Herewith this week's news.

Security Council Resolution [1]

As a Commission, we have so far not made progress; a decision from
The Hague as to the Dutch attitude to the Resolution is still
impatiently awaited. I shall be surprised if the answer is not
vague and evasive. In practice the Netherlands will accept, at
least in the first instance, only that part of the Resolution
which fits in with their policy and programme. This programme,
unless a special deal is negotiated with the Federalists, will not
include the release of Republican prisoners and, in particular,
will not provide for their establishment as a Government at
Djokjakarta. The first main function of the Commission may
therefore be to clarify the official Netherlands response, and to
make sure that the facts of Netherlands non-compliance with the
Resolution are clearly reported to the Security Council.

2. If we get past the first difficult stages of securing the
release of the Republican leaders and their re-establishment as a
Government, there will still be the problem of stopping the
fighting and in this we are likely to strike bother with both
sides. As indicated in my previous letter, one of the main
difficulties will be the Republican Army. The armed forces are the
Republic's main safeguard, perhaps its only safeguard, for the
eventual transfer of sovereignty. The Republicans can, therefore,
hardly agree to any solution involving the dissolution of the
T.N.I., the greater portion of which is intact, before a Federal
army is established under the control of a representative Federal
Interim Government. The Netherlands will doubtless strongly oppose
any regrouping of Republican forces and will seek to interpret the
Resolution so as to eliminate the guerilla bands. Planning a new
truce will certainly be tough.

Military Situation
3. There is still military confusion. Republicans are convinced
that the Dutch have failed in their military action and that they
will lose a war of attrition. Certainly some of the Dutch are
beginning to appreciate their colossal under-estimation of the
difficulties created by military action.

4. Leimena informed me yesterday that he had been speaking with a
Republican civilian who had travelled from Central Java to West
Java with a group of Siliwangi troops 1500 strong. This group took
with them a number of families, making a total party of 2000. The
journey took 36 days and only six T.N.I. soldiers were lost on the
way. Republican sources confirm that their troops have now taken
up their old positions in the West Java pockets and have been
welcomed by the local populations.

5. Quentin Pope, of the Chicago Tribune, has just returned to
Batavia after three days in East Java. The main points of his
reports are:-

'(a) Before the end of December sizeable Republican forces were
eluding Dutch columns and marching into East Java along coastal
routes.

(b) These forces have commenced attacks on British- and Dutch-
owned estates which are being raided at the rate of one every two
days.

(c) As a result a number of Dutch civilians have been killed,
women and children have been evacuated to Sourabaya, and several
estates have been closed while others are remaining open only so
long as the Dutch army can provide defence.

(d) There are reports that stronger Republican forces are at
present moving along southern coastal routes towards Banjoewangi.

According to some estimates these new infiltrators will bring the
total of Republican troops raiding East Java to some thousands.

(e) Reports from planters underline the fact that the whole area
was peaceful before the military action of December 19 and that
present guerilla activities are being conducted on strictly
disciplined lines. (Raiders are careful not to antagonize local
population and are paying for supplies, etc.)
(f) Guerilla targets include processing plants, stockpiles and
communications, to which considerable damage is being done.

(g) Roads in East Java are still unsafe and can only be used by
heavily protected convoys, and then irregularly.

(h) Dutch Field Commanders described Netherlands plans as based on
"herding Republicans into rough mountain areas away from food and
munitions, and awaiting for weather and disease to do their work".

Pope believes that this policy is enforced by the present Dutch
troop shortage and that it can only succeed if the present
Republican counter invasion of East Java is frustrated.

(i) Republican scorched earth policy has blasted virtually
everything of value in large areas of East Java.

(j) The Dutch claim that some operations are being carried out by
Republican forces which did not withdraw to Republican territory
after the Renville Agreement but, according to Pope, "all evidence
is of growing infiltration by Republicans and cohesive attacks at
both ends of Java".'

Other information from non-Dutch sources confirms Pope's opinions.

Press Attacks
6. Dutch stubbornness and inability to keep up with political
trends both internal and external have so far proved
extraordinary. Granting that Dutch natural characteristics are not
conducive to an easy solution to the Indonesian problem, there are
three special obstacles to a progressive Dutch policy-
(a) the influence of the Army and especially of General Spoor in
Indonesia,
(b) the personality of the High Representative of the Crown, Dr.

Beel, who is unacceptable to the Indonesians,
(c) the confusion of the local Dutch as a consequence of an
irresponsible and unreliable press.

7. The third of these points is worthy of some elaboration. As I
have pointed out in earlier letters the Committee has always had
an unfavourable press in Batavia (and, I understand, in Holland),
but since the military action, the campaign to belittle the
Committee of Good Offices and its work has been intensified.

8. The Batavia daily, 'Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad' is supposed to
reflect the Army point of view. Many of its attacks on the
Committee would justify legal proceedings in most countries. An
example of a critical article on the Good Offices Committee is
attachment 1. [2] Although this article reflects the stupidity of
the editorial comment in the local press, it does not properly
reflect the viciousness which has marked so many articles. This is
brought out more clearly in attachment 2 [3], a personal attack on
Graham, a year after he has left Indonesia.

