Many thanks for your letter of the 30th November. [1] I am
extremely obligcd to you for having cabled to Stirling [2] about
the Ambassador's appreciation of the Far Eastern position .[3] You
were quite right in your surmise, in suspecting my hand in the
request for the appreciation which was sent by the Foreign Office.

Times are so strenuous now-a-days that it is impossible to sit
down and write an intelligent and thought-out letter on any
subject. I propose, however, as I have a spare half hour to think
aloud on paper so as to give you some idea of what is in my mind
and what has been going on here.

First-With regard to your giving us the tip about the Ambassador's
telegram-this was particularly useful as probably without your
advising me I would never have seen his most admirable cable. The
reason for this is that over the last few months the position of
our information has deteriorated seriously since the day when you
knew it. The reason for this is that in a moment of misguided
enthusiasm they suddenly came to the conclusion it was desirable
that the Dominion High Commissioners should see something of the
current communications coming in from abroad. The result of this
inspiration was that boxes are solemnly sent round every day to
all the High Commissioners with what are described as 'general
distribution communications', which is another way of saying those
which have nothing of outstanding importance in them. The
necessity for this limited distribution, if it was to be to all
High Commissioners, was obvious, particularly prior to the war
when they went to the High Commissioner for Eire and also until
the change of Government in South Africa. The Ambassador's cable
was not included in the general distribution and had I not got the
tip from you I would probably have missed it.

I am now busily engaged in trying to restore the position whereby
we will keep in touch with everything that is going on. The method
I have adopted is to say that I do not want the boxes sent round
to me, but that I am prepared to rely upon the information that
Stirling obtains, pointing out that Stirling is in the Cabinet
Office, is subject to the discipline that applies there and that
he is a completely discreet and reliable person. By this means I
hope that we shall once more get a sight of everything without
upsetting the arrangement they have made with regard to the other
High Commissioners.

Having disposed of this minor point I might, before I go on to the
main things I want to write to you about, say a word with regard
to our new Legation in Washington. I have been in some difficulty
in writing to you about it owing to the fact that the Prime
Minister [4] was most anxious that I should transfer from London
and become the first Minister. This was the subject of cabled
exchanges between us, running over about a month. The first point
we reached was to decide that important as Washington is, during
the war London must inevitably be the main centre and as
apparently I was regarded as the star turn it would be a mistake
for me to leave. Eventually a compromise was arrived at whereby I
was to go to Washington on a special mission to establish the
Legation but making it quite clear that I was not to be the
Minister myself, but had merely come with the specific object of
inaugurating the new system. This arrangement had not got much
sense in it, but it appealed to the Prime Minister who, for some
reason, was most desirous that I should go to America at all
events for a short period. After I had inaugurated the Legation,
the idea was that you should be left as Charge d'Affaires until
such time as a Minister was nominated. When the Prime Minister and
I had agreed upon this compromise the necessary steps were taken
to give effect to it, namely, by asking the Foreign Office to move
the Ambassador [5] to approach the Administration in Washington.

When this formal approach was made, Anthony Eden [6] became all
het up at my going away, even for a short time, and the Prime
Minister here [7] was brought into the picture and cabled
privately to the Prime Minister in Australia stressing the
necessity of my remaining here and urging that the matter should
be reconsidered. This was agreed to and it was arranged that I
should not go to America but the Legation should be initiated with
a Charge d'Affaires until such time as the Minister was appointed.

The next move was that while Richard [8] was over here the Prime
Minister cabled suggesting that he should go to Washington and
after some exchange of cables this was agreed upon and no doubt by
the time you receive this letter the formal announcement that he
is to be the first Minister will be made, the Legation in the
meantime being established with you as Charge d'Affaires. I am
frankly somewhat amazed at this decision as the number of Cabinet
Ministers of first class calibre in Australia is very limited and
our Richard is certainly the outstanding member of the Government,
apart from the Prime Minister. With so few useful colleagues to
rely upon, nothing on earth would have induced me to part with
Richard if I had been in the Prime Minister's place. That,
however, is his business and not mine. I am quite sure that
Richard will be extraordinarily good and do the maximum that it is
possible for any Australian to do in Washington.

