1 Enclosure to this Document.

2 Ray Atherton.

3 Dr Quo Tai-chi.

4 U.K. Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Enclosure

Mr. A. Eden, U.K. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Mr J.

L. Dodds, Counsellor, U.K. Embassy, Japan

Dispatch 302 (COPY) LONDON, 19 June 1937

With reference to my despatch No. 285 of the 7th June [1] I have
to inform you that the Counsellor of the United States Embassy [2]
called to see Sir Alexander Cadogan [3] at the Foreign Office on
the 16th June to question him about the proposal for a Pacific
Pact. He asked particularly whether there had been any resolution
of the Imperial Conference on the subject.

2. Sir Alexander Cadogan said that there had been no resolution,
but that a discussion of the proposal put forward by the Prime
Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia [4] showed that all the
delegations considered it to be a desirable (though perhaps a
rather remote) objective. The matter had been studied in more
detail by a committee of experts, who had submitted that a Pact
might take several forms and who had felt it their duty to draw
attention to some of the difficulties involved. The experts'
report had come before the Conference, who had recognised that the
negotiation of a Pact was a matter which could not be rushed. It
had been agreed that His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom should sound the various Governments on the subject. Japan
would evidently present the most serious difficulty and it was
therefore important to ascertain what her attitude was likely to
be. It was recognised that negotiations for a Pact should not be
allowed to cut across the impending Anglo-Japanese exchange of
views. [5] One of the principal difficulties in the way of the
Pact would be the question of Manchukuo and North China and it was
felt that negotiations would probably have to wait upon a Sino-
Japanese detente and very likely also upon a settlement in regard
at least to North China. This latter aim might be facilitated by
successful negotiations for an Anglo-Japanese understanding, and
it was therefore agreed that His Majesty's Government would have
to see how these latter negotiations progressed and choose the
moment for sounding the Japanese Government on the larger
objective.

3. Before taking that action, it would be useful to know the
wishes of the United States Government (concerning which Mr
Atherton had no information).

Sir Alexander Cadogan told Mr Atherton that he understood the
Chinese Government would take no interest in a Pact confined to
insular possessions, and it would consequently have to apply to
the mainland with all the difficulties that that would imply in
connexion with Manchukuo and the risk of being drawn into Sino-
Japanese quarrels. Further, there seemed to be a general
impression that there should be some provision for consultation.

It would therefore be very interesting to His Majesty's Government
to have the views of the United States Government in the light of
these two considerations.

4. Mr Atherton said that he was going to the United States in a
month's time and would discuss the matter in Washington.

5. He expressed himself as being personally doubtful as to the
wisdom or the feasibility of the idea. He thought that the
Japanese Government had recently felt their isolation rather
acutely, and he feared it might be a mistake when they were
showing some signs of a chastened mood to make advances to them
before convincing evidence had been forthcoming from their actions
that there was a real change of heart in Japan. He emphasised,
however, that this was only his personal view and promised to try
to get the considered opinion of his Government.

C. W. ORDE
(For the Secretary of State)

[AA : A981, PACIFIC 23]

1 Not printed.

2 Ray Atherton.

3 Deputy Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

4 J. A. Lyons.

5 On 24 June 1937 it was announced that Shigeru Yoshida, Japanese
Ambassador to the U.K., had received instructions to begin
discussions with the U.K. Government on the issues of China and
Anglo-Japanese trade relations. No definite date was fixed,
however, before fighting broke out in China on 7 July, and the
conversations were postponed sine die.