9. No better indication of the effectiveness of the Committee's
reporting could be found than the bitter comment of the local
press. For example, after the first flush of embarrassment which
followed the Committee's Bangka report [4], the Dutch accused the
Committee of bias. Attachment 3 [5] is an editorial from
'Nieuwsblad'. As the Committee had, in fact, been scrupulously
careful to avoid emotional issues in its report, the criticism was
readily answered, but without publicity.

10. Then again, an article in the 'Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant'
(first published in Holland but reproduced widely in Batavia)
claimed that the Good Offices Committee's report [6] of the 14th
January had been criticised by a Senior Member of the G.O.C.'s
board of Military Observers as being unreliable (see 'Aneta'
report of the 26th January). This too could be answered
effectively. The Committee's reply is attachment 4. [7]

11. 'Aneta' of January 26 included the Committee's report on the
military situation in Indonesia of the 24th January, but distorted
the facts. According to 'Aneta', 'the report released here today
says the Netherlands Commander ordered his troops to cease
hostilities in accordance with the Council Resolution...' Of
course, the report said nothing of the kind. On the contrary, the
Committee's reports have shown clearly that the Dutch failed to
comply with the Council's Resolution [8] to cease hostilities at a
time when such a Resolution could be effective. 'Aneta' of January
26 also summarises the Committee's report [9] of the previous day.

The summary states carefully that 'neither the Netherlands
Government nor the Government of Indonesia has either officially
or unofficially stated its position regarding the visit of the
Republican leaders to the New Delhi conference. It carefully
avoids, however, any mention of the statement attributed to an
official spokesman which it had published a few days earlier, and
which was mentioned in the report, to the effect that the
Netherlands Government would grant facilities for visits of
Republican leaders to New Delhi and Lake Success.

12. In last week's letter I mentioned that I would endeavour to
send a translation from the Chinese Paper 'Sin Po' of a special
article, 'A week with guerillas'. A translation of this article
has already been sent to Canberra in the 'Press Review' numbers
105, 106, 107 and 108.

13. You will have gathered from my telegram that on January 28 the
Dutch arrested the Press Officer of the Republican Delegation and
an officer of the Republican Ministry of Information. The arrests
were based, inter alia, on Section 171 of the Penal Code which,
when translated stipulates-

'he, who purposely creates unrest amongst the population by the
dissemination of an untruthful report is liable to a penalty by
imprisonment of at most one year or of a fine of at most 300
guilders.'

The case is now in the hands of the district attorney. As, under
Dutch-Indonesian law, the onus is on the prisoner to prove that
the report is truthful, and since under a state of 'war and
siege', it is only necessary for the prosecution to show that the
report might create unrest, the prisoners seem to have little
chance.

14. Documents and office equipment, such as typewriters and
mimeograph machines, were confiscated at the time of arrest. The
Republican Information Office in Batavia will, therefore, be
unable to carry out its functions, which included the publication
of the daily 'Press Review'. As you will realize from
consideration of the copies of 'Press Review' sent to Canberra, we
shall miss the English translations of articles and comments
appearing in the Indonesian press and the foreign pressmen will
also be deprived of an important source of information.

15. Although the Commission will have to proceed cautiously and
carefully, it may be possible to make use of these arrests to
initiate further enquiries into the position of political
prisoners in Indonesia.

Political Prisoners
16. At the 395th meeting of the Security Council on December 28th,
Col. Hodgson recalled a remark made more than a year previously by
the Netherlands representative in the Security Council that 'the
Netherlands Government was not in the habit of taking political
prisoners, would not take political prisoners and had never
imprisoned them'. (Verbatim record, page 83.) The following
particulars will doubtless be of interest in this connection.

17. The facts have been supplied by George Kahin, a young American
student to whom you will remember I have referred in previous
letters and telegrams. Kahin has conducted considerable research
into the position of political prisoners, and has obtained most of
his facts from representatives of the Panitia Sosial, an
Indonesian social welfare organization working among Indonesian
prisoners in the gaols. Kahin himself has interviewed several
people who have served periods of imprisonment as political
prisoners and who have since been released.

18. In the gaols in Batavia there are at least 1000 political
prisoners, most of whom are 'preventive political prisoners' who
have not yet been charged by the Attorney-General's office with
any offence and who are stated to be 'still under investigation'.

Most of these people have been imprisoned on this basis for a
considerable time. Besides this thousand 'preventives' there is
also a large number of prisoners in Batavia who are classed by the
Dutch as ordinary criminals and are serving sentences, but who
should really be classified as political prisoners. In addition it
has been reported that some members of the T.N.I. who are captured
are now being gaoled as common criminals, the Dutch view being
that since the Republic no longer exists, there can be no
prisoners of war and that the T.N.I. can be treated as bandits.

