Cablegram K13 BATAVIA, 11 December 1947, 7 p.m.
SECRET
Following is brief summary of events during the last two days. [1]
1. The Committee has under consideration comments of the
Netherlands on rules of procedure (see document SAC10). [2]
2. At the second meeting Tuesday the Netherlands delegation gave
notice of presenting formal statement at the next meeting. They
insisted that the statement should be presented before agreeing to
my suggestion that the Committee confer informally with each
delegation before proceeding further with substantive talks. My
idea was that these informal talks would give the Committee time
to arrive at a preliminary understanding so that it would be able
to take the initiative in political discussions.
3. Abdulkadir presented statement at the third meeting yesterday
(translation of speech being forwarded by air mail).
Main points of the speech were-
(a) Historical development of the Republic pointing out that birth
largely due to collaboration with Japanese.
(b) Setting up of provisional Governments in East Indonesia etc.
as first of the component parts of the future United States of
Indonesia.
(c) Conclusion that no solution possible without actual observance
of cease fire order.
(d) Distrust of the Republic. 'If an agreement between the two
governments be concluded it would seem advisable to obtain some
guarantee that conditions of agreement shall be fulfilled by the
Republican people, this in view of experience gained during the
last two years.'
4. Sjarifoeddin then presented a statement (also being sent by air
mail) in which the following are the main points-
(a) Historical review of the movement.
(b) Explanation of the position under Japanese domination.
(c) Linggadjati agreement was eventually signed in an
'unfavourable atmosphere' as many acts 'had greatly diminished
hopes in the sincerity of the Dutch intention to implement'.
(d) Object of Dutch actions prior to police action and police
[action] itself 'appeared to be nothing short of complete
annihilation of the Republic of Indonesia and establishment of one
or more puppet states in its place'.
(e) 'Dutch intensified military operations on August 1st'.
(f) When the Security Council intervened Dutch 'policy of
political encirclement and [3] fragmentization was greatly
intensified'. Creation of autonomous territory within the
Republic's de facto territory was accelerated.
(g) The Republic 'will abide by the Security Council's decisions'.
(h) Implementation of the cease hostilities and settlement of
political dispute should take place immediately and concurrently.
Political dispute forms the basis of all points because only by
settlement of political questions final solution of military
question will be reached automatically.
5. The Netherlands document contains a good deal of inflammatory
material but at the request of the Committee, both parties agreed
they would not publish their documents.
6. I drew attention to the conclusion reached in the Netherlands
statement that a solution was not possible without actual
observance [of] the cease fire and obtained a specific statement
that the Netherlands delegation was not of the view that political
negotiations could not be carried on until negotiations over the
cease fire were completed. I also took advantage of this part of
the speech to stress the importance of acceptance by the
Netherlands of the Committee's plan for a speedy and effective
truce [4] and expressed the hope that both parties would agree
that the Committee of Good Offices could go ahead evolving plans
for the administration of demilitarized zones.
7. Informal talks will be held with each party separately today.
There will be no further meetings on political discussions for
some days to enable the Committee to decide its own attitude. I
shall put our point of view as to basis on which political
discussions should take place as forcibly as possible, but it is
already quite clear that the Americans with, it seems, the
agreement of the Belgians and Indonesians, are determined to start
from a reconsideration of Linggadjati.
8. Early discussions of Linggadjati would probably turn on Article
1. [5] I should be glad to have a fully documented legal
clarification of this Article bearing in mind the Dutch
declaration [6] that they have recognised the exercise of de facto
authority and not de facto authority itself.
[AA:A1838/283, 403/3/1/1/, xiii]