With Richard's arrival the question of your future will have to be
considered and I had a long talk to Richard on the subject while
he was here. While I think he should keep you for a certain time,
until he picks up the ropes, I think after a few months it would
be desirable you should be moved on to new activities as you have
had a long time in Washington now and have gained invaluable
experience.

I personally feel you could be better utilised than off-siding to
Richard indefinitely. This, however, is another matter which is
not my business.

With regard to the appreciation the Ambassador was asked to send
of the Far Eastern position, the circumstances behind this request
are as follows.

For some months now I have been very concerned that the United
Kingdom Government had not got a sufficiently constructive policy
with regard to the Far East; were not being sufficiently
forthcoming, and, if you like, indiscreet in their relations with
the United States Administration on this question; were concerning
themselves too much with minor questions and were running the
serious risk of getting off-side with the American Government with
resulting suggestions that once more the United Kingdom had let
America down. I kept on harassing Halifax [9] on this matter and
eventually when challenged as to what I suggested was the proper
policy to pursue sent the enclosed memorandum in September [10],
making it clear that all it purported to be was a few rough ideas
I had in my mind which I would like to discuss with them. From
this nothing resulted as you, with your knowledge of Foreign
Office methods, will realise was what was to be expected.

With the outbreak of the war I became increasingly apprehensive of
the position in the Far East, particularly when I saw the
difficulty we were having at sea in coping with the Germans,
notwithstanding the fact that our anticipations had been that when
war came we would have to deal with three opponents, namely,
Germany, Italy and Japan, instead of one.

An opportunity occurred to give voice to these anxieties during
Richard's visit here when the question of the despatch of an
Australian Expeditionary Force was under consideration. The
Australian Government made it clear that before it could agree to
the despatch of any forces from Australia it desired to be
reassured as to the probable attitude of Japan in the future and
to be informed of the steps of a naval character the United
Kingdom would contemplate taking should hostilities break out in
the Far East. As a result of this attitude of the Australian
Government the Foreign Office prepared an appreciation of the Far
Eastern situation [11] and my Lords of the Admiralty prepared an
appreciation of the naval situation. [12] Both documents were
obviously framed in order to reassure Australia and make certain
that the Expeditionary Force should be despatched at an early
date. In this objective they were successful as you will have seen
that the Commonwealth Government has now announced that the first
Division of the Expeditionary Force will embark in the near
future.

My own impression of both documents was that they drew a somewhat
over-optimistic picture. The Foreign Office appreciation stressed
the fundamental divergence in the aims and interests of the Soviet
and Japan which is perfectly accurate, and drew the comforting
conclusion that there was little likelihood of an understanding
between them, of which I am by no means sure. This document had
rather bad luck, because it had scarcely been presented to us when
the Press began to ring with the possibility of a Soviet-Japanese
understanding and a cable was received from Craigie giving a joint
appreciation of the position by himself and his French and Polish
colleagues which indicated that the possibility of an
understanding was a very real one. [13]

Close on the heels of Craigie's communication came the cable from
Lothian of the 23rd November. This is a most encouraging document
and is the best contribution I have seen from Washington up to
date. What I liked about it was that it made it perfectly clear
that the Ambassador is going to see to it that no misunderstanding
is allowed to arise between the U.S.A. and ourselves. That it
shows a greater measure of frankness than has been customary and
that it puts forward a definite and constructive policy but makes
it clear that if the U.S.A. is not prepared to accept such a
policy we are prepared to concert an alternative policy with them,
but makes it clear to the Americans that if, resulting out of that
alternative policy, trouble should arise, the U.S.A. would have an
obligation in face of the position which would have to be met.

