Report (extracts) TOKYO, 30 August 1947

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REPORT TO THE PRIME MINISTER
ON
A MISSION TO JAPAN

I was appointed British Commonwealth Member on the Allied Council
for Japan on February 26th, 1946. I took up this post on March 1st
and arrived in Tokyo on April 3rd. At the beginning of April,
1947, I was appointed Head of the Australian Mission in Japan. On
July 30th, 1947, I gave Dr. Evatt my resignation from both posts,
expressing my readiness to carry on for some weeks until my
replacement could be arranged.

Since the Minister's visit to Japan it appears that the
Commonwealth Government feels dissatisfaction with the work of
this Mission. In this report I shall try to describe the main
conditions under which I have had to work in Japan.

THE ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

(1) S. C.A.P.'s attitude
I find it hard to see how the Council could have been made an
effective or important Allied instrument. S.C.A.P. strongly
opposed its establishment, and when established against his
protest he treated it from the beginning with contempt. S.C.A.P.'s
attitude was expressed in he following ways-
(a) At the opening Meeting of the Council on April 5th, General
MacArthur made it clear that he interpreted the Council's Terms of
Reference in a way that would make it an obscure and unimportant
part of the Occupation. He emphasised that its powers were purely
advisory whereas the Terms of Reference provide that, in certain
circumstances, it was necessary for S.C.A.P. not merely to consult
the Council about projected measures but to secure its unanimous
prior approval. I was instructed, however, not to raise this issue
on the Council.

(b) At the Second Council Meeting General Courtney Whitney,
representing S.C.A.P., addressed the Council for over three hours.

His attitude was rude and blatant, his tone one of frivolous
derision. The key note of his tirade was that the Council had not
been brought to Tokyo 'to pry into the Supreme Commander's
armour'.

(c) S.C.A.P. consistently blocked the Council's channels of
information. He laid down an extremely cumbersome procedure by
which Council members desiring information about the Occupation,
should request it in writing from the Secretary General. The
request was then 'routed' through devious channels in G.H.Q. to
the particular Section possessing the information. The answer was
returned through the same channels. I only asked for information
in this way twice. In each case, what I wanted to know could have
been given to me or one of my officers in perhaps ten or fifteen
minutes' conversation. It took from three to four weeks to receive
evasive replies in writing.

General Chu, the Chinese Member, summed up the position aptly as
early as May 7th, 1946, when I asked him whether he had any plans
for the next Council Meeting. He replied-'What is the use of
saying anything? We cannot give advice without information. We
cannot get information without asking questions. But behind every
question the S.C.A.P. representative seems to suspect some
impertinent intention to criticise the work of the Supreme
Commander.'
(d) With two or three exceptions, S.C.A.P. has refrained from
asking Council advice on the most important issues that have faced
the Occupation during the last eighteen months. He has never asked
for Council advice on the food question, on the dissolution of the
Zaibatsu or on the new Constitution. On the other hand, he did,
for a period, load the Agenda with a series of highly technical
questions with which the Council was not the proper or competent
body to deal. The Council, for example, was asked for its advice
on the most effective methods of vaccinating and innoculating
repatriates.

(e) S.C.A.P. has resisted every effort to make the Council a
deliberative body. He has taken the line that Council Meetings
merely provide each member with an opportunity of expressing his
Government's point of view and has always tried to avoid having to
put the question to a vote.

Moreover, when, on certain occasions, Council Members have asked
the Chairman whether he could indicate S.C.A.P.'s reaction to the
advice given by the Council, the Chairman has insisted that this
was an improper question. The Supreme Commander could be relied
upon to give the advice of Council Members the importance it
deserved. Council Members would, in due course, by reading
official reports and newspapers, discover for themselves how far
the Supreme Commander had been able to act on their advice.

