2783 result(s) found, displaying 1801 to 1810
- … these two brigades. CURTIN 1 Document 372. 2 Cablegram P51 of 24 February (AA:A3195, 1942, 1.8156) dealt with the strategic significance and defence capabilities of Ceylon. Cablegram P55 of 27 February (AA:A3195, 1942, 1.8580) informed … these two brigades. CURTIN 1 Document 372. 2 Cablegram P51 of 24 February (AA:A3195, 1942, 1.8156) dealt with the strategic significance and defence capabilities of Ceylon. Cablegram P55 of 27 February (AA:A3195, 1942, 1.8580) informed …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-05/389-mr-john-curtin-prime-minister-to-sir-earle-page-special-representative-in-the-united-kingdom
- … of the cablegram regarding Admiral King was quoted in Churchill's cablegram 294 of 6 March (on file AA:A2937, A.B.D.A. Strategic Area, 1941-1942). It conveyed a similar assessment of King to that set out in Document 392. [AA:A3195, 1942, … of the cablegram regarding Admiral King was quoted in Churchill's cablegram 294 of 6 March (on file AA:A2937, A.B.D.A. Strategic Area, 1941-1942). It conveyed a similar assessment of King to that set out in Document 392. [AA:A3195, 1942, …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-05/393-sir-earle-page-special-representative-in-the-united-kingdom-to-mr-john-curtin-prime-minister
- … Commissioner in the United Kingdom, which urged Curtin to convey to the U.K. Govt the Commonwealth Govt's views on the strategic consequences of Portuguese troops replacing the Australian-Dutch force in Timor. See Bruce's cablegram 4 [A] of 3 … Commissioner in the United Kingdom, which urged Curtin to convey to the U.K. Govt the Commonwealth Govt's views on the strategic consequences of Portuguese troops replacing the Australian-Dutch force in Timor. See Bruce's cablegram 4 [A] of 3 …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-05/258-mr-john-curtin-prime-minister-to-lord-cranborne-uk-secretary-of-state-for-dominion-affairs
- https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-02/160-mr-sm-bruce-high-commissioner-in-london-to-mr-rg-menzies-prime-minister
- … the political level. It is necessary, therefore, as we see it, for ministers to take stock of where we are and reach the strategic decisions required on how we proceed from now. Thus our first responsibility in our meeting will be to review on a … the political level. It is necessary, therefore, as we see it, for ministers to take stock of where we are and reach the strategic decisions required on how we proceed from now. Thus our first responsibility in our meeting will be to review on a …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-23/168-message-from-talboys-to-anthony
- … was defined as for 'furthering offensive operations in the Pacific'. Their re- allocation implied no alteration in the strategic conception laid down in WW1 [7], but was based upon the fact that necessary postponement of the major operation … was defined as for 'furthering offensive operations in the Pacific'. Their re- allocation implied no alteration in the strategic conception laid down in WW1 [7], but was based upon the fact that necessary postponement of the major operation …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-06/23-bruce-to-curtin
- … analogous situation in Solomons area, and therefore hope you reassess also MacArthur's area, so as to make vital strategic bases here, at any rate, secure against large scale invasion. 5. Matter is of global importance because in the … analogous situation in Solomons area, and therefore hope you reassess also MacArthur's area, so as to make vital strategic bases here, at any rate, secure against large scale invasion. 5. Matter is of global importance because in the …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-06/24-evatt-to-king
- … this morning at the Foreign Ministry and 'at another place concerned with Portuguese Timor matters' (Tjan at Centre for Strategic and International Studies). Stone said he would call back at 1400 hours Jakarta time (1700 hours Sydney time). … this morning at the Foreign Ministry and 'at another place concerned with Portuguese Timor matters' (Tjan at Centre for Strategic and International Studies). Stone said he would call back at 1400 hours Jakarta time (1700 hours Sydney time). …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-20/269-cablegram-to-canberra
- … they do not constitute the main reason why Australia might prefer to see Timor incorporated into Indonesia-this is the strategic/defence argument in the latter half of paragraph 7. The formulation in paragraph 8 suggests that incorporation and … they do not constitute the main reason why Australia might prefer to see Timor incorporated into Indonesia-this is the strategic/defence argument in the latter half of paragraph 7. The formulation in paragraph 8 suggests that incorporation and …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-20/64-minute-from-williams-to-joseph
- … proceed on the assumption that the objective is to arrive at a just and workable settlement. Consideration of possible strategic interests either in terms of future allies, military bases, or oil, is likely to distort the picture. Stability in … proceed on the assumption that the objective is to arrive at a just and workable settlement. Consideration of possible strategic interests either in terms of future allies, military bases, or oil, is likely to distort the picture. Stability in …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-16/25-throssell-to-shann