Reference telegram from High Commissioner Wellington No. 452 of
the 23rd November. [1]

I saw Prime Minister [2] yesterday afternoon before receipt of the
telegram under reference and he informed me that he had heard from
Casey in London a day or two before that the New Zealand
Government had notified United Kingdom Government of their
intention to despatch a force overseas at an early date . [3] New
Zealand Government and Commonwealth Government have hitherto kept
closely in touch as to their respective defence measures; but no
intimation of this decision had been received direct from New
Zealand Government. Commonwealth Government at once telegraphed
New Zealand Government [4] and were informed that the reason why
New Zealand Government had not informed Commonwealth Government of
their decision was that they had anticipated that you would do so,
and that the reason underlying the decision to despatch force
overseas was that training facilities in New Zealand were such
that training of the second brigade could not be begun until the
first had been got rid of. [5]

No decision had yet been reached, the Prime Minister said, as to
despatch overseas of so called sixth division now under training
in Australia, but Casey was now urging now [sic] [6] in view of
New Zealand decision, arrangements for very early despatch
overseas of Australian force should be put in hand at once.

Reasons why no decision had yet been reached were:-

(1) It was not obvious that there was at present any need for
further man power on the Western Front and it was thought better
therefore to carry on training as far as possible in Australia.

(2) Labour Party were definitely opposed to despatch of any force
overseas. If and when activity on the Western Front flares up, and
there was visible need for men, this opposition would disappear
and the force would be despatched by unanimous consent. It seemed
undesirable to force Labour into strong opposition unless there
was real necessity.

(3) The utmost difficulty had been experienced in obtaining
shipping for wheat and for concentrates. In the opinion of the
Commonwealth Government, it was, in the present stage of the war,
more important to ship commodities than to ship men, and they
would be reluctant to see shipping, already so difficult to
obtain, diverted to the needs of expeditionary forces which was at
present unnecessary.

(4) If Germany invaded and conquered Holland this would leave the
Dutch East Indies masterless and they might prove too tempting a
bait for Japan.

(5) He and his colleagues understood that success of air training
scheme was infinitely more important than despatch of one or two
divisions overseas. So long as it was understood in Australia that
air trainees would definitely proceed overseas while destination
of sixth division was uncertain, recruits would be attracted to
the Air Force rather than to the Army. As soon, however, as it was
known that sixth division was proceeding overseas at an early date
there would be a clamour for establishment of further divisions
for overseas and the majority of possible recruits would prefer
the Army to the Air Force. As it was he anticipated considerable
difficulty in enlisting Australia's full quota for Canadian
scheme.

In these circumstances, the Prime Minister said, New Zealand
Government's decision, which he felt must have been taken without
very full consideration of the relevant circumstances, was
embarrassing to the Commonwealth Government and he was about to
telegraph Savage urging that no public announcement should be made
without further consultation between the two Governments.

Soon after I left the Prime Minister Daventry announcement was
received here. [7] As soon as the telegram under reference had
been deciphered about 10 p.m. last night I saw the Prime Minister
again. He said that Daventry announcement had been received while
his telegram to New Zealand was being despatched and that the
latter had then of course been cancelled. Commonwealth Government
were now placed in a position of very considerable embarrassment.

There was rivalry in patriotism between New Zealand and Australia
which, while perhaps foolish, had to be taken into account.

Announcement of New Zealand's decision would give rise to demand
in Australia, which he did not think could be resisted, to send
force overseas at least as soon as New Zealand, but even if the
Government yielded to this demand, as he anticipated they would,
it would still be incontestable that their hands had been forced
and that they were merely following New Zealand's lead. Labour
Party would be thrown into strong opposition, which was
particularly undesirable at the moment, and other considerations
against sending a force, enumerated above, would have to be
disregarded. Decisions of such importance ought, he said, if
possible to be reached in consultation between the two Governments
and announced simultaneously. He was obviously highly incensed at
the New Zealand Government.

The Prime Minister ended by saying that he did not feel that there
was anything that could usefully be done in the matter, but he
wanted you to know the background.

Incidentally with regard to the suggestion in the telegram under
reference that Mr Savage's [8] message to Mr Chamberlain [9] was
based on considerations suggested by Mr Menzies, I gather that the
latter's telegram to Mr Savage was confined to considerations
enumerated above and did not refer to sea dangers.

Cabinet will consider the question on Monday and will almost
certainly decide to send sixth division overseas as soon as
shipping available. [10]