Verbatim Minutes (extract) CANBERRA, 28 August 1947
TOP SECRET
MR. FRASER: Civil aviation is as integral a part of a country's
economy as rail or road transport. The prohibition of the running
of civil airlines by the Japanese would create a feeling of great
inferiority which, instead of helping to solve our problems,
would, in my opinion, only increase them. We cannot put even Japan
into a straitjacket. The Chief of the New Zealand Air Force
asserts that the possession of civil airlines by Japan would not
constitute a real danger because this would require the training
of pilots and technical personnel for air transport duties only
and not for the many and complex operations needed in war. Of
course, anything used in civil life can be turned to war purposes.
The question is whether we shall say to Japan: 'We will form an
international airline and run your civil aviation traffic.' We
might as well say: 'We will run your railways and your road
services.' There is another question, relating to freedom of the
air. We must insist on international airlines having terminals or
landing places in Japan. It is worth while considering also
whether the air over Japan should be internationalised. This might
involve discrimination against Japan, but there is a strong
argument in favour of the internationalisation of all air. I shall
not deal with that argument in detail now. I consider that
prohibition of civil aviation would be impracticable and would
only constitute the very dangers that we are trying to avoid.
MR. RAFI: I agree with Mr. Fraser. It has been observed that it
would be undesirable to allow Japan to manufacture aircraft. The
only reason given in support of that observation is that
economically it would be unsound because Japan may not require
more than a relatively few aircraft. I consider that the decision
as to whether the proposition would be economically unsound should
be left to Japan. That is not our business. Is there any other
objection to the manufacture of aircraft by Japan?
MR. CLAXTON: Our experience as aircraft producers shows that any
plant which is competent to make civil aircraft can be converted
very rapidly to make war aircraft.
MR. RAFI: I appreciate that fact, but that danger would be
considerably minimised by the existence of supervisory committees
and all sorts of restrictions on the range and power of aircraft.
Having all this in view, I think it would be desirable to allow
the manufacture of aircraft in Japan.
DR. EVATT: I do not regard paragraph 94 [1] as having any economic
purpose whatever. It is aimed purely at the prevention of the
development of war potentials. We should remember what happened in
Germany after World War I. Germany was permitted to engage in
limited civil aviation, and its manufacturing potential grew until
its great aircraft industry was completely re-established. Japan
is now very much in the same position. It is worth remembering
that sometimes a prohibition can be made effective whereas a
regulation cannot be enforced. History shows that civil aviation
accompanied by manufacturing rights is inseparable from military
aviation. The civil aircraft is a military aircraft. As soon as
war starts, the civil plane becomes a transport carrier. It is an
essential part of the armed forces. I do not dissent from some of
the remarks that have been made about giving the Japanese a
chance, but I would not give them a chance in this field.
MR. McNEIL: I make plain the fact that my Government agrees
completely with the proposal made by Dr. Evatt in paragraph 94 of
his notes in relation to the manufacture of aircraft. So, I
gather, does the Canadian Government. We favour a total
prohibition of manufacture. We merely argue that certain
exemptions might be permitted since, if we agree upon prohibition
of manufacture, we can easily control imports.
MR. FRASER: I think the economic ground is incidental.
MR. CLAXTON: Yes. I make clear that it would not work an economic
hardship on Japan to impose a prohibition against manufacture. A
further point is that convertibility of plant is not the only
question involved. There is also the question of the continued
existence of research, design, development, teams of skilled
workers having the 'know-how', and the assembly of special types
of machinery, jigs, and patterns, which all go to make up a
military potential. If a country manufactures civil aircraft, a
war potential must exist.
DR. EVATT: We were told before the beginning of the war against
Japan that the fighter plane used in Malaya, the Brewster Buffalo,
was superior to anything that the Japanese might produce, but the
whole course of the war in the Pacific was altered by the
manoeuvrability of the Zero. We have learned that the Japanese
people build wherever possible in secret. The great naval base at
Kure was practically prohibited to the people. Workers were not
allowed to leave the big machine shops. I feel that, in the
interests of other nations, we should not permit the manufacture
of aircraft in Japan. I again assure Mr. Rafi that there is no
economic reason whatever for my proposal.
