Your telegram No. 191 of the 11th September. [1] Please inform
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth as follows [2]:-

1. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are grateful for
the Prime Minister's message, which seems to them to set out very
clearly the principal factors which must be taken into account in
considering how the Far Eastern situation is likely to develop.

2. Question of what action should be taken on the Japanese
Government's 'friendly advice' to withdraw our garrison and ships
is under urgent consideration with the French and United States
Governments, and until agreement is reached with them, it is
impossible to say definitely what is likely to be the immediate
future of Anglo-Japanese relations. The issue depends on the
extent to which we and the French can rely on United States
support in countering Japanese irritation if we disregard their
advice. As soon as consultation with France and the United States
is complete, we shall telegraph further. Meanwhile following are
interim replies to the Prime Minister's questions.

3. Our reasons for believing that Japan will remain neutral for a
time are that this would seem most likely to serve her immediate
ends. It would improve her chances of an early Chinese settlement.

She has had more than two years of war in China and five months of
by no means inconsiderable hostilities on the Mongolian frontier.

She has been disconcerted by the German-Soviet agreement and is
uncertain of the attitude of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. and
conscious of the value of the British and French Empires as
markets. It seems unlikely that Japan would lightly engage in
actual hostilities with either, unless and until she feels
reasonably sure that their preoccupations elsewhere are such as to
ensure their inability to resist Japanese attack. Japan may, in
fine, be expected to play, as the Prime Minister says, a purely
selfish game and is likely to enter into no agreement now either
with us or the enemies which she would regard as binding on her
for longer than she thought it would pay her.

4. We should have made it clear in telegram No. 191 of the 8th
September [3] that the possibility of Japanese hostility is not
excluded, and that the suggestions in that telegram were framed to
meet the present situation. These suggestions would, we feel, tend
to increase Australian readiness to meet any contingency, i.e.

both Japanese hostility and neutrality. We appreciate that whether
or not it will be possible for Australia to despatch oversea land
and air forces to assist in the general war effort of the British
Empire must be decided by the Commonwealth Government in the light
of the conditions at the time when these forces are ready.

5. Admiralty would not propose in the first instance to employ the
second cruiser and five destroyers (see para. 4 of telegram No.

191) west of Suez, and it is realised that the availability of
naval and air force personnel from Australia and technicians of
all three services must of course depend on the extent to which
these could otherwise be usefully employed in the Australian
forces.