that I was not at all satisfied
that our whole machinery for directing the war was working in a
way which would enable prompt decisions to be come to, that what
would happen would be a delay of days before we could get moving.

Eden, as usual, said he would take the matter up but I am quite
sure he will do nothing.

I left the matter by expressing my dissatisfaction of the position
but I am getting so tired of reiterating the same story without
any results that I did not press the matter further.