Resulting from our consideration of the possibility of a Trade
Agreement with the United Kingdom, we have been considering a
means by which we could demonstrate in Australia the benefits
resulting from each of the Trade Agreements to which we may be a
party.

Variations in duties require an examination in Parliament of each
particular item and in the past it has been necessary to provide
reasons supporting reductions in protective duties. On this
occasion, if negotiations are successfully completed, we shall
have to rely on more general explanations than would be possible
if we had had Tariff Board recommendations to determine new rates
of duties on individual commodities.

Apart from any reductions in duties which we ourselves may secure
in direct negotiations with other countries, we shall, under the
proposed procedure, secure, indirectly, benefits from reductions
which other countries may obtain from countries with which they
negotiate. Many of these, of course, will be of remote value, as,
for example, concessions that may be made by China in a
negotiation with the Syro-Lebanese Customs Union. On the other
hand, we may look for long-term gains in respect of reductions
secured by the U.K. in the duties on manufactured items entering
the United States.

We, therefore, thought it might give a more balanced picture of
the position if a statement were compiled listing on one side-
(a) commodities in respect of which Tariff concessions were
granted by Australia to each of the countries with which we
negotiated directly,
(b) commodities in respect of which Tariff concessions were
granted by Australia in payment for indirect benefits received
through negotiations between U.S.A. and other countries
and showing, on the other side, commodities-
(a) on which Tariff concessions were secured by Australia as the
result of direct requests on other countries,
(b) on which Tariff concessions were secured by Australia
indirectly through negotiations between other countries and in
respect of which Australia at present has-
(i) only a slight interest;

(ii) no interest at all.

For example, such a statement for the U.S.A. would be drawn up in
the following form:-

U.S.A.

A. Commodities in respect of which reductions have been made in
the Australian tariff in response to U.S.A. requests.

(say x items)
B. Commodities in respect of which reductions have been made in
the Australian tariff in payment for indirect benefits received
through negotiations between U.S.A. and other countries.

(say y items)

A. Commodities in respect of which reductions have been made in
the U.S.A. tariff in response to Australian requests and of which
Australia is a major supplier.

(say z items)
B. Commodities in respect of which reductions have been made in
the U.S.A. tariff in response to requests by other countries and
of which Australia is a significant but not major supplier.

(say z items)
C. Commodities in respect of which reductions have been made in
the U.S.A. tariff in response to requests by other countries and
of which Australia is not at present a significant supplier.

(say w items)

Such a statement as this would bring clearly before the public the
whole of the benefits which we secure through the negotiations in
comparison with what we gave. The statement would show
considerably more commodities on which concessions were received
by Australia than were covered by the requests made and more than
those on which Australia granted concessions.

As you know, we have tended to keep our requests upon countries to
a minimum and where, in the past, we have not been an important
supplier, we have not made requests. Most of our requests,
therefore, relate to the duties charged on primary products. Our
possible future interests in the export of manufactured goods have
not been overlooked, but we expect that other countries, which are
at present the principal suppliers of these goods (for example, to
the U.S.A.) will make the necessary requests for reductions in
these duties. We would, then, in accordance with the most-
favoured-nation principle, obtain the benefit of such concessions
as resulted from these requests, without payment or with much
smaller payment than if we made direct requests ourselves in
respect of the commodities concerned.

For the most part, we have felt that we would be creating
difficulties for ourselves in including in our requests, items in
respect of which the benefits will be of a long-term nature and
which we may reasonably expect to gain from the requests made by
other countries. Thus, we could, no doubt, make some requests on
Chile, although we have no immediate prospects of exporting to
that country. If we do so, however, it would presumably be more
difficult to withstand pressure in response to requests from Chile
for reductions in the Australian tariff.

Similarly, we could make requests on manufactured food items in
U.S.A. and Indian, N.E.I. and Chinese tariffs. If we do so,
however, we will either be informed that we are not entitled to
make the requests or what might be worse, expected to make
concessions to balance benefits we would get indirectly anyway.

We are closely watching the requests made by other countries to
ensure that reductions in the tariffs on manufactured goods
entering the U.S.A. and other principal markets will be sought in
respect of commodities of which we are potential future exporters,
and we will keep you advised of these.

I feel that the suggested method of presentation referred to above
is a better method of demonstrating that we are, in fact, getting
a 'mutually advantageous' bargain than by attempting to expand our
requests.