Development and
implementation of bilateral safeguards measures that ensure nuclear material
and items exported from Australia remain in exclusively peaceful use.
Milestone
B1
Internationally agreed standards for physical protection of
nuclear material are applied to all AONM.
Activities
ASNO continued past practice, requiring exporters to adopt
and report on specific procedures to ensure appropriate levels of physical
protectionfor shipments of uranium ore concentrates (UOC) from Australia to the port
of unloading overseas. These procedures
included checking on the physical condition of the containers and verifying the
container and seal numbers at each port of unloading or transhipment.
At the time of export ASNO contacts its counterparts in
countries through which the material will transit alerting them to the need to
protect appropriately AONM within its jurisdiction.
Administrative Security Arrangements (ASA) pursuant to the
Australia/United States Silex Agreement were put in place in September
2000. These were revised in May
2001. The ASA covers procedures to be
applied when classified SILEX technology is transferred and specifies the level
of protection to be applied in the receiving country. A joint classification guide was finalised with the US in May
2001 to ensure that SILEX technology is protected to an equivalent standard in
both Australia and the USA.
Performance Assessment
Reporting by conversion facilities, safeguards authorities
and shipping agencies confirms that all AONMshipments from Australia safely reached their destinations.
The specified physical protection measures
effectively contributed to this good outcome.
Milestone B2
AONM in countries with which Australia has concluded nuclear
safeguards agreements is accounted for in accordance with procedures and
standards prescribed under relevant agreements.
Activities
Exports of Uranium Ore Concentrates (UOC)
Between 1 July 2000 and 30 June
2001 there were 64 shipments of UOC from Australia. These were from the Ranger mine, Northern Territory, and the
Olympic Dam and Beverley mines, South Australia. Exports totalled 9,722 tonnes of U3O8 or U3O8
equivalent as UOC; export earnings were over $497 million. Further information on Australia's uranium
exports is at page 68.
Exporters shipped UOC to conversion facilities in the UK,
the US, France and Canada. ASNO
notified each export to the safeguards authorities in relevant countries. In every case, those safeguards authorities
confirmed to ASNO receipt of each shipment. ASNO also notified the IAEA of each export: to non-nuclear-weapon states
pursuant to Article 35(a) of Australias NPT safeguards agreement with the
IAEA; and to nuclear-weapon states under the IAEAs Voluntary Reporting.
Receiving countries similarly reported receipts to the IAEA.
The shippers weight for each consignment was entered on
ASNOs record of the relevant countrys inventory of AONM. These weights, subject to amendment by
measured Shipper/Receiver Differences, are the basic source data for ASNOs
system of accounting for AONM throughout the international nuclear fuel cycle.
Operation of bilateral agreements
Reports from ASNOs counterpart organisations were provided
in a timely fashion and in the agreed format which enabled analysis and
reconciliation with ASNOs records.
Messrs Bellinger and Leask visited the EuratomSafeguards Office (ESO) in November 2000 and February 2001
respectively. These regular visits have
proven invaluable to ASNOs appreciation of ESOs practices and procedures for
accounting for nuclear material in the European Community and in developing a
closer cooperative relationship. In
June 2001 an EU delegation travelled to Canberra for nuclear policy
consultations, as provided for under the Australia/Euratom safeguards
agreement. ASNO participated in these
consultations, and hosted a technical meeting with ESO associated with the
consultations. At this meeting ASNO and
ESO concluded a revision of the Administrative Arrangements under the Agreement
to clarify reporting arrangements.
In addition to the
Australia/Euratom nuclear policy consultations, ASNO also participated in
nuclear policy consultations with Japan and the ROK, pursuant to the respective
Agreements.
During May 2001 Messrs Bellinger and Doulgeris held
technical discussions with ASNOs counterpart organisations in the US, Japan,
the UK and Sweden. These discussions
covered the reconciliation of accounting figures under the respective
Agreements and a range of technical issues germane to their operation.
In addition to the consultations referred to above, during
the year Messrs Carlson and Leask had discussions with senior officials in the
US and Japan.
Figure 5 Mr Santos-Bento, representing ESO, and Mr Carlson signing revised
Administrative Arrangements under the Australia/Euratom safeguards agreement.
Laser enrichment technology
The arrangements established by ASNO with the US covering
the transfer of the SILEX laser enrichmenttechnology control both the way in which the technology must be
protected and exactly what this technology can be used for. If SILEX technology is adopted by the US
company USEC, uranium enriched by this technology will become subject to the
same requirements as uranium exported to the US from Australia, i.e. it will
become AONM.
Performance Assessment
On the basis of reporting, other information and analysis,
ASNO concludes that all AONM has been accounted for satisfactorily.
ASNOs counterparts have either confirmed receipt of all
relevant exports in accordance with the requirements of the bilateral
safeguards agreements or are investigating the transfer. In addition, the IAEA provides ASNO with
regular acknowledgments of ASNOs notifications of international transfers of
nuclear material to and from Australia. The IAEA has confirmed that, as at 11 July 2001 there were no
outstanding unconfirmed shipments to Australia (i.e. imports). Similarly, receipt of all of Australias
exports up to 11 July 2001 has been confirmed through the IAEAs transit matching
system.
As at 30 June 2001 ASNO had satisfactorily accounted for
AONM located overseas through, inter alia,
the annual reports (made pursuant to bilateral agreements) and other
information provided by relevant bilateral treaty partners, namely Canada,
Euratom, Finland, France, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK
and the US. Australias other bilateral
partnersEgypt, Mexico, the Philippines and the Russian Federationdid not hold
AONM in 2000 (Mexico received its first AONM in March 2001 and therefore will
submit the initial annual report under the agreement in 2001-02).
Given that AONM located overseas has been accounted for
satisfactorily and is under IAEA safeguards, and drawing on the IAEAs
Safeguards Statement for 2000 (see page 67),
ASNO concludes that no AONM has been used for non-peaceful purposes.