2795 result(s) found, displaying 1811 to 1820
- … these two brigades. CURTIN 1 Document 372. 2 Cablegram P51 of 24 February (AA:A3195, 1942, 1.8156) dealt with the strategic significance and defence capabilities of Ceylon. Cablegram P55 of 27 February (AA:A3195, 1942, 1.8580) informed … these two brigades. CURTIN 1 Document 372. 2 Cablegram P51 of 24 February (AA:A3195, 1942, 1.8156) dealt with the strategic significance and defence capabilities of Ceylon. Cablegram P55 of 27 February (AA:A3195, 1942, 1.8580) informed …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-05/389-mr-john-curtin-prime-minister-to-sir-earle-page-special-representative-in-the-united-kingdom
- … of the cablegram regarding Admiral King was quoted in Churchill's cablegram 294 of 6 March (on file AA:A2937, A.B.D.A. Strategic Area, 1941-1942). It conveyed a similar assessment of King to that set out in Document 392. [AA:A3195, 1942, … of the cablegram regarding Admiral King was quoted in Churchill's cablegram 294 of 6 March (on file AA:A2937, A.B.D.A. Strategic Area, 1941-1942). It conveyed a similar assessment of King to that set out in Document 392. [AA:A3195, 1942, …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-05/393-sir-earle-page-special-representative-in-the-united-kingdom-to-mr-john-curtin-prime-minister
- https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-02/160-mr-sm-bruce-high-commissioner-in-london-to-mr-rg-menzies-prime-minister
- … proceed on the assumption that the objective is to arrive at a just and workable settlement. Consideration of possible strategic interests either in terms of future allies, military bases, or oil, is likely to distort the picture. Stability in … proceed on the assumption that the objective is to arrive at a just and workable settlement. Consideration of possible strategic interests either in terms of future allies, military bases, or oil, is likely to distort the picture. Stability in …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-16/25-throssell-to-shann
- … that strategy is best served by policy based on principle. We have always believed, as we have made it clear to you, that strategic objectives in the Middle East might have been best secured by following through the Assembly recommendation by … that strategy is best served by policy based on principle. We have always believed, as we have made it clear to you, that strategic objectives in the Middle East might have been best secured by following through the Assembly recommendation by …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-16/42-department-of-external-affairs-to-noelbaker
- … independence in 1947, instead of the gradual development towards dominion status proposed earlier. In view of Ceylon's strategic importance, UK military advisers recommended that an announcement of intention to grant independence should not be … independence in 1947, instead of the gradual development towards dominion status proposed earlier. In view of Ceylon's strategic importance, UK military advisers recommended that an announcement of intention to grant independence should not be …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-12/527-chifley-to-attlee
- … the political level. It is necessary, therefore, as we see it, for ministers to take stock of where we are and reach the strategic decisions required on how we proceed from now. Thus our first responsibility in our meeting will be to review on a … the political level. It is necessary, therefore, as we see it, for ministers to take stock of where we are and reach the strategic decisions required on how we proceed from now. Thus our first responsibility in our meeting will be to review on a …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-23/168-message-from-talboys-to-anthony
- … between Australia and the British Commonwealth nations and the countries of South-East Asia. Australian commercial and strategic interests depend on the maintenance and extension of such friendly relations. Such relations are regarded as the … between Australia and the British Commonwealth nations and the countries of South-East Asia. Australian commercial and strategic interests depend on the maintenance and extension of such friendly relations. Such relations are regarded as the …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-14/132-department-of-external-affairs-to-posts
- … this morning at the Foreign Ministry and 'at another place concerned with Portuguese Timor matters' (Tjan at Centre for Strategic and International Studies). Stone said he would call back at 1400 hours Jakarta time (1700 hours Sydney time). … this morning at the Foreign Ministry and 'at another place concerned with Portuguese Timor matters' (Tjan at Centre for Strategic and International Studies). Stone said he would call back at 1400 hours Jakarta time (1700 hours Sydney time). …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-20/269-cablegram-to-canberra
- … they do not constitute the main reason why Australia might prefer to see Timor incorporated into Indonesia-this is the strategic/defence argument in the latter half of paragraph 7. The formulation in paragraph 8 suggests that incorporation and … they do not constitute the main reason why Australia might prefer to see Timor incorporated into Indonesia-this is the strategic/defence argument in the latter half of paragraph 7. The formulation in paragraph 8 suggests that incorporation and …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-20/64-minute-from-williams-to-joseph