MR. RAFI: I fail to appreciate the difficulty of controlling the
manufacture of aircraft. If such a difficulty applies to the
control of civil aviation, why will not the same difficulty affect
the control of other forms of manufacture?
DR. EVATT: Mr. Claxton has already dealt with that question. I
think you will realise that a prohibition is much more easily
enforced than a form of regulation over manufacture. Also, once
there is an industrial potential covering the manufacture of
aircraft for civil purposes, there is a potential for the
manufacture of fighting aircraft.
MR. CLAXTON: As an illustration, I refer to the fact that Canada
is developing a civil transport type of jet-propelled aircraft. In
the same shop, the same people are working on a long-range jet-
propelled fighter. If we wanted to keep the latter work secret we
could continue work on the transport machine and at the same time
work in secret on the military machine without making any major
changes in technique, personnel, patterns, or jigs.
DR. EVATT: The same clause which rejected the suggestion contained
in Section 94 of 'Preliminary Notes on Provisional Agenda',
circulated by myself, was contained in the Treaty of Versailles,
under which the Germans were forbidden to have an air force but
were permitted to possess and operate aircraft. We all know how,
from glider clubs, they built up a huge military air force.
MR. FRASER: I think that it is almost impossible, and utterly
impracticable, to prevent any country from carrying on civil
aviation. Either democracy or totalitarianism will predominate in
Japan. If the Japanese people are made to feel that democracy
unfairly handicaps and restricts them by all sorts of annoying
prohibitions, they will inevitably turn to the alternative
philosophy. That is the real danger, as I see it. I agree that we
should prohibit the manufacture of aircraft, even civil aircraft,
for the reasons enumerated by Mr. Claxton. On the other hand our
experience during the war taught us that it was not easy to
transform civil aviation plants to production of military
machines. By all means let us have international control of the
air, with international supervision for the time being, but let
the Japanese operate their own internal airlines.
MR. DEDMAN: My defence advisers are most emphatically of the
opinion that the Japanese should not be allowed to possess or to
operate civil aircraft. Their apprehension derives from our
experience during the recent war, and some of us who were very
close to events feel that if the Japanese, instead of landing in
New Guinea, had made straight for Australia, this country would
have fallen into their possession. Members of Conference can
appreciate, therefore, our very real apprehension of the Japanese
being permitted to possess and operate aircraft. Apparently the
Conference is unanimously of the opinion that Japan ought not to
be allowed to manufacture aircraft, but there seems to be some
difference of opinion as to whether it ought be allowed to possess
and operate civil aircraft. I acknowledge the force of Mr.
McNeil's argument that for certain purposes civil aircraft may be
considered an essential to a modern nation, but perhaps his point
could be met if the words, 'Subject to certain exceptions, Japan
should be forbidden to possess or operate civil aircraft' were
written into the Treaty. If a system were introduced of licensing
aircraft imported into Japan complete control could be
established. I realise that aircraft are required to carry mails,
for use in connection with the agricultural and the fishing
industries and to act as air ambulances, and I believe that we
must assist Japan by permitting the use of aircraft for these
purposes, particularly in regard to her fisheries, which are an
important means of supplying food. At the same time, because of
the very definite views of myself and my service advisers, I am
entirely opposed to the operation of unlimited numbers of aircraft
in Japan.
MR. FRASER: There is no question of Japan being permitted to have
unlimited numbers of aircraft. As against the advice of Mr.
Dedman's service advisors, we have our service advisors, whose
advice is at least equally sound. The real point is, are we to
permit other nations' air-lines to operate in Japan, thereby
exploiting the Japanese people? I submit that such a view is quite
untenable. If we are to have a democratic Japan, is it reasonable
for us to say to the Japanese that they cannot be trusted even to
operate their own internal air services?
SIR RAMA RAU: I am rather impressed by what Mr. Fraser has just
said, and I confine my suggested restrictions on Japanese aviation
to the manufacture of aircraft. Obviously, such services as air
mails and medical services must be permitted.
