I have the honor to refer to your note of January 21, 1947 [1],
commenting upon Mr. Acheson's note of November 6, 1946 with
reference to the terms upon which the United States Government is
prepared to place the former Japanese Mandated Islands under
trusteeship.

The United States Government learns with satisfaction that it is
the view of the Australian Government that the ultimate solution
of the question of the Japanese Mandated Islands lies in their
being controlled by the United States. It notes, however, that the
Australian Government regards the question of the islands as an
integral part of a comprehensive settlement of the entire Pacific
ocean area, and that it feels that to isolate the question of the
mandated islands from the settlement with Japan as a whole is an
approach almost untenable both politically and juridically.

With regard to the procedure contemplated by the United States,
this Government does not consider that there is any barrier to the
placing of these islands under trusteeship in accordance with the
Charter whenever the Security Council approves the draft
agreement. The islands never did belong to Japan, which, moreover,
as a result of the war, has ceased to exercise any authority
therein. Further, it was agreed at Cairo and Potsdam, and
reaffirmed in the instrument of surrender accepted by the Powers
responsible for Japan's defeat, that Japan should be deprived of
any authority in these islands. Moreover, practically all the
states which might conceivably have an interest in the disposition
of the Japanese Mandated Islands are either members of the
Security Council or, as in the case of the Philippines and New
Zealand, have been provided with information about the United
States proposals. For these reasons, the United States considers
that the conclusion of the trusteeship agreement for the Japanese
Mandated Islands can be properly dealt with now by the Security
Council in accordance with the Charter and does not depend upon,
and need not await, the general peace settlement with Japan.

As regards the timing of its proposal, it is the view of the
United States Government that formal presentation of its
trusteeship agreement should be made to the Security Council at an
early date. These islands were administered for nearly a quarter
of a century under a mandate of the League of Nations and,
therefore, they appear clearly to belong in the category described
in Article 77(a) with regard to which the spirit and intent of the
Charter indicated the early placing under trusteeship. Moreover,
the General Assembly Resolution of February 9, 1946 expressly
invites 'the states administering territories now held under
mandate' to undertake practical steps to place such territories
under trusteeship. The United States is not, of course, a
mandatory over the former Japanese Mandated Islands, but it has
been administering them de facto and, therefore, considers it a
duty to do its part in giving prompt effect to the Assembly
Resolution. The United States believes that it should proceed with
this program in order that other governments and peoples may know
the reasons underlying the United States proposal. There would
also seem to be sound, practical grounds why, in the interest of
the inhabitants and the general stability of this area, a
definitive arrangement should be provided for as soon as possible
rather than delay it to an indefinite date in the future. Finally,
it will be recalled that the President, in his announcement of
November 6, 1946, stated that the draft trusteeship agreement
would be submitted to the Security Council for its approval at an
early date, and any further delay might be likely to lead to
misunderstanding.

In view of the foregoing, the United States Government believes
that there should be no serious objection to its announced plan to
make an early formal submission of the draft agreement to the
Security Council, and hopes that the Australian Government will be
convinced of the desirability of this course. After its proposal
has been formally placed before the Security Council the United
States would be quite willing to consider acceding to any
reasonable postponement of consideration and action if this were
deemed to be desirable or convenient by other members of the
Council although, as stated before, it does not feel that action
by the Council need necessarily be deferred until the negotiation
of the Peace Treaty with Japan.