PMM(46) 18th Meeting (extracts) LONDON, 22 May 1946, 3.45 p.m.

TOP SECRET

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United Kingdom Defence Obligations
2. The meeting had before them a memorandum by Lord Addison
(P.M.M.(46)31) summarising the present military and financial
commitments of the United Kingdom. The memorandum showed that, in
order to carry out the military commitments essential to an
effective foreign policy, the United Kingdom would need to
maintain in 1947 forces varying between 1,194,000 in strength at
the beginning of the year and 1,077,000 at the end. There would be
no alternative to the maintenance of lengthy compulsory military
service over the next five years. Total military expenditure in
the current year was 1,200 million plus additional charges
arising from the termination of the war of 576 million which
would be largely non-recurrent. Of the figure of 1,200 million
some 250 million would be incurred overseas. Particulars were
also given of other inescapable overseas expenditure to a total of
195 million to indicate the strain imposed on the United
Kingdom's balance of payments.

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DR. EVATT said that he found the memorandum a most impressive
document. The figures it contained were to him most significant
and he could quite understand the great anxiety which Mr. Attlee
and his colleagues had on account of them. As in the case of the
United Kingdom and Canada, Australia's expenditure on defence was
already greatly increased, but Mr. Chifley had indicated at their
earlier discussions that, in future, Australia must accept a
permanent obligation greater than any that she had had before the
war. It was worth taking out an insurance in peacetime against
finding ourselves in the future as embarrassed as we had been in
1939. It had been the general view at the previous discussion that
the problem could not be solved by the old method of a direct
contribution by Dominion Governments to the cost of the United
Kingdom services. Such a contribution to the Royal Navy had been
suggested before the war. But this would be out of harmony with
the temper of opinion in the Dominions. It seemed to him that each
Dominion should rather assume obligations to provide forces under
its own control for the defence of its territory and region. This
was, in effect, a pooling of reserves. That was, indeed, the way
that matters were developing in the Pacific. He added that greater
decentralisation of control necessitated improved methods of
military liaison. That matter had been discussed at an earlier
meeting and he regarded it as very important. It was virtually
true to say that there had been no Commonwealth plan for defence
in 1939. We had had to improvise and in the result very effective
arrangements had been worked out. He thought it would be most
unfortunate if the foundations of this organisation were not kept
in being. For instance, the Air Training Scheme had been a very
important factor leading to victory. He would like a framework to
be retained, which could be quickly revived if need be.

Dr. Evatt thought it worth mentioning that it had seemed to him
more difficult in this war than in the previous war for officers
from Dominion forces to rise to the most senior commands in the
Empire, as General Monash had done. This might be due only to a
difference in personal qualifications but it might also indicate
some deficiency in the machinery for co-ordination of effort.

He noticed in the United Kingdom memorandum a reference to the
fulfilment of commitments in the Netherlands East Indies. He hoped
that British soldiers would not be kept there to maintain the
Dutch position against the Indonesians. Quite apart from
considerations of finance, he thought that politically this would
be most unfortunate.

Finally, Dr. Evatt said that he would show this impressive
document to Mr. Chifley who would study it most sympathetically
with the desire to help in every way possible. Whatever could be
done to lighten the burden on the United Kingdom should be done.

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