INTERIM NOTES ON N.E.I.

The contrast between our reception by the Dutch and the
Republicans was no less striking because we had expected it. DR.

VAN MOOK himself was friendly and courteous, but this attitude was
not evident in the behaviour of some of his chief advisers. DR.

VAN HOOGSTRATEN, for example, began our conversation by saying
'well I take it that you have got a number of goods you cannot get
rid of in Australia and so you thought you might unload some of
them on us'.

2. When I met him just before I left Batavia, he said in the
course of another charmingly frank conversation-'what I do not
like about the Australian Government is that it kicks its friends
in the stomach when they are down'. He then went on to speak
violently about Australian policy on the Security Council. At the
end of the talk he said 'anyway, Australia has backed the wrong
horse. You have kept thinking the Republicans were going to win
this struggle-surely the present facts will convince you that this
was a blunder. Nothing now can prevent the full success of our
cause.'
3. At Djokjakarta, Soekarno, Hatta and all the members of the
Government were touchingly friendly. They went out of their way to
make our stay in their territory easy and happy. On our arrival
HATTA and the Cabinet received us and talked to us for an hour. At
11.0 a.m. we called on the President, SOEKARNO, at his palace. He
was most friendly and sincere, and like HATTA, referred with
gratitude and admiration to DR. EVATT'S work on the Security
Council, and his general policy towards Indonesia. CRITCHLEY has
made a great reputation with the Republicans, of whom, when his
name came up, SOEKARNO said 'I love him'. He then went on to
explain what very good ideas CRITCHLEY had and what an immense
support and inspiration he was to the Republican leaders.

4. I had a long private talk with SHAHRIR and with SALIM. I gave
SHAHRIR Dr. Evatt's personal message, and he gave me to understand
that he had forgotten any thought of personal irritation that he
may have previously felt about some of his experiences in
Australia. [2] There is speculation in Djokjakarta about the
possibility of SHAHRIR becoming Prime Minister soon as the leader
of the Indonesian Social Party. SALIM was clearly out of favour
officially during our stay. SHAHRIR was staying with him at his
house and the two seem to be working very closely together. SALIM
has given us a letter for Dr. Evatt which we enclose in the Bag.

5. During our two days in Republican territory, we visited
educational institutions, laboratories and hospitals. The main
impression was of sincerity and industry, handicapped by lack of
certain essential materials due to the Dutch blockade.

6. I feel that Australia has a singular opportunity to give some
intellectual leadership to the Republic. They cannot get on
without it, and they would prefer it to come from Australia than
from the United States. The U.S. has already set up an Information
Library in Djokjakarta. It seems to me that this is something we
might try to do at once. The idea would not be to provide
literature boosting Australia, but to have some trained librarian
in charge, who could talk to the Republican students and
technicians and put them on to the sort of scientific and
political publications from Australia that would help them in
their work. In the recent past, they have been almost completely
cut off from the rest of the scientific and academic world.

7. The Republicans were very anxious that Australia should send to
them direct whatever supplies would be made available to them.

They would also like us to deal directly with them over
scholarships. They put this to us in a very indirect way,
recognising that this might be an embarrassing political issue.

8. DR. SCHUURMAN on the other hand, in Batavia, was very explicit
that whatever aid Australia gave to the Republican area, must be
given through the N.E.I. authorities in Batavia. He repeated that
DR. VAN MOOK had already said that the N.E.I. would only accept
relief goods if shipping services between Australia and N.E.I. ran
smoothly. As for the distribution of goods and scholarships
between Republican and Dutch territories, the Dutch authorities he
said, must be the arbiters. He could only promise that Australia
could rely on them 'to do the fair thing'. I felt that this
question of the proportionate distribution between Dutch and
Republican territory and the associated question of the means by
which the goods would be sent, were not matters that I should
discuss while in the N.E.I., and I indicated this both to the
Dutch and the Republicans. I said that these were questions that
would no doubt be decided in later consultations with the
Australian Government.

9. I discussed with DR.SCHUURMAN in a tentative way, the
possibility of future trade between Australia and the Indonesian
Republic. He said that if the N.E.I. authorities:-

(a) were able to inspect cargoes in order to ensure that no
materials of war were being sent to the Republic and (b) to ensure
that none of these exports from the Republican Territory were from
European-owned estates there could be no objection to trade on a
barter basis.

Trade by normal financial methods would only be possible after a
political agreement had been reached between the Dutch and the
Republicans.

10. My general impression of Indonesia was that the Dutch are in a
very favourable position for the immediate future. The economic
blockade they are imposing on Republican territory is very
effective. In the long term, however, I feel convinced that the
Dutch will be faced with insuperable difficulties, partly because
so many Indonesians [who] now are technically co-operating with
the Dutch are, at heart, bitterly anti-Dutch. I think the future
undoubtedly lies with the Republicans, but this future may not
come for 10 or 20 years.