(Due to arrive Melbourne-26.6.26)

My dear P.M.,

As I did not feel competent to write up the inner history of the
General Strike and the events which led up to it, I asked Tom
Jones [1] if he would put something on paper for me to send you.

He responded very nobly in the shape of the carefully considered
document (marked 'A') which I am able to enclose with this letter.

[2] No one knows the real story of it all as well as he and I
think you can take this paper of his as being very near the truth,
not only as regards facts but as regards motives and influences
that actuated both sides.

As you will see, his name does not appear on it at all and he asks
that his name be not mentioned as being the author of it.

I have also talked to S. G. Tallents, the Secretary of the Supply
and Transport Committee of the Cabinet, who had quite a
considerable insight into the conduct of the measures taken to
combat the strike during its course. I have set down in another
paper the points on which he laid stress, but through pressure of
other work I have not been able to get this typed to go to you by
this mail.

I am, Yours sincerely,
R. G. CASEY

[Enclosure A]

The project of a General Strike is one with which the more ardent
spirits of the Labour movement have toyed for some years, and
various unstable Alliances of the bigger Unions have prepared the
way for it. Successive measures have been deliberately taken to
concentrate power more and more in a central executive which could
act swiftly and without consultation. The Unions vary in the
degree to which they have surrendered their initiative, but there
is no doubt that large numbers of the rank and file were
astonished to find that they were called out without a ballot.

This exercise of overriding authority, while it did not prevent
men coming out in obedience to instructions, did undoubtedly cool
their ardour and make many of them disinclined to remain out.

In July 1925 the Government were threatened with a concerted
attack by the big Unions. The country was ill-informed as to the
merits of the coal dispute and the Government was uncertain as to
how far it could rely on its emergency preparations. A breathing
space was obtained by means of a subsidy and the appointment of a
Royal Commission.

The Royal Commission reported in March 1926. The Report was
wellreceived at first. It was a fair and persuasive document and
the Government secured for it a wide circulation by issuing it
first at a shilling and then at threepence. But when one sat down
closely to apply the recommendations of the Report, it was found
to be either nebulous or ambiguous at crucial points. Especially
was this the case with the question of wages and a national
minimum. The ambiguity was due to the Report being the work of
more than one hand and to the hurry to complete and publish it
before the different parts were properly harmonised. Had the
'Samuel Memorandum', which the Chairman prepared during the
General Strike, been embodied at the end of the Report many of our
troubles, and perhaps the General Strike itself, would have been
avoided. [3] In the course of the negotiations between Owners and
Miners, the Government did not call upon the Commissioners to
clear up the disputed points. This is regrettable because the
Commissioners' view was nearer to the men's interpretation than to
the owners', and the Miners' Executive had learnt this privately.

Broadly the Commission intended that-
(a) The subsidy should cease;

(b) That there should be genuine guarantees that the mining
industry would be thoroughly reorganised in the immediate future;

(c) That the miners having satisfied themselves as to (b) should
agree to a temporary reduction of wages in the neighbourhood of
ten per cent.

The Owners thoroughly disliked the reorganisation proposals; the
Government believed the relief they would bring was exaggerated
but were prepared to go ahead with them provided the wage
reduction was secured.

The reorganisation proposals are largely the result of criticism
advanced by 'intellectuals' behind the Miners' Leaders from the
days of the Sankey Commission [4] onwards. The Miners' Leaders
themselves, certainly their spokesmen Smith [5] and Cook [6], have
a very imperfect grip of 'reorganisation' and use it as 'a blessed
word'. What they are really determined about is to hold on as long
as possible to their slogan 'Not a penny off wages, not a minute
on hours'. They know well enough that the economic position of the
industry is most serious. They exaggerated the probable savings
from reorganisation and they counted all along that the kindly
Prime Minister [7] would be forced to continue the subsidy for an
indefinite period and thereby postpone the evil day when they
would have to tell their men that wages had to come down or hours
be extended, or both.

It is important to remember that the Seven Hours Act of 1919 and
the advance of wages in 1924 were both granted under duress and
that moderate opinion holds that, in the circumstances of today,
they should be withdrawn. It is equally true that the Mining
Association is a thoroughly reactionary body not representative of
the most enlightened employers.

