In continuation of my C.4 of 5th November [1] and reference first
paragraph of your Secret and Personal of 21st November. [2]

The latest appreciation by French and British General Staff now
anticipates that the Germans will be able to put a total of 160-
170 Divisions fully equipped into the field in all theatres by the
Spring.

Total Allied forces likely to be available on Western Front in
France by next Spring-French 70-85 Divisions, depending upon
Italian situation, and British 10.

Apart from any Dominion contributions, do not expect to be able to
train and equip more than the abovementioned 10 Divisions by
Spring.

The French Government and General Gamelin [3] are constantly
pressing the British Government and War Office to accelerate their
programme both in regard to additional troops and production of
munitions. Have seen number of letters from both Daladier [4] and
Gamelin to British Government in which this is being most strongly
urged.

They represent that one Frenchman in every eight has been
mobilised in Services and, in consequence of the drain on their
man power, industrial and munitions output is falling and that
this can only be rectified by withdrawing older men and tradesmen
from the Army. This they dare not do for fear of jeopardising the
security of France in the Spring, when it is anticipated that
German attacks on a grand scale are likely to be launched. They
point out that British have only one in 40 called up. This latter
figure is an understatement, but it is near enough for purposes of
argument although it ignores the vast aircraft and munitions
effort in Britain.

The French Government are also anxious about the effect of
continued German propaganda which is concentrated upon driving a
wedge between the Allies. There is a continuous stream of
broadcasts now being aimed at the French people and dropping of
propaganda pamphlets. These depict Britain leaving France in the
lurch and being half-hearted about conducting the war. Recent
German broadcasts have repeatedly stated that the Australian
Government is mostly concerned with possible Japanese activities
and also with selling their wool and wheat and that Australian
troops will not be sent overseas. This constantly repeated
propaganda is not without its effect and the French are beginning
to be concerned. The British and French Governments feel that the
most effective reply will be to see the British forces in France
increasing and Dominions forces arriving from overseas.

The summaries comprising My C.25 and 26 [5] are summaries of
British Government documents which have been approved by War
Cabinet. At my request naval appreciation (see C.26) has been
reconsidered in relation to Netherlands East Indies and following
is text of additional relevant paragraph approved by War Cabinet.

(Begins) Hitherto this Note has dealt only with the gravest issues
of a major attack upon Singapore or a serious invasion of
Australia or New Zealand. However, the question has been raised of
an encroachment by Japan upon Dutch colonies in East Indies,
probably arising out of a German invasion of the Netherlands, in
which event it might be assumed that we should be involved in a
state of war with Japan. It seems very unlikely that U.S.A. would
impassively watch the acquisition by Japan of naval bases in the
west and south-west of the Philippines. Such an act of Japanese
aggression would seriously compromise the whole American position
in the Pacific; and it cannot be doubted that Japan would weigh
this consideration with the utmost care before committing herself,
having regard especially to the fact that she is already deeply
entangled in China. The contingency must, therefore, be regarded
as highly improbable, unless of course Great Britain and France
are getting the worst of it, when many evils will descend upon us
all.

However, should Japanese encroachment begin, or should Great
Britain pass into a state of war with Japan, the Admiralty would
make such dispositions as would enable them to offer timely
resistance either to a serious attack upon Singapore or to the
invasion of Australia and New Zealand. These dispositions would
not necessarily take the form of stationing a fleet at Singapore
but would be of a character to enable the necessary concentrations
to be made eastward in ample time to prevent a disaster. With our
present limited forces we cannot afford to have any important
portion of His Majesty's Fleet idle. All ships must play their
part from day to day, and there are always the hazards of war to
be faced, but the Admiralty can be trusted to make appropriate
dispositions to meet events as they emerge from imagination into
reality. (Ends.) [6]

My own summing up of position in the light of what I have said in
C.4 and in this telegram and based on many discussions is as
follows: I believe the greatest menace to Australia is the
possibility of Britain being beaten in Europe. As long as Britain
and France are not getting the worst of it in Europe, the British
Government do not think there is any appreciable danger of Japan
adventuring against British or (French) [7] possessions in the
East. I think the British Government's statements regarding
ensuring safety of Australia and of Singapore are satisfactory.

Weighing all the factors it appears to me that the wisest
conclusion in our own and general British interests is to send
special division abroad at the earliest.

CASEY