Your telegram 29 [1] and my telegram K58. [2]

The following is military position on February 11th.

2. In Sumatra, the implementation of the Truce Agreement was
influenced by
(a) The distances and [p]aucity of the Republican communications,
road, rail, air and signals.

(b) The fact that the Dutch Commanders at Medan, Padang and
Palembang with the co-operation of the Military Observers
exercised a considerable degree of initiative in interpreting the
spirit of the truce.

The direct result of (a) was delay in establishing original
contacts between the Dutch and Republican Officers with the
consequent growth of anxiety as to whether the truce would be
implemented.

However (b) above with pressure by the Military Observers brought
satisfactory result. In every case where contact was established
both parties co-operated fully. Because of (a) above the greater
strain fell upon the Republican Representatives. All Republican
armed forces have now withdrawn to their own controlled territory.

3. In Java the situation is complicated by the large demilitarised
zones involved and the large number of Republican forces to be
withdrawn. It is estimated that approximately 20,000 Republican
forces will have been transported by road, rail and sea when the
evacuation is complete. Moreover, wide distribution of Republican
forces throughout the territory under Dutch control has created
difficulties in establishing contact and arranging evacuations.

4. In Java in distinction to Sumatra, local Dutch Commanders have
had very little delegated power. The Dutch Army communications
system is well established and a contract of control can be
retained. In these circumstances frequent interpretations of the
Truce Agreement were sought by the local Commanders with
consequent delays.

5. Because of isolation [of] the Republican forces (within Dutch
territory) from their Command Headquarters at Djokjakarta,
Republican Liaison Officers were used with Military Observers. In
some instances treatment of these Liaison Officers was contrary to
the spirit of the Truce Agreement. In some cases Republican
Officers were hesitant to take action when some exercised
initiative would have produced more desirable results.

6. In East Java there has been delay in the evacuation of
Republican forces but measures taken by Republican authorities for
improvements are considered reasonable and adequate.

7. All practical factors considered, the Republic has made every
reasonable effort to adhere to the spirit of the Truce Agreement.

8. The following particulars show approximately the number of
evacuations effected to date in Sumatra and Java.

Sumatra 1500, Padang and Palembang areas. Java to Bantam
(Republican territory) 2700. To the Republic by road and rail
6400: by ship 5800 Cheribon to Rembang, by road and rail 2800 from
East Java. Total 19,200. [3]