Cablegram 503 CANBERRA, 25 August 1947, 12.10 p.m.
MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET
Your UN.784. [1]
INDONESIA.
1. Australia took the initiative on this matter and put forward
clear-cut propositions for observation of 'cease fire' order and
for arbitration based upon Chapter seven of the Charter. These
had, in principle, the support of the majority of the Council,
and, if they had been put to a vote immediately, they would
probably have been carried.
2. Now, as you state, the situation is becoming confused with
numerous resolutions and questions of procedure, and a deliberate
attempt is being made by the United States, United Kingdom and
Belgium to confuse the issue and prevent the Security Council
reaching a majority decision. They have adopted these tactics
because, in fact, we did have the numbers.
3. You have no course before you but to submit our resolutions for
observation an arbitration [2] and let them be accepted or
rejected. On arbitration your text in paragraph 2 of UN.784 is
acceptable amended by substitution of 'directs' for 'requests'.
During the last meeting, Australia lost the initiative. Moreover,
the effective action taken by the Security Council initially, and
which did credit to the Council, is now resulting in complete
stalemate.
4. We fear that your new resolution [3] is [no] more than a series
of requests, whereas, under Chapter 7, the Security Council
directs or orders. This type of compromise will reflect upon
Australia's initial action as well as the authority of the
Security Council.
5. You should point out delaying tactics and move to close the
debate and to vote on resolutions before the Council without
further debate. This is reasonable, as there has been three weeks'
debate and deliberate attempts to prevent a decision. Care must be
taken, however, to ensure that Australia's two resolutions are
voted on first and compromise is not accepted before Council has
voted on main resolutions. There is great danger in a compromise
resolution such as outlined in paragraph 1 of your UN.784, as,
while you might get an affirmative vote for this, you might find
the Council inclined to accept a proposal for observation as being
sufficient and unwilling to accept a second step regarding
arbitration. In short, endeavour to avoid any compromise and go
ahead in the belief you have a majority who agree with Australia
in principle and, when put to it, will vote with Australia. If
there is an arbitration tribunal of three, there is little reason
why all should not be appointed by Security Council if the
majority will not favour the alternative course contained in
Australia's proposal.
6. In these cases, a weak or futile compromise may be worse than
open defeat upon a clear issue. You must be careful of well-
meaning advisers who fail to see that Indonesia is at least as
much a test case as Greece.
7. Failing decision by Security Council, the Indonesian matter
must go to the Assembly by one route or another: and it is far
better that it should go there in circumstances showing
Australia's consistent, open, democratic policy as declared in the
Prime Minister's original statement [4] to which attention might
again be drawn.
[AA:A1838/274, 854/10/4, iii]