Ministerial Despatch 8/1947 (extracts) BATAVIA, 14 November 1947

SECRET

I have the honour to state that the work of the Committee of Good
Offices still holds the main interest in the East Indies,
particularly in Java, and full details of its work have of course
been promulgated officially. It is the general opinion that
progress in preliminary talks has been slow, that the question of
the provision of a ship for substantive talks between the parties
is still very much in the air and that the date of commencement of
substantive talks is governed largely by the date from which a
ship will be available.

2. Meanwhile the Committee and Staff spends the major portion of
its time in Batavia, and is subject by general contact and
entertainment to impregnation with Dutch influence. Great
advantage is obviously being taken of the fact that firm action by
the Committee is most difficult when governed by the term 'good
offices'. Judge Kirby informs me that the Committee is, even at
the present time, 'sitting on dynamite' and I feel this is only
too true.

3. It is obvious that the Dutch are employing all delay tactics
possible and this is probably for the following reasons:

(a) A quick solution, unless to the advantage of the Dutch, is not
required on account of possible economic assistance from the
U.S.A. to Holland while the issue is in abeyance.

(b) Delay is likely to cause difficulties and dissension amongst
all concerned with the dispute.

(c) Change of countries in Security Council. [2]

(d) Food and economic position in the Republican territory which
will deteriorate as time goes on.

(e) Advantage of the Committee remaining in Batavia as long as
possible.

The Dutch seem to be striving in every possible way to bring
considerations of the status of the various States, East
Indonesia, East Sumatra, West Java, Borneo, etc., into the
settlement of the dispute, even with the Committee of Three. Their
object is to obtain, in the solution by the Committee, a United
States of Indonesia, of which the Republic will be just a part.

4. The local Chinese press now seems to have become a medium for
anti-Republican propaganda, with the possible connivance of the
Chinese Consul-General, who seems to have turned Dutch-wards. A
Chinese radio is to be initiated in Batavia for broadcasts. In
addition a new Dutch short-wave broadcast service to Europe is
being established.

[matter omitted]

6. Again the almost insurmountable difficulties regarding the
cease fire order and demarcation lines without a political
solution are emphasised and to me it still seems that a withdrawal
of forces of both sides from the disputed areas and the
establishment of a Joint Police Force must eventually be the
practical solution.

7. An interesting point brought up by the French Consul-General,
M. Raux, at the meeting between the Committee of Three and the
Consular Commission [3], was to the effect that the Committee of
Three should endeavour to obtain the withdrawal of certain high
officials of both parties to the dispute who have been very
virulent to the other side, as their presence will mitigate
against a solution when substantive talks are commenced.

8. It is worthy of note that the Netherlands East Indies
authorities have not yet promulgated the names of their delegation
for the substantive talks, but at the same time representatives
have been brought to Batavia from all the various States already
established by the Dutch in order that they should take part,
whenever possible, in talks with their Contact Committee which is
at present engaged in preliminary talks with the Committee of
Three.

[matter omitted]

10. The senior Netherlands East Indies officials do not appear in
any way to be relaxing in their attitude towards the Committee of
Three and the dispute in general. On the other side the Republican
camp is becoming more and more pessimistic and despondent on
account of the slow progress. However, in the near future it is
quite possible that mutual talks will commence for the first time
between Republican and Dutch officials, but these talks will be
confined entirely to proposals for the implementation of the cease
fire order.

11. Difficulty of interpretation of the Security Council
Resolutions of 1st August and 1st November, regarding the 'Cease
Fire Order' and the withdrawals respectively, have caused, and are
continuing to cause, confused thinking by those associated with
the dispute, and are factors which tend to hamper an attitude of
compromise. On the other hand many people fully appreciate the
difficulty for the members of the Security Council to picture
clearly the situation in Indonesia and to realise that the so-
called 'Police Action' is a full scale, though small, military
operation, and that definite armistice conditions should have
accompanied the Cease Fire Order.