Using Lothian's cable as a lever, I induced Richard to come with
me to see Halifax and we had a long talk to him with regard to the
Far East position. [14] Broadly what we put to him was that the
Far East is Australia's main preoccupation but that it was
impossible to separate the Far East from the European situation
because the seriousness and even the probability of any
development in the Far East would to a great extent, if not
entirely, be governed by how events moved in the European area.

We then drew a harrowing picture of what might occur in Europe,
somewhat down the following lines.

Assuming, contrary to the general Foreign Office view, that
relations between Germany and the Soviet are not becoming
strained, the possibility of a move by the Soviet against Finland
had to be visualised as a first step in a German-Soviet domination
of the Scandinavian countries, the Soviet having Sweden and Norway
as its sphere of influence, and Germany [having] Denmark as its
sphere. That having completed their programme in the Baltic and
Scandinavian countries there might then be a German-Soviet move in
the Balkans and the Near East. Simultaneously the Soviet might
start something in the Middle East.

The point we made was that should all these unpleasant
possibilities eventuate and even excluding further unpleasant
possibilities, such as Italy being drawn in on the German-Soviet
side out of sheer fear, or Turkey for the same reason refusing, or
with all the will in the world being unable to do anything
effective, France and Britain would find their hands so full that
they would certainly be unable to take on another adventure in the
Far East.

We therefore put it that it was essential to take any steps
humanly possible to prevent an understanding being arrived at
between the Russians and the Japanese, particularly in view of the
fact that if such an arrangement was arrived at the Germans would
probably be in the picture and you would have something in the
nature of a German-Soviet-Japanese rapprochement, which however
loose it might be would constitute a very serious danger.

We stressed that this danger would become increasingly serious in
so far as Britain and France were in trouble in Europe and it was
difficult to see how they would not be in very serious trouble if
the horrible possibilities we had visualised, and which I have
indicated above, had eventuated.

The conclusion we drew was that it was essential that the line
which Lothian had suggested in his cable, namely the fullest
exploration with the U.S.A. as to the possibilities of bringing
about a settlement of the Sino-Japanese trouble and if the
conclusion were that action in this direction was impossible, then
the fullest discussion as to the alternative line which should be
followed in the course of which Lothian could follow up the
admirable line he has already taken of bringing home to the
Americans their responsibilities in the event of trouble resulting
[sic].

Halifax's reaction was that he appreciated our great interest in
the Far East but that he thought we had rather exaggerated the
dangers at both ends of the world. With regard to Europe he
pointed to the obvious objection of Germany to a Soviet domination
of Sweden, particularly in view of the fact that Germany has to
draw her vital supplies of iron ore from that country. He also
pointed out that in the Danubian basin and the Near East there
were irreconcilable divergences of interests between the Soviet
and Germany, as, for example, the control of the mouth of the
Danube and Constantinople. With regard to the Far East he stressed
all the points in regard to the fundamental differences in aims
between the Japanese and the Russians and broadly his reply to us
was that while the United Kingdom policy was to try to get an
understanding with the Japanese, and he instanced what had been
done in connection with Tientsin and the Silver question, he did
not feel that the position was quite as serious as I had been
picturing it.

He then came to the question of our relations with the United
States in connection with the Far East and outlined what had been
taking place, but stressed that we must move with a certain amount
of circumspection in order to avoid arousing American suspicions
that we were going back on Chiang-kai-Shek [15] as it would have a
most deplorable effect if they got that idea in their minds. To
this I replied that I appreciated that fact, but I felt very
strongly that one of the main reasons that tended to make the
Americans suspicious of us was that we were always apprehensive of
being completely frank with them and putting all our cards on the
table. As exemplifying this point I put it to him that it was not
sufficient to talk to the Americans about the Far East and the
problems that were likely to arise there. What I felt we had to do
was to put the whole world position to the Americans as we saw it.

If we were to do this it would mean painting the whole picture
that I had been putting to him as to the possibilities of the
close association between Germany and Russia as the two aggressive
Powers, showing their possible line in Scandinavia, which
incidentally should have a greater appeal to the Americans with
their large Scandinavian population, indicating the possible
developments in the Balkans and Near East that might follow the
Scandinavian adventure, the possible developments in the Middle
East and frankly put it to the American[s] that an understanding
between the Russians and Japanese with the blessing of Germany
would be adding something that would be beyond the powers of
Britain and France to cope with.

