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180 Attlee to Chifley

Letter LONDON, 17 August 1947

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We have very carefully studied your letters of May 28th, 1947, and
the memoranda attached to them about co-operation in British
Commonwealth Defence and the future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
in Australia, and have been able to consult the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, who has had the advantage of recent and
extensive talks with you on these subjects.

2. As to co-operation, I am very pleased to see that we are in
agreement on the need for each Dominion to undertake the
development of the defence aspect in regional areas in which they
are directly concerned and on the means for achieving this. In
general, we welcome your intimation that Australia is willing that
its defence organisation should undertake the development of the
defence aspect of matters relating to regional security in the
Pacific in accordance with the principles and procedure outlined
for the functioning of the Australian higher defence machinery. We
assume that New Zealand must be a party to agreements to this end
and that co-operation between you will develop under the
provisions of the Australian - New Zealand Agreement. The extent
of the responsibilities you feel able to undertake can no doubt be
settled between us after further discussions.

3. We note that you wish to establish in London an accredited
defence representative of the Australian Defence Department,
Defence Committee and Chiefs of Staff, and to leave unchanged the
existing Australian Service Representatives accredited to British
Service Departments in London. This arrangement is quite
acceptable to us since it suits your Governmental Defence
Organisation, and we shall be glad to give your representative all
facilities.

4. We entirely agree in principle with the comments in paragraph
12 of your memorandum about the procedure outlined for the use of
the Australian Defence machinery, and we have discussed in
considerable detail the most appropriate United Kingdom Service
representation in Australia, and the organisation which will best
serve both our Governments.

5. What we should like to propose, and it accords with your
suggestions, can be briefly put as follows. There should be a
single Head of the British Military Liaison Staff-probably of
Rear-Admiral rank or equivalent-who will be served by a small
inter-Service staff. The Head of the Liaison Staff will normally
be the British representative to the Australian Governmental
Committees you mention, and he will normally be the authority
through and from whom will be conducted British Military Liaison
business of a Joint Service nature. For reasons of economy,
particularly in staff and of senior ranking officers, we wish to
combine the responsibilities of a Chiefs of Staff Committee
representative and a Service Representative. Thus, the Military
Head of the Staff, with whom only the Australian authorities will
normally deal, with his two lower ranked colleagues and advisers
(of the rank of Air Commodore or Group Captain for the Royal Air
Force and Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel for the Army) from the
other two Services, will be the representatives of the British
Chiefs of Staff Committee accredited to the Australian Defence
Department, and the British Service Representatives to the
Australian Service Departments. They must also bear responsibility
as the British Military Advisers to the United Kingdom High
Commissioner in Australia, a position, I understand, similar to
your Defence Department Representation in London.

6. We entirely share your wish to cut down attendance at Committee
Meetings, and have therefore nominated a single Senior Officer,
the Chief of the Military Liaison Staff, as the normal spokesman
for the three Chiefs of Staff Committee and Service
representatives. By arrangement and according to the nature of the
subject to be discussed, the Joint Service Representative could be
accompanied or represented by other members of the Liaison Staff.

We suggest that this organisation should be reviewed in a year's
time.

7. Turning to the future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Australia, we agree that J.C.O.S.A. should be dissolved as soon as
practicable, and that you should undertake responsibility for
B.C.O.F. We should thereafter retain our voice in determining the
policy control of these forces, through the medium of the above
proposed Service Liaison Staff in Australia. We assume that you
will put this proposal to dissolve J.C.O.S.A. formally to the
Governments of the other Commonwealth countries concerned. Once
agreement has been reached on this, we will withdraw the United
Kingdom element of J.C.O.S.A. and appoint Service Liaison Staffs
which will be very much smaller and have entirely changed
responsibilities. Our agreement to dissolve J.C.O.S.A. would, of
course, largely meet the points raised in your letter of July
22nd, 1947. [1]

8. As soon as you have assumed control in B.C.O.F., it will be
possible also for our representatives to get to work in
consultation with yours on those problems which lie before us.

These appear to us to be:-

(a) The extent of responsibilities that the Australian Government
is willing to undertake in matters relating to regional security
in the Pacific;

(b) Measures for the protection and furtherance of Commonwealth
interests in South East Asia;

(c) An implementation of the principle of joint responsibility of
Commonwealth members for the protection of lines of communication
between main support areas.

9. There are one or two other points in your proposals which are
still being studied, and I shall write to you again.

1 That is, 'extravagant' UK representation attached to JCOSA.


[AA: A5954/1, 1850/1]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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