Owners' and Men's organisations are alike led by men who are
obstructionists rather than negotiators. They have long been
accustomed to periodic strikes and lock-outs and regard them as
normal means of settling their differences. There is even ground
for thinking that the Mining Association in the present case from
the start believed a stoppage to be a wholesome form of blood-
letting and that the Miners' Leaders believe it will be easier for
them to get the men to swallow inevitable reductions after a few
weeks' stoppage. The other point to bear in mind is that the
public are readier to sympathise with the Miners than with any
body of workers, owing to the nature of their occupation. Much of
this sympathy is misplaced. The modern mines are very different
from the old pits and tens of thousands of men classed as 'miners'
never go underground. But throughout the public have been friendly
to the miners' cause and a sharp distinction was drawn between the
action of the Trade Union General Council and the mining dispute.

The negotiations between the three parties had made little
progress when the breakdown was reached on Friday, April 30th. The
owners had posted up notices of wages in some of the districts.

The Government had induced the owners to agree to negotiate
nationally but the wages which the owners could offer for a 7
hours day, with practically no profit to themselves, were
miserably low. The Government felt increasingly that the solution
lay in the direction of an 8 hours day but were estopped from
travelling on that route by the verdict against it in the Report.

The Government put forward no proposals of its own, but were
willing to stand on the Report if the others would. The men
refused to budge either on wages or hours. They thought that at
the last moment the Government would yield on the subsidy and
postpone the necessity for reduced wages. But the Government did
not yield.

On the following day the T.U.C. took over the negotiations and at
the same time threatened a General Strike. The Government ignored
the threat and negotiated all through Saturday and Sunday with the
T.U.C. leaders. Both sides laboured with all their might for
peace. The chief figures, Pugh [8] and Thomas [9], fought down the
extremists in their own camp and were reinforced by Ramsay
MacDonald [10] and Arthur Henderson [11] acting for the Labour
Party. But MacDonald was handicapped because he was not a Trade
Unionist, and Thomas was suspect because of 'Black Friday' years
ago when he was supposed to have let down the miners. Thomas, who
was much the most resourceful and determined negotiator, was
violently hated by Cook, the Miners' Secretary, and disliked by
Citrine [12], the T.U.C. Secretary. The other outstanding figure
on the T.U.C. was Bevin [13], the leader of the Dockers, who with
Bromley [14] and Purcell [15] led the Left Wing. The T.U.C. was
practically in session all day and half the night at Eccleston
Square. Executive action mainly originated with Bevin. It is
believed that Bevin, Bromley and Purcell were mainly responsible
for the policy which caused the telegrams to go out on Sunday
ordering the General Strike. This act, while seriously meant by
the Left Wing, was probably regarded as bluff by the Moderates. It
was certainly not generally regarded by the Executive as a
revolutionary measure challenging the State. It was meant as the
most convincing demonstration of solidarity with the miners in
their fight for the maintenance of their standard of living. But
on Sunday night the bluff was called by the Government to the
amazement of the T.U.C. who believed that they were within a few
hours of securing agreement.

This action of the Government was precipitated by the 'Daily Mail'
incident [16], but throughout Sunday the attitude of the
Government had been hardening. It is impossible now to say what
might have happened. The most probable view is that if the T.U.C.

had failed to get the Miners to accept the 'Birkenhead' [17]
formula on Sunday night, the T.U.C. would have broken then with
the Miners and called off the General Strike before it began. It
is not likely that the Miners would have accepted the 'Birkenhead'
formula that night. More than a week later they refused to accept
the 'Samuel Memorandum' as the price of calling off the General
Strike. Nor have they moved since one inch from their original
position.

On Monday, May 3rd, the P.M. defined the issue as a challenge to
constitutional Government in a speech in the House of Commons-a
speech strictly impartial in its narration of events and
conciliatory in temper. He knew that the chief trade union leaders
and the leaders of the Labour Party in the House were entirely
opposed to a strike against the State and that their only defence
would be to describe what was happening as an industrial dispute.

He was determined to keep the way open for their speedy retreat.

The battle proceeded on two points: the material front, by the
provision of essential services by the Government's central and
local, official and voluntary organisations, and, secondly, the
moral front, by speeches and messages and pledges, by means of the
official newspaper and by broadcasting. In the House of Commons on
May 6th Sir John Simon [18] told the country that a General Strike
was illegal and its promoters liable in damages to the uttermost
extent of their possessions. This made a marked impression and it
was greatly deepened five days later in a case before Mr. Justice
Astbury who laid it down, in addition, that members of Trade
Unions could not lose benefits by refusing to obey illegal orders.

