2814 result(s) found, displaying 1801 to 1810
- … the level at which food production should be maintained for exports to Britain. As Australia is in a sphere of American strategic responsibility, Mr. Churchill also agreed that I should discuss the matter in Washington. 4. Had circumstances … the level at which food production should be maintained for exports to Britain. As Australia is in a sphere of American strategic responsibility, Mr. Churchill also agreed that I should discuss the matter in Washington. 4. Had circumstances …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-07/184-curtin-to-roosevelt
- … have been initiated and when withdrawal would disorganize completely not only the immediate campaign but also the strategic plan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the Australian Government, however, does contemplate action along this line, … have been initiated and when withdrawal would disorganize completely not only the immediate campaign but also the strategic plan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the Australian Government, however, does contemplate action along this line, …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-08/89-macarthur-to-chifley
- … Commissioner in the United Kingdom, which urged Curtin to convey to the U.K. Govt the Commonwealth Govt's views on the strategic consequences of Portuguese troops replacing the Australian-Dutch force in Timor. See Bruce's cablegram 4 [A] of 3 … Commissioner in the United Kingdom, which urged Curtin to convey to the U.K. Govt the Commonwealth Govt's views on the strategic consequences of Portuguese troops replacing the Australian-Dutch force in Timor. See Bruce's cablegram 4 [A] of 3 …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-05/258-mr-john-curtin-prime-minister-to-lord-cranborne-uk-secretary-of-state-for-dominion-affairs
- … these two brigades. CURTIN 1 Document 372. 2 Cablegram P51 of 24 February (AA:A3195, 1942, 1.8156) dealt with the strategic significance and defence capabilities of Ceylon. Cablegram P55 of 27 February (AA:A3195, 1942, 1.8580) informed … these two brigades. CURTIN 1 Document 372. 2 Cablegram P51 of 24 February (AA:A3195, 1942, 1.8156) dealt with the strategic significance and defence capabilities of Ceylon. Cablegram P55 of 27 February (AA:A3195, 1942, 1.8580) informed …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-05/389-mr-john-curtin-prime-minister-to-sir-earle-page-special-representative-in-the-united-kingdom
- … of the cablegram regarding Admiral King was quoted in Churchill's cablegram 294 of 6 March (on file AA:A2937, A.B.D.A. Strategic Area, 1941-1942). It conveyed a similar assessment of King to that set out in Document 392. [AA:A3195, 1942, … of the cablegram regarding Admiral King was quoted in Churchill's cablegram 294 of 6 March (on file AA:A2937, A.B.D.A. Strategic Area, 1941-1942). It conveyed a similar assessment of King to that set out in Document 392. [AA:A3195, 1942, …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-05/393-sir-earle-page-special-representative-in-the-united-kingdom-to-mr-john-curtin-prime-minister
- https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-02/160-mr-sm-bruce-high-commissioner-in-london-to-mr-rg-menzies-prime-minister
- … proceed on the assumption that the objective is to arrive at a just and workable settlement. Consideration of possible strategic interests either in terms of future allies, military bases, or oil, is likely to distort the picture. Stability in … proceed on the assumption that the objective is to arrive at a just and workable settlement. Consideration of possible strategic interests either in terms of future allies, military bases, or oil, is likely to distort the picture. Stability in …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-16/25-throssell-to-shann
- … that strategy is best served by policy based on principle. We have always believed, as we have made it clear to you, that strategic objectives in the Middle East might have been best secured by following through the Assembly recommendation by … that strategy is best served by policy based on principle. We have always believed, as we have made it clear to you, that strategic objectives in the Middle East might have been best secured by following through the Assembly recommendation by …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-16/42-department-of-external-affairs-to-noelbaker
- … independence in 1947, instead of the gradual development towards dominion status proposed earlier. In view of Ceylon's strategic importance, UK military advisers recommended that an announcement of intention to grant independence should not be … independence in 1947, instead of the gradual development towards dominion status proposed earlier. In view of Ceylon's strategic importance, UK military advisers recommended that an announcement of intention to grant independence should not be …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-12/527-chifley-to-attlee
- … the political level. It is necessary, therefore, as we see it, for ministers to take stock of where we are and reach the strategic decisions required on how we proceed from now. Thus our first responsibility in our meeting will be to review on a … the political level. It is necessary, therefore, as we see it, for ministers to take stock of where we are and reach the strategic decisions required on how we proceed from now. Thus our first responsibility in our meeting will be to review on a …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-23/168-message-from-talboys-to-anthony