Your telegram No. 90-Japanese Peace Settlement.

Prime Minister is of the opinion that as a preliminary step United
Kingdom and other British Commonwealth Governments should be
sounded to ascertain if they would be in a position to accept
invitation to participate in immediate discussions at a non-
ministerial level on matters related to the Japanese Peace
Settlement. Although it would be inconvenient from the point of
view of our staffing situation (since the senior officer, which
would probably be charged with the responsibility for such work,
is in Washington) we would, of course, be willing to cooperate.

2. We have, so far, hardly begun to formulate our views on the
nature and substance of the Japanese Settlement. It has always
been our intention that should it seem likely that a peace
conference be initiated suddenly we would do our best to prepare
for and participate in such a meeting. Nevertheless, we feel we
have little to gain ourselves by pressing for an early treaty. We
have taken this view not because we have been satisfied with the
present control machinery but because of the likelihood under
existing circumstances that the conclusion of an early peace
treaty would be followed by the replacement of existing control
with something still less effective. Meanwhile, provided that we
participate in such policy decisions as are made concerning the
future of Japan, it seems to us no great disadvantage in having
these decisions made one by one according as agreement is reached
between the participant countries on F.E.C. We take a very
different view of any decisions affecting the Japanese Peace
Settlement which are made without our active participation. It is
in an endeavour to avoid such incidents arising that we had in
mind action along the lines of our telegram No. 66. [1] Indeed, we
still consider that there is something to be gained by having
discussion in F.E.C. and my immediately following telegram
contains the text of a message we would like to [send] to other
British Commonwealth Governments. [2] It does not say that this
proposal and your own desire for a conference in Canberra are, in
any way, incompatible. [3]

3. On the proposals raised in your telegram No. 83 we cannot, at
this stage, offer more than preliminary and tentative opinions as
the matters in question are some of the most fundamental with
which the treaty will be concerned. With the sentiments you
express in paragraph 3 of your telegram, however, we are in
general agreement. With respect to paragraph 4, it is clear that
some provision will have to be made for a commission of control
for Japan on which former active belligerents should have a
continuing voice. However, since we should suppose that the
functions of such a commission would be confined to the control of
Japan it would seem inadvisable to call it a Pacific Regional
Security Commission, as this would be either a misnomer or would
have implications of a very far reaching nature. We should also
like to consider further what should be the exact relationship of
the Control Commission to the United Nations, as Articles 52 to 54
of the Charter appear to contemplate a regional arrangement mainly
for the purpose of maintaining peace and security amongst United
Nations members rather than specifically for the purpose of
exercising corporate control over non-members. There may be no
better alternative arrangement, though we are afraid the veto will
intrude itself no matter what arrangement is advocated. Until we
have given the matter further study we are reluctant to comment on
what should be the functions and powers of the Control Commission,
especially at present when the date at which it would be
established must be very conjectural. In general, however, we
agree that for some considerable time the control authorities
should have powers which will enable them to eliminate obstacles
to democratic tendencies.