United Kingdom Government have been reviewing their Military
manpower position and this review shows that the commitments of
the United Kingdom throughout the World exceed the manpower that
the United Kingdom can make available to meet them.

2. The salient feature of our Army manpower position is that since
we fixed our rate of demobilisation, new Military commitments have
arisen, and certain other commitments which were foreseen,
particularly in Venezia Giulia, Italy, Palestine, Burma, the
Netherlands East Indies and Greece, have not been reduced at the
rate which we previously expected. As a result, there will be
752,000 trained men and women in the Army on 31st December, 1946,
against Military requirements for 821,000, leaving a deficit of
69,000. Moreover, in the Army alone, more than 500,000 men will be
serving outside the United Kingdom which is I believe a
considerably higher figure in relation to the population than that
for any other country in the British Commonwealth or the United
States.

3. In reviewing the position we have had to bear in mind two
undertakings which the United Kingdom Government have given in
connection with the scheme for a fixed term of conscript service
starting on 1st January, 1947. These undertakings are that every
endeavour will be made to ensure:-

First, that all men called up for the Armed Forces before 1st
January, 1944 will be released by 31st December, 1947, and Second,
that ail conscripts called up before January, 1947, will be
released by 31st December, 1948.

We cannot go back upon these pledges which were given in view of
the urgent need for reconstruction at home and of the fact that
many men had already been serving for long periods overseas.

4. We have reached the conclusion that we must reduce the size of
our Military commitments and especially the strength of the Army
overseas. Such reduction means that we must take greater risks,
some here, but it is necessary to accept this fact, and the
dangers can be minimised by careful adjustment of the size of our
forces in different areas. The measures which we plan to take
include reduction of our forces in Hong Kong, Malaya, the Middle
East and Europe (including the Occupation Forces in our zone of
Germany). We cannot, however, secure the necessary economy of the
manpower from reductions in these areas alone. The only other area
from which troops can be moved with minimum risk is Japan. This
seems to us to be one of the areas from which the United Kingdom
troops can best be spared, as in Germany, Allied control over the
country is firmly established and, therefore, a reduction of our
Contingent would be unlikely to endanger the common objectives. We
have, therefore, felt bound to examine the possibility of the
early withdrawal of the United Kingdom Brigade from the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force.

5. We are anxious that the joint character of the B.C.O.F. should
be preserved and the steps which we have been examining need not
in our view impair our partner-ship in this undertaking. The
withdrawal of the United Kingdom Brigade would involve about 3,500
men. It would not affect the R.A.F. Contingent of the Commonwealth
Air Forces nor the Royal Naval Port Party at Kure. It would not be
proposed to withdraw the United Kingdom element either of the
Headquarters of the B.C.O.F. or of the Corps Troops. Nor would it
be proposed to withdraw the United Kingdom element of the
Headquarters of the British Indian Division, nor such United
Kingdom Administrative Units as will be required for the continued
maintenance of that Division. Subject, therefore, to ... detailed
examination on the spot and the views of the Commander-in-Chief,
B.C.O.F., we would hope that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom
Brigade would not mean that the B.C.O.F. would have to reduce the
area it is now occupying. The numbers of the United Kingdom
element of the B.C.O.F. remaining in Japan would be about 6,500
and the total numbers of the B.C.O.F. would still be over 30,000.

6. We feel sure that the Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments
will appreciate that we have been forced to consider the
possibility of this move solely as a result of our manpower
difficulties, and that we are doing so with great reluctance. We
should, of course, continue to co-operate with other Governments
in every possible way in Japan's affairs and we should hope to go
on playing our part in the J.C.O.S.A. and other British
Commonwealth Organisations as we have done hitherto.

7. As a first step we should be grateful for an early expression
of the views of the Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments upon
the possibility of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom Brigade. I
realise that it may not be easy for you to let me have a quick
reply on this matter but I hope that you will find it possible to
do so because our manpower difficulties are urgent and if the
United Kingdom Brigade is to be withdrawn the sooner this is done
the better. Moreover, in that case, the next step would be
discussion with the United States Authorities, and it would be
very convenient from our point of view, if your reply could be
received in time to make it possible for the Foreign Secretary to
take the matter up with Mr. Byrnes during the current session of
United Nations Organisation in New York.

The MacArthur-Northcott Agreement provides that the British
Commonwealth Force may be withdrawn wholly or in part upon
agreement between the Governments of the United States and
Australia or upon six months notice by either party, and we should
certainly hope that, if the United Kingdom Brigade is to be
withdrawn, this should be arranged by mutual agreement, rather
than under the provision for unilateral six months notice.

It is not improbable that a decision to withdraw the United
Kingdom Brigade would lead to a request by the Government of
India, who are known to be very anxious to withdraw as many as
possible of the Indian troops now outside India, that the Indian
Brigade in the British Indian Division should be withdrawn
simultaneously with the United Kingdom Brigade if the decision to
do so is taken. I am therefore deferring any reference of the
matter to the Government of India until I am informed of your
views. [1]