PART I
Reference telegram 112 [1] from Brookes and letter referred to in
that telegram. [2] Sjahrir is proceeding with preparation of
counter proposals [3] according to draft set out in Brookes'
telegram 113, but has not yet presented them. On reading Brookes'
telegram 112 and the letter referred to therein I think Sjahrir
rather clumsily expressed his intention which was not to make a
formal request to Australia for intervention by UNO at that stage
but to indicate that when his counter proposals are turned down by
the Dutch as he is certain they will be he will then make a formal
request to Australia to the effect indicated. In this way Sjahrir
believed Australian Government could be prepared for the request
in advance and that if thought advisable the Government could
unofficially indicate its attitude to me to such a request and if
and how the Government would like it made. As I happen to be an
Australian on the spot with no official representative position
Sjahrir will probably ask me to return to Australia with a request
which could be received if desired without public announcement
until such time as Government desired. Would appreciate urgent
advice in anticipation of request by Sjahrir for me to act as
indicated.

Since writing the above I have learned that whilst Soekarno has
definitely agreed with Sjahrir and cabinet to the request for
Australian intervention through UNO he had previously made
unofficial approaches to Nationalist leaders in India to raise the
issue on their behalf with the Government of India. As long as
Indian troops and journalists are here Soekarno will continue to
have unofficial contact with Nationalist leaders in India and I
should think would not hesitate to make similar appeal to India
should other alternatives fail.

PART II
Further my 111.

1. After seeing Sjahrir I have been consulted by his departmental
legal officers who suggested trial [4] by Indonesian Court with
Australian observer but I flatly refused to discuss this.

Interview however was extremely amicable and I feel certain that
at any time now Sjahrir will carry out suggestions set out in
paragraph 2 of III [5]

2. Subject your approval I have always envisaged trial by military
court set up by AFNEI in Batavia. In fact mentioned this to
Mountbatten before his departure but I did not make a feature of
this as I thought AFNEI would in that way deal itself with all
offences of a military nature as occupying force. He indicated
general approval of my plans but said I was to ask Mansergh to
carry out my requirements first and only invoke SAC authority if
Mansergh considered he could not act without it.

3. Since my arrival in Batavia I have been informed that all
offences by non-military personnel whether of a military nature or
not are tried by Civil Affairs Courts and that this has been
ordered by War Office. The fact is that these courts are
exclusively conducted by Dutch Law Officers.

4. Because of information set out in paragraph 3 I feel it should
be assured before the suspects are handed over to AFNEI that AFNEI
will set up military court and not (repeat not) hand them over to
a court conducted by Dutch officials which would not, I take it,
be countenanced by Australia.

5. At first I intended to get prior undertaking by Mansergh-
(1) to retain custody of suspects by AFNEI once custody was
obtained;

(2) to set up military court to try them;

(3) not (repeat not) to put a Dutch member on the Court.

6. In spite of unofficial endeavours to get some advance idea of
Mansergh's probable attitude to a request by me as set out in
paragraph 5 I have no real anticipation of his attitude.

7. Therefore as at present informed I feel it might be a big risk
to have the suspects handed over to AFNEI without being sure of
the three matters set out in paragraph 5.

8. As the War Office evidently involved by having given some
instruction to the effect set out in paragraph 3 I thought I
should ask you for instructions as to whether to approach Mansergh
first and if refused SAC or whether it would be better for you to
raise the matter with the Government of the United Kingdom so that
the matter could be dealt with on a higher level. In case of a
change of circumstances here it might be advisable to let me know
of your intention to take latter course before acting.

9. My hesitation in approaching Mansergh is that the Dutch may
hear of the matter and complicate the whole position by making a
request that they as the de jure sovereign power exercise the
right to try the suspects or by making a demand for the trial to
be by the usual Civil Affairs Court especially if there has been
some agreement that such Courts should try all offences by non-
military personnel. I do not think it wise to place too much
reliance on Van Mook's statement referred in paragraph 1 of my
telegram III. [6]

10. Although I have not yet succeeded in obtaining the evidence
against the suspects possessed by the Indonesians their
departmental officers informed me and I believe that there is no
doubt of proof of their guilt and that confessions have been made
by each of them.

11. Because of the general situation the question of trial may not
be considered as immediately important as formerly by the Minister
and a false step in regard to it might seriously prejudice more
important matters. I think it important also to remember that if
the information in paragraph 10 is correct investigation into
background suspicions may be more important than the trial of the
actual perpetrators.

12. In view of the delicate situation you may prefer me to return
and have the benefit of discussion and advice before taking any
definite step and even if Sjahrir offers to hand over suspects to
AFNEI I will await instructions before I let him announce such
offer or implement it. I expect this offer by Sjahrir to be made
at any time now.

13. If I were required by you to return with the request by
Sjahrir mentioned in part I the other matters could be held in
status quo pending conference and instructions.

14. The above has been written to keep you fully posted and to
give you the opportunity to give me special instructions if you
desire but if you think it advisable I am fully prepared to handle
this matter of custody and trial here myself.

15. Could I please have urgent instructions. [7]

16. I feel I should add that Brookes has very good standing here
with Sjahrir and MacKereth and that in my lay opinion he has
handled a difficult situation very well.