In my view, and this I have stressed to all members of the War
Cabinet I have been able to see today, the most urgent question
for consideration is attitude and method of stating our position
in the event of the situation developing down the lines of Ciano's
statement (see Dominions Office telegram No 331, paragraph 7,
mediation [1]) which in my opinion is what will happen. I have
stated that, in the event of decision being to stand fast and for
the French and British to refuse any suggestions of mediation,
negotiation or compromise, I have no doubt Australia would support
such action. I made it clear, however, that before such a decision
was taken and we were asked to support it we would expect that all
that such a decision involved would have been exhaustively
examined and that the United Kingdom Government would have
satisfied itself that the circumstances which would arise could be
met.

In order to clarify the issues involved, I have submitted the
following questionnaire.

In view of the possibility of early defeat of Poland following
points have to be considered:

(1) Is it contemplated that any steps can be taken which would
force the Germans to retain in the East forces beyond those
necessary to contain Poland and to ensure the neutrality of
Rumania?
(2) Is an early success by the Germans in Poland likely to
influence the Turks to refrain from completing agreements with the
United Kingdom and 'France and to adopt an attitude of strict
neutrality?
(3) Will an early success by Germany against Poland determine
Mussolini to come down on the side of those leaders in Italy who
desire that Italy should come into the war taking the German side?
(4) How far can the Spaniards' neutrality be relied on,
particularly in view of the Ambassador at Rome's communication of
8th September, see Stirling's cable? [2]

(5) How serious is the danger of Japan's attempting to fish in
troubled waters and how far would such a danger be offset by the
fact that a move by Japan might lead to United States
intervention?
(6) In view of the apparent probability that Germany will suffer a
relatively small diminution in her man-power and equipment as the
result of the Polish campaign, how many divisions is it
contemplated that she could transfer to the Western Front?
(7) Is it considered that the Maginot Line is impregnable,
irrespective of number of German divisions available and the
lessons the Polish campaign has taught us as to the power of a
strong air force against ground troops and communications in
interfering with reinforcements and supplies?
(8) Assuming the Maginot Line on the German and French border is
impregnable, is it considered probable that the Germans will
attempt an attack through the Netherlands and/or Belgium?
(9) Assuming an attack through the Netherlands and/or Belgium, how
long is it estimated [it] would take the Germans to transfer the
necessary number of additional divisions from the Eastern to the
Western Front?
(10) After such attack develops, how much resistance is it
estimated could be offered to it by the Netherlands opening the
dykes and flooding the country and by armed resistance and Belgium
by armed resistance?
(11) How far is it contemplated that Anglo-French assistance could
be given in relatively open warfare that would take place in
Belgium?
(12) Is immediate and extensive action being taken to strengthen
the Maginot Line between France and Belgium from the Ardennes to
the Coast?
(13) Is it estimated that serious operations between Germany and
the Anglo-French forces would develop before the winter? If so,
have the French and British sufficient divisions plus the
necessary co-operation available to hold the Germans?
(14) How far would the British forces be sufficient to take such a
reasonable proportion of the line of resistance to active German
attack as to avoid dissatisfaction on the part of the French as to
the share of the burden they were carrying?
(15) At what pace is it estimated that British divisions can be
equipped to reinforce Anglo-French forces in France?
(16) With Italy in, would it be contemplated that any attack would
be developed by the French on the French-Italian border?
(17) Conversely is it contemplated that any German-Italian attack
would be developed against France?
(18) How far would the necessity of reinforcing Egypt reduce the
number of troops available for France?
(19) To what extent would our power to wage economic warfare be
diminished by dominating position the Germans will hold in the
East enabling them to exercise irresistible pressure on the
Danubian countries including unrestricted river transport of
supplies?
My own impression is that an examination of all the above points
plus such others as emerge will be to show an extremely serious
and difficult position, but one the United Kingdom and France can
and must face with recognition that it means being prepared for a
protracted war and that decision will be to stand fast and refuse
to entertain any suggestion of mediation or negotiation.

In the event of such a decision, a statement making the position
of the United Kingdom clear beyond the possibility of any
misunderstanding will probably be made if time permits before any
suggestion of mediation or negotiation is made.

At the same time statement of our war aims will also probably be
made down lines which would appeal to public opinion in neutral
countries particularly the United States.

BRUCE