(2)The Reasons for S.C.A.P.'s Attitude
General MacArthur and his representatives have always sought to
justify their 'toughness' with the Council in terms of the Soviet
danger. They have claimed that the Soviet Member's sole interest
in the Council was to use it to sabotage S.C.A.P.'s work and to
undermine his prestige. It would be impossible to give information
to the British or Chinese Members and deny it to the Soviet
Member. It was therefore necessary to clamp down on any
information which might be used by the Soviet member in criticism
of S.C.A.P. Moreover, since the Soviet Member was utterly
unscrupulous and only understood the language of force, it was
necessary to 'bash him down' whenever he raised an issue. It would
have been useless and dangerous to have tried to examine and
discuss issues on their merits.

Although this is the declared reason for S.C.A.P.'s hostility to
the Council, I believe that he has continuously used the Russians
as an alibi. Perhaps the deeper reason for General MacArthur's
attitude is to be found in his own temperament and character. I
think that he would have, in any case, strongly resisted the
emergence of any body in Japan which might have, even in the
smallest way, diverted attention from himself
(3) My Instructions I very rarely received any instructions about
the line I should take on the Council.

This meant that I had to use my own discretion on almost every
question. Indeed, I may say that the only general instructions I
ever received were those which you yourself gave me informally
during your visit to Tokyo in May, 1946. As I understood it, it
was my duty-
(a) to try to maintain the right of the British Commonwealth to
express a distinct and independent point of view on Occupation
policy.

(b) while doing this, to seek to avoid any statement or action
which might be construed as a serious breach between the United
States and the British Commonwealth.

In other words, I was not to be a cypher but not to be a nuisance.

This course was beset with difficulties because the general
tendency of S.C.A.P. Headquarters was to suspect that behind every
mild enquiry there might be some intention 'to pry into the
Supreme Commander's armour'. Moreover, to express even partial
agreement with the Soviet Member in opposition to the United
States Member on even a secondary question of procedure meant
running the risk that this action would be construed as 'lining up
with the Soviet against General MacArthur'.

I have, accordingly, shown great restraint in the Council. The
statement I telegraphed to the Minister on October 22nd, 1946,
remains true-

'FOR THE MINISTER FROM MACMAHON BALL No. 24.

Your No. 134.

1. I have been consistently cautious about supporting Derevyanko
on Council. On questions of substance, he and I have always taken
separate and independent lines, though, at some points, these
lines have converged ...

2. On some procedural questions, we have been in agreement, but
even there, I think in every case we have had the concurrence of
the Chinese Member. On several questions of procedure which
Derevyanko considered vital, I have declined to support him. Where
I have supported him has been on his right to seek information
from S.C.A.P. ...' [1]

Whenever we have been given an opportunity to do useful work on
the Council I have tried to make the most of it. The Ten Point
Programme on Land Reform which I submitted to the Council in the
middle of last year was warmly applauded by S.C.A.P. The Japanese
Land Reform Act includes most of its substance and much of its
detail. [2] The recommendations I made on the control of the coal
mining industry are nearly identical with the steps Mr. Katayama
[3] and the Social Democratic Party are now trying to take. My
recommendations on the stabilization of prices and wages and on
economic policy generally have been of considerable assistance to
S.C.A.P. and the Japanese Government. These contributions to the
Council have not, however, received much publicity. I think they
have been of [some] value.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES

From the day of my appointment I have come up against a series of
administrative difficulties which have hampered me in this work.

[matter omitted] [4]

THE MINISTER'S VISIT

(1) The Preliminaries
I received an immediate telegram, dated June 2nd, 1947, which
read, inter alia-
'From a tactical point of view, it would be most useful if the
Supreme Commander issued a personal invitation to the Minister to
visit Japan in the immediate future.'
The following day I telegraphed to the Minister a personal and
most cordial invitation from MacArthur. I was greatly puzzled when
I received a later telegram, dated June 11th, stating that-
'It seems likely that a message will come from MacArthur in the
near future inviting the Minister to Tokyo.'
The Department explained that they had not received the telegram
from me transmitting MacArthur's invitation, though our check with
the signals people showed that it had been delivered to the
Department of External Affairs. It was not until June 16th that I
received a personal telegram from the Minister instructing me to
convey to MacArthur his acceptance of the invitation. That meant a
lag of fourteen days in accepting the invitation. It was in the
same telegram that the Minister instructed me, as I understood his
wording, to try to secure from MacArthur a press statement
referring to the Minister's close war-time association with
MacArthur during his command of the South West Pacific, and also
to ask MacArthur to arrange for a S.C.A.P. aircraft to transport
him to and from Japan.