MR. LAWRENCE: I think Mr. Dedman acceded to that when he suggested
some system of licensing aircraft. I agree with the delegates for
Canada, India and New Zealand that we should permit civil aviation
to operate. The point was made yesterday that opportunities must
be given the Japanese of building up their economy because
industry means employment and prosperity. I am not advised on the
military aspects of the problem, but I have in mind the fifty
machines which comprised South Africa's civil aviation aircraft in
July 1939. I know that those aircraft were virtually harmless from
a military point of view. Therefore, I feel that we are, perhaps,
attaching too great a significance to the possession of a fleet of
civil aircraft. I do not think that there would be any real danger
if the number of planes permitted Japan was restricted. However, I
agree that their manufacture should be prohibited. The delegate
for Pakistan asked what necessity there is for this prohibition,
if we retain control of their operation? I think that the answer
to that contention was supplied yesterday when we were told that
the Japanese are a patient race. We know from past experience how
easy it is for us to be lulled into a false sense of security. If
a prohibition on the manufacture of civil aircraft is not included
in the Treaty I do not think we shall be able to insist on such a
prohibition later.
MR. McNEIL: With the exception of the delegate for Pakistan we all
agree, from our experience, that there are very good security
reasons for prohibiting the manufacture of aircraft and aircraft
components, and I think we should include such a provision in the
Treaty. The difference amongst members begins to appear when we
consider the views expressed by Mr. Dedman. We all know that
nowadays there are multiple air services, and I think that that is
something which can scarcely be prohibited. Dr. Evatt remarked
yesterday that he thought we were making a Carthaginian peace, and
I think he was justified in making that remark. But if we are
going to deny to the Japanese people modern services which most
countries have been enjoying for the last 25 years, I think we
will most assuredly be making a Carthaginian peace. We might as
well go on to prohibit the continued existence of the automobile
industry. If we permit the operation of a limited number of air
services, such as medical transports, 'spotters' for agriculture
and fisheries, and mails, we must consider how the Japanese are to
staff and operate the services. The only alternative would be the
acceptance of Dr. Evatt's proposal that civil aviation should be
operated by a non-Japanese concern-an 'international corporation'-
but that would involve the employment of an army of non-Japanese
nationals, which does not seem practicable. On the other hand, if
the air services are to be operated by Japanese, we have to ask
ourselves where the Japanese are to be trained? Are we to permit
Japan to maintain an air service for the training of the
personnel? I think our approach to this problem should be to start
with a complete prohibition on the manufacture of aircraft, to
insist upon a rigorous scrutiny of aircraft licences, and then to
grant permission to the Japanese to train pilots for civil
aviation. I realise that there is an apprehension that civil air
pilots may easily become pilots of military aircraft, but from our
own experience I think that that apprehension is largely
unfounded. If this course is followed and an efficient
inspectorate is appointed to supervise the operation of Japanese
civil airlines and the training of civilian pilots, the
requirements of international security should be sufficiently
safeguarded. Otherwise I think we shall create in the minds of the
Japanese a feeling of social stigma which will produce the
greatest resentment. Furthermore, the denial of these facilities
to the Japanese people must impose considerable economic burdens
on them.
DR. EVATT: Mr. McNeil, I understand, favours the prohibition of
any aviation manufacturing industry, but suggests the introduction
of a system of control of imports. I am anxious that we should
give Japan every opportunity for economic recovery consistent with
international security.
MR. FRASER: I think that the advent of international civil
aviation is not far distant. The discussions which took place at
the Chicago Conference in 1944 support this view, and I suggest
that we might make a start with Japan. I have no doubt that civil
aviation can be internationalised effectively.
DR. EVATT: We have received a similar suggestion from our civil
aviation advisers, who think that Japan might be required to make
an unqualified surrender of sovereignty over her air space. I
think that the future of Japanese civil aviation is one of the
great problems for the Peace Conference to solve. The discussion
this morning has been most valuable.
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