With this background I suggested it was quite possible for us to
say without any fear of being misunderstood that we wanted to
discuss the Far Eastern position with the Americans with the
utmost frankness. I said that I felt that in this atmosphere there
could be no misunderstanding and it would have the advantage of
bringing the Americans hard up against the fact of how vital it is
for them to face up with us to the possibilities of the future if
they want, not only to keep out of the war, but also to avoid
finding themselves in the future the only defenders of
civilisation against a triumphant combination of aggressive
Powers.

While Halifax, who is a most charming person, listened to all this
with exemplary patience, I am sure in his heart he feels that my
views are extreme and my methods far too dashing. Notwithstanding
this fact I have continued to press him because while I feel that
my unpleasant forebodings may never be realised, we will be
incredibly foolish if we refuse to recognise that they are
possible and to visualise our line of action to meet the
circumstances that would arise in the event of their unhappily
becoming true.

With regard to Scandinavia, I have suggested that the German
objection to a Russian domination of Sweden might be overcome by a
joint attack after Finland has been overcome, the Russians coming
in from the north and the Germans from the south, with an
arrangement for partition of spheres of influence which would
safeguard the Germans in regard to their supplies of iron ore.

With regard to the divergence of interests in the Danubian Basin
and the Near East, I have admitted the difficulties of an
arrangement but have suggested that this does not appear to me a
more insoluble problem than the bringing about of the original
agreement between the Soviet and Germany in August last.

I am glad to say this pressure has had some effect, as in the last
few days the War Cabinet has asked for an appreciation from the
Foreign Office of the possible developments in Scandinavia, and as
soon as it has been received and considered by the War Cabinet it
will go on to the Chiefs of Staff.

With the recognition that is now gradually coming that there may
be serious developments in Scandinavia, the necessity of a real
understanding with the Americans about the Far East becomes
increasingly imperative. The line which the Ambassador in
Washington is following is, to my mind, admirable and will get us
somewhere if he receives proper backing from this end.

Incidentally I have only in the last few days seen the reply to
him from the Foreign Office of the 30th November and his cables
871, 872 and 883. [16]

In a conversation with Halifax this week, he referred to them and
was amazed when I told him I had not seen them. The fact that I
had not was, of course, due to the unfortunate system which has
grown up, to which I have referred above. He immediately had them
made available to me and as a result of this episode I think we
shall get back to our old position, and this view is strengthened
by the fact that Hankey [17] to whom I spoke about the matter is
doing everything in his power to help. From what I have written
above you will grasp how cordially I would agree with the line the
Ambassador has been taking.

The somewhat reassuring views as to the probable developments in
the Far East that both Sumner Welles [18] and Hornbeck [19] put
forward are, I think, discounted by the fact that they are
obviously based upon the war going satisfactorily in the European
theatre. What we are concerned with, however, is the position in
the event of the war not going too satisfactorily, and our finding
our hands very full as they certainly will be if any of the
horrible suggestions I have put earlier materialise. In that event
I do not think either of them would be so comforting as to the
improbability of a Japanese adventure and Hornbeck practically
says this in his conversation with the Ambassador recorded in
cable 883. [20] This is a reason why it is essential that the
background to the Ambassador's conversations should be a realistic
appreciation of the possibilities of adverse developments in the
European theatre. The point we have to keep constantly in mind is
the one brought out by the Ambassador that the Japanese cannot
remain indefinitely in a state of war with China, and a state of
strained relations with the Soviet and the Democracies.

What I have dictated is, I am afraid, long, rambling and somewhat
incoherent. It may, however, convey something of what is in my
mind to you.

The other matter which is giving me a lot of thought is what is
going to happen if and when we have got rid of this infernal war.

I will try and take an opportunity of sending you something on
this subject later.

S.M. BRUCE