1. We regret that your position in relation to finance and
manpower has forced you to the conclusion that you ought to
withdraw forthwith the remainder of the United Kingdom forces from
Japan. We are fully conscious of your difficulties and are
desirous of assisting you in this matter to the greatest possible
extent.

2. Your proposal has been examined by our Service advisers who
have represented that B.C.O.F. was organised as a composite force
and a substantial share of the administrative backing for the
Force was provided by the United Kingdom Army personnel, which you
agreed to retain in Japan when the United Kingdom Brigade was
withdrawn earlier this year. The strength of the remaining United
Kingdom Army personnel is 1499 and as many of these are in
specialist and key units and responsible staff appointments, their
retention or replacement is essential for the maintenance and
efficiency of B.C.O.F. Certain personnel could not be replaced at
short notice as qualified Australian personnel are not available
and in many cases lengthy periods of training would be involved.

In view of this position we hope you will agree not to press for
the immediate withdrawal of the whole of the Army component. We
have asked J.C.O.S.A. to examine urgently in consultation with the
C. in C., B.C.O.F. all practicable measures including a
reorganisation of administrative services whereby the greatest
number of these personnel may be released at the earliest date.

3. We concur, however, subject to the approval of the United
States Government, in the immediate release of the R.A.F.

component (less 1,415, Communications Flight), totalling 2,240
personnel. The Communication Flight, the establishment of which is
51 all ranks, carries out all internal air transport duties for
B.C.O.F. in Japan, but the practicability of the early release of
R.A.F. personnel of this Flight will be examined urgently.

4. As the Naval Port Party (whose establishment is 95) is
responsible for certain logistic duties for Naval Forces 'T' as
well as essential sea transport duties for B.C.O.F. at Kure, it
has been assumed that your proposals do not include the withdrawal
of this detachment whilst B.C.O.F. and Force 'T' are in being.

5. On receipt of a reply from you with further advice on the
matters raised in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above, I shall arrange for
a formal approach to be made to the United States Government to
agree to the additional reductions in United Kingdom forces.

6. In the light of the new situation, our Service Advisers have
been instructed to examine the entire basis of participation of
Australian Forces in the occupation in Japan in order to ensure
that the organisation and strength, the system of command and
administration, and the method of control from Australia are such
as to secure the most economic and effective results, having
regard to our manpower and other resources. This would also entail
a review of the relation of the present B.C.O.F. area to the
prospective strength of the Forces. You will appreciate that the
re-organisation in view will take time to effect.