I shall be glad if you will convey the following message to the
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs [1]-
Reference your Circular Z.41 [2], I desire to offer certain
criticisms and suggestions regarding resolutions of Supreme War
Council. At same time desire to make it clear that while we will
from time to time make criticisms or suggestions on matters which
appear to us to be of great moment, these must not be taken at any
time as exhibiting any weakening in our resolution to stand with
Great Britain to our fullest capacity in relation to any war
policy that may be adopted.

1. FINLAND
I feel reservations about giving any guarantee which it may prove
impossible to honour. Are you satisfied that a further attack on
Finland would not lead to our standing helplessly by whilst small
neutral countries said-'There goes another country which expected
help from Great Britain and France'.

As to Norway and Sweden, my instinctive feeling from this distance
would be to take no step that would throw them into the arms of
Germany. But War Council have no doubt given this factor full
weight. Having regard to events in relation to Finland, I now see
no objection to take steps reasonably designed to deny to German
ships safety in Scandinavian territorial waters.

2. HOLLAND AND BELGIUM
I have no comment to offer.

3. PROPOSED ACTION AGAINST RUSSIAN OIL SUPPLIES IN THE CAUCASUS
Entirely agree that a dear knowledge as to the probable attitude
of Turkey is essential. Would like to go further, however, and say
that it is inconceivable that proposed action would not be
regarded as an act of aggression against Russia leading to war
with Russia. Had it been done at the time of Russia's aggression
against Poland or Finland or other Baltic States, the world would
have held it justified. But those actions having in effect been
condoned, would not this proposed step produce adverse world
reaction? Also point out that while French interests are pre-
eminently European there are vital British interests in Iraq,
Persia, Afghanistan and India, to say nothing of Palestine and
Egypt, all of which may be affected by a Russian war, involving
the lengthening of our front and the very wide dispersion of our
military forces. As this matter affects major British lines of
communication and must have some bearing on Far Eastern position,
I ask that Australian Government should be provided with an
appreciation of the pros and cons of war with Russia so that we
may be able to offer a useful opinion upon a problem which plainly
has a most intimate significance for us. [3] Broadly, feel that it
is one thing to intensify our activity on existing fronts against
an existing enemy but quite another to create new fronts and new
enemies. This does not mean that we are under all circumstances
hostile to war with Russia and, as I have said, if under any
circumstances Great Britain becomes involved in war with Russia we
will support her loyally. But it does mean that on so great a
matter we feel that the fullest consideration of all factors-many
of which are too remotely known to us-should be provided for.

4. CONTRABAND CONTROL IN THE FAR EAST
I cannot understand how we can make a close contraband control
effective in an ocean area in which one country immediately
affected, that is, Japan, has a marked naval superiority. As the
matter appears to me and to my senior colleagues with whom I have
discussed it, this control would tend to be provocative and
ineffective in relation to Japan and the United States of America
and might well turn out to be enforceable only against smaller
countries like the Netherlands East Indies who are our friends.

Having regard to enormous transport problem of taking goods into
Russia along Trans-Siberian line, we are strongly of opinion that
the contraband steps promised are likely to achieve results
incomparably smaller than the risks which they would create.

Perhaps you have some fuller information on these points than has
been communicated to us but, having regard to the fact that in
despatching forces abroad we have increasingly assumed the
neutrality of Japan, there would be considerable uneasiness in
Australia at the adopting of any measures in the Far East which
are calculated to bring us into conflict with Japan. [4]

MENZIES