Ministerial Dispatch 3147 TOKYO, 30 September 1947

TOP SECRET

In my first despatch No. 1 of 16th September, 1947, I remarked on
the bitterly anti-Soviet sentiment which was so openly displayed
by most of the staff of the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers in Japan. After making some closer contacts with the
highest ranking American officers in Japan, I have been further
impressed by the advanced stage to which their future planning has
apparently already gone. The impressions recorded briefly in the
following paragraphs were gained in quite informal and personal
conversations. Their possible interest lies in their general trend
and not in the details, which I would be in no position to
confirm. Nor can I estimate to what extent their views are
accepted in Washington.

2. The generals on the staff of SCAP are unanimous and frank in
expressing their beliefs on the lines that the dangers and unrest
in the world today stem ultimately from the USSR, that the only
way to deal with Communists is to exterminate them and that the
USA should do this by using atomic weapons against the USSR. To
this end the US bomber air force is being built up in Europe and
the Far East. Although they have long range plans for the
production of jet propelled bombers, at present their efforts are
concentrated on building up squadrons of atomic bomb carrying
B29s.

3. The U.S. Army and Air Force officers here apparently believe
that the fighting strength of the USSR could be destroyed in
perhaps one day with the atomic bombing of just under 200 main
urban and industrial targets. Most of these would be reached from
Western Europe from bases in Germany. In the Pacific, the island
of Guam remains the main base with Okinawa and the Japanese main
islands being regarded as staging posts. Okinawa is well
developed, there is a good air field used by the 5th Air Force at
Nagoya in the Japanese main island of Honshu, and a larger field
is being constructed near Sendai in northern Honshu. It is on this
base near Sendai that the largest constructional effort in Japan
is being at present directed, the expense of which consumes about
80% of the supplementary budget.

4. I have the impression that at Nagoya the US 5th Air Force
already hold about nine atomic bombs. The effective range of the
B.29 air-craft is 3,000 miles and the Americans boast that there
are plenty of American volunteers of the 'kami kaze' school to
make this a one way range. I gather also that one new squadron of
B.29s is coming forward each month.

5. The American service leaders here believe that the USSR is not
yet in possession of atomic bombs but will ultimately make them.

They say they have detailed orders for attacking the USSR which
they can implement on their own initiative in the event of some
disaster overtaking Washington or the President. They are
convinced that a policy of attacking the USSR would not run
counter to the present state of public opinion in the United
States.

6. So far as American policy in Japan is concerned, the thinking
of the US Army officers which I have been discussing is framed on
their estimate of Japan's future usefulness as an American base
and possibly as an ally in the coming struggle with the USSR.

There are a few Japanese who, like the Filipinos, are somewhat
sceptical as to the advantages of being an anchored aircraft
carrier in a new global war. Some, however, see in such a conflict
the quickest chance to restore their country's dominant position
in East Asia.

7. I might add that the American generals of my acquaintance
express the highest regard for the Australian forces with which
many of them worked during the Pacific War. They are very keen for
Australia to maintain a force in Japan on a fitting ratio with the
American forces. Their assumption is that such forces would play a
part in whatever operations were thought necessary by the United
States in this area at a later date.