Parts I and II.

Thanks for your telegram 360. [1] Unfortunately your telegram 349
[2] as received did not state that you had passed on my request to
Evatt. Naturally I read from the remainder an implication that you
had failed to do so and the whole of your telegram was read in
this light. Let us start from here like good boys but I would have
been helped greatly by receiving Dr. Evatt's advice some days
earlier. Zeeland has left for Belgium and I only succeeded in
persuading Graham to follow my plan on interpretation and report
to the Council the day Zeeland left. [3] We almost persuaded
Zeeland to agree but not quite and Graham has insisted we
telegraph Zeeland and get his approval before following my plan to
the limit. We are awaiting Zeeland's reply.

2. Cease Fire Committees are meeting in Jogjakarta, Brookes and
Campbell with them. [4] I hope the Committee will present
interpretation about Wednesday and if the Dutch refuse to withdraw
to August 4th [positions] Graham has intimated strong probability
that he will join me in report to the Security Council. I think if
this course followed the Republic will agree to stand fast in
present position and without reservation obey further resolution
of the Security Council. This in order to show the Council and the
world they are confident of the righteousness of their cause and
although they would be prejudiced by such a stand-fast that they
are prepared to put all their faith in the Security Council. This
in the expectation that the Security Council will not see them put
in a worse ultimate position because of military aggression.

3. Unfortunately I cannot prophesy with certainty on these matters
as Graham's concurrence will depend on Zeeland's reply.

4. It is obvious that when substantive discussions do start the
Dutch will say-
(1) They are in favour of granting independence to Indonesians
generally but will deny that the Republic has the support of such
Indonesians even in Sumatra, Java and Madura.

(2) They will point to evidence in all Dutch occupied areas in
these three islands of an apparent support of the Dutch by the
Indonesian population which obviously has been induced by food and
clothing they have been distributing as an inducement to win
people over from the Republic.

(3) In any case they will argue that the feelings of the
population in the outer islands of the Netherlands East Indies
must be considered and that, therefore, independence if given
should be given to a Federated States of Indonesia.

5. Pity is that external evidence available will go a long way
towards proving their assertion in (2) above. As an instance of
this the case of Madura is most favourable to them. Eaton has, I
understand, cabled you details of this. [5]