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52 Mr Longfield Lloyd, Trade Commissioner in Japan, to Lt Col W. R. Hodgson, Secretary of Department of External Affairs

Memorandum 395 TOKYO, 14 June 1937



I have regularly forwarded by each mail, without comment, a series
of local Press cuttings setting forth or otherwise discussing, a
proposal purporting to have been made, in. London, by the Right
Honourable J. A. Lyons, C.H., P.C., M.P., Prime Minister of the
Commonwealth of Australia.

These cuttings showed something of the reaction in Japan so far as
it could be noted from the Press in these early stages; but as
Japan does not usually react with certainty at an outset, it is
yet too early to make any definite report in that respect.

I take opportunity however to send this Memorandum to cover one or
two additional items, including note of an informal approach made
to me by an American official in Japan.

This official, a member of the United States Embassy in Tokyo [1],
who is known to me, called in order to enquire what reactions I
had heard or experienced since the first publication of this
matter. I replied that no person, Japanese or otherwise had up to
then said anything to me about it, which was really the case at
the time, though I have since heard of some reactions which I
later mention.

My American visitor after some few preliminary hypotheses based
upon the Press articles and having heard from me that I had no
other source of information myself, discussed a view which seems
to have been the general one arrived at from the local Press
announcements. That is, he imagined (and presumably his Embassy
generally) that Mr Lyons, doubtless with the knowledge even
encouragement of the United Kingdom Government and possibly also
of the United States Government, propounded a plan which could be
regarded as a pleasant gesture to Japan who stood to benefit by it
to a marked extent in that it could give pause to armament and
presumably simultaneously facilitate acquisition by a Pacific
'have not'-by approved friendly means-of certain materials fairly
essential to the point of general well-being.

My caller seemed to consider that the Japanese showed too untoward
a hesitancy-engendered though it be by the traditional suspicion
of all foreign proposals-and were unwise not to make some show of
jumping at the chance, thus demonstrating in a spontaneous way an
alignment with the peaceful objective (which they always aver
themselves) by which such proposals would have been inspired.

He seemed to feel too-a possible conclusion in the Pacific
situation of the day-that Japanese failure to join in with Powers
which could, in the ultimate, control the situation, could imply
Japanese reluctance to modify the much heralded present expansion
programme (e.g. 'Southward Expansion Movement'); a programme which
if pursued could well result in British and United States
increased preponderancy of establishment in the Pacific with a
consequent check to any untoward phases of the said 'Southward'

That is the 'appreciation of the situation' by the observer on the
spot and is nothing new of itself However I think that I should
confidentially mention the foregoing for although some of the
Press reports imply that the United States Government is dubious
about the Prime Minister's reported proposal (and that even
Whitehall affects doubt) it is one which has obviously interested
U.S. Representatives in the Orient and they may tend to judge the
sincerity or otherwise of Japan's oft-repeated but not
particularly well and/or tactfully demonstrated desire for peace,
by the ultimate measure of her reaction to a proposal which
whether correctly reported or otherwise, is a formula, and one
which does not have any appearance of other than material
consideration for Japan.

Japanese officials themselves are very reticent about the matter;

and the inherent nervousness amongst the Japanese generally in
international affairs has precluded any utterances by men who even
in their everyday lives are accustomed to examine all doors and
speak with painful trepidation upon much smaller issues than that
now referred to. Death stalks the indiscreet or even supposedly
indiscreet Japanese.

Ultimate negotiation, should it reach that stage, would hardly be
but several months distant, and although I should here (by first
safe-hand opportunity) touch upon the matter because it is a
'live' Press subject, I have no special information from any
official source other than that already available to the Prime
Minister, both at London and Canberra-that is the British Embassy
cable already sent to both points recording the present lukewarm
Japanese reaction; and a reference thereto in the regularly
transmitted Embassy 'Diary'.

I now refer to some indirect but usually reliable reactions which
I have otherwise obtained, and which, in passing, I have also
mentioned to H. B. M. Embassy. These are:

(1) The Japanese War Office (by which term the Army is meant)
seems to be favourably inclined towards the Prime Minister's plan;

(2) The Japanese Navy Office is hesitant and if anything dubious.

In the normal course of events in Japan, it is usually the Army
which takes an uncompromising view, and the Navy a more liberal
one. This is supposed to be-probably is-due in most instances to
the more travelled and experienced outlook of the Navy as compared
with the Army, but in the present instance the Navy doubtless
regards itself as the very spearhead of the 'Southward Expansion
Movement' which is unquestionably an emphatic feature of Japan's
present Pacific policy.

In Australia, it is not perhaps easy to reason why, if pleasant
and friendly solutions are proffered in any cases of such Japanese
need as may invite consideration, such formulae are not at once
appreciated by Japan in the spirit in which they are conceived,
but it may throw some light upon the inherent Japanese outlook if
it is just mentioned that 'Shinto' has been analytically defined
as being practically indivisible from the State and the
undercurrent of belief in force; one succinct view is:

'Conquest is the basis of Shinto as a political force and an
engine of State.'
Whilst the principal religion of Japan is Buddhism, Shinto is the
National and united cult and is the very basis of the outlook of
Japan and its people. This background can never advisably be left

[The remainder of this dispatch dealt with Japanese activities in
Timor, duplicating information already in Documents 18 and 49.]


1 Probably George D. Andrews, Second Secretary at U.S. Embassy in
Tokyo, who sent a report of his conversation with Longfield Lloyd
to Washington. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937,
vol. III (Washington, 1954), p. 980.

[AA : A981, PACIFIC 23]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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