As I have already reported to you in my telegram of July 31st it
was within the same short period that I was instructed to ask
MacArthur to cancel the projected Antarctic whaling expedition and
to earmark a group of Japanese whaling vessels for Australia. I
have reported in my telegrams of July 31st and August 2nd, the
embarrassment and, I am afraid, annoyance which I subsequently
felt when I learnt of the Minister's appeal through B.C.O.F. to
MacArthur for air transport and his subsequent direct appeal.

I may have been quite wrong in allowing myself to be concerned
with these questions. I recognise that it was my job to carry out
instructions, not to formulate or criticise them. Yet it is very
difficult to be merely a robot. I knew from unofficial State
Department sources that there was some anxiety in that Department
about the Minister's visit to Japan. It was an open secret here
that for a long time, and particularly since General Marshall's
appointment, there was a growing distrust between the State
Department and S.C.A.P. There was certainly strong anxiety in the
State Department that MacArthur might, during the Minister's
visit, make some 'unilateral' arrangement with him which would
short circuit the State Department. In the meantime, members of
MacArthur's personal staff were trying gently and tactfully to
explain to me that to send the 'Bataan' on a double return trip to
Australia to transport the Minister would 'certainly get General
MacArthur in bad with the people at home'. In these circumstances,
I felt it was very unfortunate for the Minister to persist three
times with a request which I felt certain MacArthur was bound to
refuse. I felt the self-respect of Australia was involved, though
I recognise that it was not my business to have any feelings about
the matter at all.

(2) The Minister's First Two Days at Kure
I had done everything in my power to organise the details of the
Minister's visit in the way he had instructed. I went to meet him
at Kure, determined that every member of this Mission would go
flat out to help the Minister in whatever way he could to make his
mission a success. There had been considerable difficulties in
arranging an itinerary since communication with the Kanimbla had
been most unsatisfactory and the Minister several times changed
his mind about the instructions he sent me. On his arrival,
however, quick action was taken to line up a definite itinerary.

During his first two days at Kure, particularly as a result of his
inspection of the Naval Arsenal, the Minister expressed many times
his concern at the military potential that appeared to remain in
Japan and spoke of the need for strict and comprehensive controls
by the Allies. He warmly applauded me for my work on the Allied
Council and particularly, for a 'stand' I was reported to have
taken at the last Meeting. [5] He appeared to be giving me the
fullest support and emphasised the independent and critical
attitude which Australia must take on Japanese questions.

After his arrival in Tokyo, the Minister had a long talk with
MacArthur. The press here reported that the Minister, on his
return from this talk, was described by one of MacArthur's
personal staff as being 'as happy as a schoolgirl with two
holidays'. The following day, International News Service reported
that it was understood Dr. Evatt had come here 'in order to
identify himself with General MacArthur'. I was very concerned at
this report and expressed my concern to the Minister. He said he
was not worried about it.

I then noticed what seemed to be a very marked change in the
Minister's general attitude towards the Peace Settlement and to
me. He showed no interest at all in the summarised reports of
conditions here which we had prepared for him. He said it was
'useless to hold post mortems'. It was necessary, he said, to
think about the future. He mentioned the need for taking into
account the changes in public opinion in Allied Countries since
the war, that there was not now the same bitterness against the
Japanese that there had been two years ago. He spoke of the
difficulties of securing Allied personnel to establish any
comprehensive or detailed control over Japan after the Peace
Treaty. He spoke of the great success achieved in the disarmament
of Japan. He thought some kind of control might be necessary for
perhaps ten years.

