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156 Mr R.G. Menzies, Prime Minister, to Mr N. Chamberlain, U.K. Prime Minister

Cablegram unnumbered 27 August 1939,

I have carefully considered Hitler's proposals [1] and make the
following comments for your consideration:-

Having regard to past experience proposals should be approached
with great suspicion.

In particular we should do nothing which would lead Poland to
think that we were deserting her as this would not only be a
breach of guarantee but disastrous in South East Europe.

Hitler should therefore be clearly told that we will not modify
our Polish obligations.

Subject to the foregoing I would make it clear to Hitler that we
regarded merits of Danzig and the Corridor as quite open to
argument and that we would use our influence with Poland to
procure some form of arbitration or adjustment so long as Germany
was prepared to play her part; that we felt the time was opportune
for a general European settlement which would recognise Germany's
obligations to Italy and ours to France and that we welcome his
reference to possible future limitation of armament because we
felt that the present state of affairs must lead to serious
economic breakdown in which Germany would suffer as much as any
country.

I would emphasise that there was amongst all British people a
genuine desire for good relations with Germany but that this
desire was not inconsistent with the determination to fight her in
what seemed a just cause but that it would be a tragedy if we
should fight each believing his cause to be just when unprejudiced
discussion and desire to understand other man's point of view
might have avoided it. From this point of view a clear statement
by Hitler of his aims and desires should if possible be obtained.

Throughout I would not dismiss Hitler's proposals because they are
vague and sometimes meaningless.

I think it essential that our approach should be liberal and
generous so long as the generosity is at our own expense.

What I have in mind is that we must not connive at a Polish
settlement which would leave Poland at such disadvantage in future
negotiations as to render it probable that her future history will
resemble that of Czechoslovakia.

While suspicion in our own minds is inevitable and proper I
consider endeavour should be made to make Hitler realise that we
are taking him seriously and that we are prepared to treat his
approach as genuine. Having regard to type of man Hitler is this
seems essential.

You personally went to Germany to prevent war last September.

Would like to suggest you invite Hitler to London or to some
neutral meeting place and that it be put to him that acceptance of
such invitation would have following advantages-
(a) it would tend to break down psychological barriers now being
rapidly built up between British and Germans.

(b) it would be most effective way in which Hitler could
demonstrate reality of his own peaceful desires.

(c) it would so reduce European temperature as to render recovery
more probable.

In reading the cables I have been much struck by what appears to
be a real advance in Hitler's last statement to Henderson [2] over
what he said in his letter to you two days before.

My comments above. are made with necessarily limited detailed
knowledge of the background and circumstances. Whatever your
decision is you may rely upon our loyal co-operation and support
and our appreciation of your great efforts. [3]

1 See Document 153.

2 Sir Nevile Henderson, U.K. Ambassador to Germany.

3 Menzies informed S. M. Bruce, High Commissioner in London, of
this cablegram in an unnumbered cablegram of 27 August 1939 (on
file AA: A1608, A41/1/1, iv).


[AA: A981, AUSTRALIA 39, i]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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