All this was bound in time to weaken the determination of the
strikers, but they stood notably firm and united throughout this
week. The men who returned to the railways were largely of the
supervisory and clerical grades, and had the T.U.C. extended the
strike the position would quickly have become grave.

Meanwhile much was going on out of sight. On May 8th Sir Herbert
Samuel had taken on the role of a voluntary intermediary and was
making a favourable impression on the T.U.C. but was cutting no
ice with the Owners. The latter 'stood behind the Government' and
would discuss nothing until the General Strike was called off.

Samuel, however, persevered with the T.U.C. leaders, and though
distinctly repudiated by the Government, it was doubtless believed
by the men that there was at least 'an understanding' between him
and the Government. Lord Reading [19] was also active behind the
scenes and several of the labour intellectuals, alarmed at the
prospect of tempers becoming worse and of 'incidents' inflaming
the populace, were seeking a way out which would save the face of
the T.U.C.

On the other hand, the T.U.C. had made an overt move which made
peace far more difficult. On May 7th they issued orders to
interrupt the supply of food. This led to convoys of flour from
the docks covered by armoured cars. Feelings grew more intense and
the moderate men on the T.U.C. were privately pressing hard for
some gesture from the Government on which they could fasten and
which would give a peaceful turn to events. On Saturday night, May
8th, the P.M. responded to this appeal by a personally broadcasted
speech, which while absolutely firm on the central issue, was very
conciliatory on the mining dispute. This speech had a marked
effect on the country and on the T.U.C. itself. The latter
squabbled for hours over it trying to decide what action, if any,
they might venture to launch upon it. Some were pressing for
extending the strike by calling out 'the second line'. Others were
leaning on the Prime Minister's message and on the Samuel
negotiations and searching for a way out. These latter were
gaining ground all through Sunday and Monday at Eccleston Square.

Rumours began to circulate with exaggerated force that the
Government were contemplating extreme measures in regard to trade
unions and trade union leaders. Rumours also were spreading that
more and more men were returning to work. The orders calling out
engineers and shipbuilders had evoked a poor response. All this
had its effect at Eccleston Square upon men who were utterly
exhausted by the strain of long interminable wrangling in an
atmosphere of smoke and drink and with irregular meals and little
sleep. Immense and complicated responsibilities had been suddenly
thrown on the T.U.C. of conducting a General Strike and for this
task they were unprepared. On Tuesday morning news reached the
Government that the moderates were in the ascendant and that they
would probably win in the course of the day. But the day wore on
to midnight and the early hours of Wednesday and the T.U.C. had
failed to get the Miners to accept the 'Samuel Memorandum'. The
T.U.C. then decided to throw over the Miners and on Wednesday, May
12th, came to Downing Street to announce that the General Strike
was being terminated that day. The P.M. called for cooperation and
goodwill in healing the breach and two days later announced the
Government's proposals for settling the Mining dispute. These
proposals have since been rejected by Owners and Miners and the
coal deadlock continues.

Reviewing the whole momentous experience the chief reflections
which occur to one at this stage are:-

1. Few competent students of recent industrial history will regret
the General Strike. It, or something like it, 'had to come' in
view of the temper of the most assertive elements in the trade
union world.

2. The General Strike could not succeed because some of those who
led it did not wholly believe in it and because few, if any, were
prepared to go through with it to its logical conclusion-violence
and revolution.

3. It manifested a most impressive trade union loyalty only
equalled by the orderly behaviour of all concerned.

4. The rank and file knew little or nothing of the divisions and
jealousies of the central executive and were taken by surprise
when the strike was called off. There is widespread anger with the
T.U.C. fomented by Cook for betraying the Miners, but the tide is
turning against the Miners because of their obstinacy in rejecting
first the Samuel Memorandum and then the Government's proposals.

5 . The motorcar, aeroplane, and wireless were of immense value to
the Government.

6. The T.U.C. made a first class blunder in calling out the
printers but it is difficult to run a Government newspaper. [20]

7. The chief asset in keeping the country steadfast during the
negotiations was the Prime Minister's reputation for fair dealing
enhanced later by his sincere plea against malice and
vindictiveness. His seeming weakness has been his strength. Had he
yielded to the Die-hard influences he would have prolonged the
strike by rallying the whole of Labour in defence of Trade
Unionism. He was wise to give them the chance and he was
enthusiastically supported in this course by the majority of the
House of Commons.