In fulfilling
the safeguards obligations of the Agency in 1999, the Secretariat did not find
any indication that nuclear material which had been declared and placed under
safeguards had been diverted for any military purpose or for purposes unknown,
or that facilities, equipment or non-nuclear material placed under safeguards
were being misused. All the information
available to the Agency supports the conclusion that the nuclear material and
other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or
were otherwise adequately accounted for.

In 1999, the Agency was in the early
stages of implementing protocols additional to safeguards agreements
(additional protocols). Having
completed the evaluation of all the information available to the Agency in
respect of two States, including information obtained through activities
pursuant to their comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols,
the Agency found no indication either of diversion of declared nuclear material
or of the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in those
States. In the case of other States
with comprehensive safeguards agreements and an additional protocols in force,
the evaluation of the information available to the Agency was not yet complete.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) remains in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. The Agency is still unable to verify the
correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material
made by the DPRK and is, therefore, unable to conclude that there has been no
diversion of nuclear material in the DPRK.
Although the safeguards agreement between the DPRK and the Agency
remains binding and in force, the Agency is able to implement only some of the
required safeguards measures in the DPRK.
These measures include monitoring the freeze on the DPRK's graphite
moderated reactors and related facilities, as requested by the United Nations
Security Council and as foreseen in the Agreed Framework of October 1994
between the United States of America and the DPRK.

Since 1991, the Agency's safeguards
activities in Iraq under the comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded
pursuant to the Treaty on the non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have
been implemented as part of the activities carried out by the Agency in Iraq
pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 687 and related
resolutions. In 1999, the Agency was
not in a position to implement its Security Council mandated activities in Iraq
and could not, therefore, provide any assurance that Iraq was in compliance
with its obligations under these resolutions.
In these circumstances, given the requirements of its safeguards system,
and pursuant to Iraq's safeguards agreement, the Agency scheduled, for December
1999, a physical inventory verification of the nuclear material subject to
safeguards in Iraq with the objective of verifying the presence of the nuclear
material in question. The inspection
could not be carried out in December 1999 because the Government of Iraq
provided the necessary visas for safeguards inspectors only in January 2000.

Note: The planned
physical inventory verification inspection in Iraq took place from 22 to 25
January 2000. The inspectors were able
to verify the presence of the nuclear material subject to safeguards.

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