At the same time the Minister appeared to take some pains, as I
have previously reported, to dissociate himself from me, if not
publicly to repudiate me. In private conversation, he conveyed the
very clear impression to a number of people here that he greatly
deplored 'the anti-American attitude' I had taken. At the only two
social functions at which the Minister himself took the initiative
in deciding which Australians he wished to have with him-at a
party given to American officers who had been in Australia and at
the Press Club luncheon-he deliberately excluded me from this
group. During his visit here he made public statements giving the
highest praise to the work of General Robertson, but when asked to
express his confidence in me at the Press Club luncheon, declined
to do so. At this luncheon a number of correspondents were very
interested in a question prepared by one of them. The question was
'Does what Dr. Evatt has said since he has been in Tokyo mean the
repudiation of the line taken until now by Mr. Macmahon Ball on
the Allied Council?' I understand that this correspondent was
dissuaded from asking his question by a member of the Minister's
personal staff.

It was in these circumstances that I felt I could not possibly
carry on and gave the Minister my resignation.

I think my personal reason for resignation needs no further
explanation. I do, however, feel that the political issue involved
may be of far reaching importance to Australia. It seems to me a
serious mistake to suppose that we can draw a sharp dividing line
between Japan under the Occupation and Japan after the Peace
Treaty. We cannot dismiss the analysis of developments in Japan
during the Occupation as a mere holding of postmortems. If all of
S.C.A.P.'s claims about the success of the Occupation are to be
accepted, then only the mildest and loosest control will be
necessary after the Treaty. If the actual situation in Japan is
very different from S.C.A.P.'s official description of it, then
much more careful and sustained controls may be necessary after
the Peace Treaty if the renewal of Japanese militarism is to be
avoided.

I am particularly sorry not to be present at the Canberra
Conference. Since, however, the Minister did not display the
faintest interest in any information or views about Japan which I
was eager to place before him while he was here and since he
clearly wished to dissociate himself from me, my presence in
Canberra would not only have been useless, but would quite
possibly have been a source of irritation to the Minister.

I fully recognise that it is for the Minister and not for me to
make Australia's policy towards Japan. I fully recognise that it
is for him and not for me to decide whether he should suddenly
change his policy and outlook. I do, however, wish to point out,
on the negative side, that never at any time during my eighteen
months on the Council has the Minister even indirectly suggested
to me that I was not faithfully and accurately carrying out his
policy and, on the positive side, that until his first talk with
MacArthur, he actively approved of what I had been doing.

CONCLUSION

May I be permitted a personal footnote?
During the last two and a half years I have been entrusted with
three tasks by the Commonwealth Government-at San Francisco, in
the Netherlands East Indies and in Japan. I did not seek, either
directly or indirectly, appointment to any one of these three
posts. In February, 1946, I resigned my permanent position as Head
of the Department of Political Science in the University of
Melbourne and gave up my other work in order to accept this post.

I did this gladly because I felt then that the work here would be
very important. The Allied Council has turned out to be something
like a fiasco. Throughout my term here I have tried to send
accurate and objective reports on Japan under the Occupation. I
believe these reports have been of some value. I have carried out
my work with complete loyalty to the Commonwealth Government and
done my best to maintain good and friendly relations with the
representatives of other nations on the Allied Council and with
all Allied Missions in Japan. I have for long felt great
frustration in the work of the Allied Council here and have found
the social obligations of this kind of post unpleasant and
tedious. For these reasons I informed the Department some months
ago that I wished to leave Japan by this August. When, however, it
became likely that the Peace Settlement might be made earlier than
expected, I expressed my willingness and eagerness to help in any
way that might be considered useful. I naturally regret that I
shall not now be able to take any further part in this work. I
also regret that after these eighteen months' service your
Government appears to consider that my efforts have resulted in
discredit and failure.

I have no doubt that a Government may exercise great freedom in
its treatment of its officers. The officer is in a poor position
to defend his own work or his reputation. To do so would, in most
cases, mean serious breaches of official confidence. However, I
can not believe that a Government which seeks to repudiate and
discredit those who have served it well is acting justly and
wisely.

I hope you may be good enough to grant me a personal interview on
my return to Australia.