IAEA Statements of
Conclusions of Inspections in Australia.

During 1999-00 the
IAEA carried out inspections in four of Australias five Material Balance Areas
(MBAs): AS-A; AS-B; AS-C; and AS-D. The
IAEA provides statements of conclusions about these inspections under Article
91(b) of Australias NPT Safeguards Agreement.

Article 91(b) statements for inspections conducted during 1998-99 stated
the following conclusions (Activity 3 applies only to MBAs AS-A and AS-D).

Table 19 IAEA Conclusions of
Inspections in Australia

The only material
unaccounted for (MUF) declared for the year was a small quantity of enriched
uranium in AS-C.

Explanatory note on MBA AS-E

This MBA covers all
locations in Australia, except ANSTO at Lucas Heights, where safeguardable nuclear
material is present.

No IAEA statement
under Article 91(b) of Australias NPT Safeguards Agreement is provided for
this MBA since the IAEA has not inspected the nuclear material located
there. This is because the quantities
are too small to be of proliferation significance and in most cases have been
exempted from active safeguards or have had safeguards terminated in accordance
with the Agreement (Articles 36, 37, 38 and 39 of the Agreement refer).

However, this year a
complementary access pursuant to the Additional Protocol to INFCIRC/217 took
place at the Defence Science and Technology Organisations establishment at
Salisbury in South Australia. The
Agencys conclusions drawn from this access have been received, together with
those concerning the similar access at the Ranger Mine in June 1999. The Agency noted that access to both
locations pursuant to Article 4.a.(i) of the Additional Protocol did not
indicate the presence of any undeclared nuclear material or activities.

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