19. Of the political prisoners in Batavia, 352, all 'preventives'
are in Glodok gaol, where they have been imprisoned for an average
of ten months. At Struiweg gaol there are 24 political prisoners
who are classed by the Dutch as 'political internees'. These
people have been imprisoned following convictions of being
'dangerous to law and order'. The majority of political prisoners
in Batavia are in Tjipinang gaol, which cannot be visited, even by
members of the Panitia Sosial. Among the 'preventives' at
Tjipinang, 41 are known to be former policemen.

20. It is claimed that in West Java at least 5000 political
prisoners are held by the Dutch, the greater number of whom are
'preventive political prisoners' who have not been charged with
any offence.

21. Conditions in at least some of those gaols which can be
visited are extremely bad and 'preventive political prisoners',
whatever their standing in the community, are accorded the same
treatment as criminals. In the Batavia gaols, for instance,
prisoners are given nothing to sleep on, but are forced to lie on
bare cement floors which are usually damp and often wet. According
to Kahin cases of brutal treatment and torture are frequent. Kahin
himself has interviewed some former 'preventives' who had been
subjected to torture.

Developments in Pasundan
22. Since the resignation of most of the members of the Pasundan
cabinet following the arrest of four leading Republicans of that
State (reported in my telegram K.257 [10] and mentioned again in
my letter [11] to you of January 25), further information has come
to hand regarding the background to these events.

23. You will remember that Adil Puradiredja's cabinet resigned on
December 19 following the Dutch military action. This was in
pursuance of a promise made by Adil to Hatta on December 12, that
he and his cabinet would resign if and when the Dutch attacked the
Republic. Following Adil's resignation, according to Republican
sources, Spoor sent an emissary to the Wali Negara of Pasundan
(Wiranatakusuma) to impress upon him the urgency of immediately
forming a cabinet so that Pasundan could be represented at the
B.F.O. conference and in discussions with Drees. At this time the
Dutch were extremely embarrassed because Drees had been unable to
contact responsible Federalists following the Cabinet resignations
in East Indonesia and Pasundan.

24. Wiranatakusuma unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Adil to
form a new cabinet. Djumhana who was next called upon, accepted.

Djumhana has a somewhat chequered political background. Early in
1948 he was prominent among the Republican supporters in opposing
the formation of a State in West Java. During recent months
according to Republican sources he has begun to play both sides.

While assuring the Republicans that he would oppose any Dutch
military action he is suspected of having informed the Dutch that
he would support such a move. Republicans, generally, regard him
as an opportunist.

25. According to the U.P. correspondent's story, which I have been
unable to verify, Djumhana in accepting the mandate to form a new
cabinet, declared that its policy would be based primarily upon
the restoration of the Republican Government. According to the
same source after forming his cabinet, he presented to the
Ministers the 'urgency programme' attachment 5. [12] If these
reports are correct, there can be no question of the Ministers
having been in ignorance of the 'urgency programme'.

26. Djumhana, of course, represented Pasundan at the B.F.O.

conference early this month, and was one of the five-man
commission appointed by the B.F.O. to contact various Republican
leaders, including those interned at Prapat and Bangka, with a
view to establishing an interim federal government on the basis of
the B.I.O. decree. [13] This apparently provoked strong opposition
from Republican supporters in Pasundan. It is difficult however to
escape the conclusion that the fall of the Cabinet was directly
connected with the military proclamation of Engles (see last
week's letter) and the arrest of leading Republican supporters.

27. According to Republican sources, many Indonesians believe that
Engles's proclamation, which accused the Pasundan Government of
not fully co-operating in maintaining law and order, was a direct
order to Wiranatakusuma to keep in line, as he had already been
warned to do by Spoor's emissary a few weeks previously. In any
case, both Wiranatakusuma and Djumhana made appeals to the people
of Pasundan, shortly after the arrests, for the restoration of
'peace and order'. An interesting sidelight on Wiranatakusuma's
position is that he is believed by Indonesians in Bandung to be in
contact with his son, Col. Achmid Wiranatakusuma, a member of the
Republican Siliwangi Division, now carrying on guerilla activities
south of Bandung.

28. The latest development is that Djumhana has succeeded in
forming a new cabinet, which includes Adil Puradiredja. There are
conflicting rumours as to its composition and policy.

White Australia
29. The Dutch press here are giving special prominence to reports
regarding the deportation order issued by the Minister for
Immigration against Mrs. Annie O'Keefe [14], an Indonesian woman
married to an Australian. Reports such as this, in addition to
encouraging those ill-disposed towards us, cause the utmost
confusion among our friends in these parts. The O'Keefe case has
already caused considerable embarrassment to those Indonesians who
regard Australia as a champion of liberty and to those foreigners
here, whether Asian or European, who have constantly praised
Australia's realistic policy in South East Asia. A few reports of
this nature, which arouse humanitarian opposition and cannot be
defended by any of the stock arguments, can undo, perhaps
irreparably, goodwill which has been built up by months of
painstaking effort. But, then, I know you appreciate all this.