We have had under examination the position of our component in the
British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan which at present
consists of one R.N.Z.A.F. Squadron of approximately 300 personnel
and an Army Brigade Group with supporting troops totalling 4,254.

All personnel w[ere] recruited on a voluntary basis for a period
of twelve months service and arrangements must be made for the
relief of the Army component in May (3,310) and July (646).

Personnel of the Air Force Squadron were relieved recently.

2. Within the last fortnight an appeal has been made for
volunteers for the Army component but the result to date indicates
that the numbers forthcoming will probably not be sufficient to
provide more than one infantry battalion and a few administrative
personnel a total approximately of 1,200 all ranks. In all the
circumstances we will find it necessary therefore to reduce our
future army contingent to this figure plus one R.N.Z.A.F.

Squadron. We feel sure that the position in which we find
ourselves will be understood by other Commonwealth Governments and
would be glad if we could be advised urgently of your comments on
our proposal which we assume will also be submitted to J.C.O.S.A.

for consideration.

3. It will I am sure be appreciated that the maintenance in Japan
of a force of even this size will because of the general manpower
shortage constitute a severe burden on industry. Notwithstanding
this and the serious doubt we feel as to the value of continued
British participation in military occupation of Japan we are
anxious to do what we can with our Commonwealth partners in
contributing to the security of the Pacific. We would, however,
suggest that the whole position might be reviewed. It seems to us
that purely military tasks must be reducing, so permitting some
overall reduction in the size of the force to be maintained.

Furthermore the existence of the force does not afford any of the
participating Governments any share in the military Government of
Japan and an opportunity therefore of influencing directly the
development of democratic institutions and a way of life in Japan
which will not be a menace to the future security of the Pacific.

It is doubtful also whether the existence of the force is of any
value to us in the advocacy generally of policies affecting Japan
while its maintenance in a position of substantial inferiority to
the Americans tends to diminish our prestige in the eyes of the
Japanese.

4. We would welcome your general observations on the question of
the value of the force.