PMM(46) 3rd Meeting LONDON, 24 April 1946, 11 a.m.

TOP SECRET

Military Bases in the Pacific
The Meeting had before them-
(a) A note by the Secretaries (P.M.M.(46)3) covering (i) a record
of a meeting held in London with the United States Secretary of
State on the 22nd January, 1946, regarding the request of the
United States Government for military bases in British and other
territory; (ii) telegrams from His Majesty's Ambassador in
Washington reporting the results of informal technical discussions
with United States representatives in Washington; and (iii) a
report by the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff prepared after
consideration of the results of these informal technical
discussions;

(b) A memorandum by the Prime Minister of Australia (P.M.M. (46)6)
[1] setting out the views of the Australian Government on the
general approach to the problem of regional security in the
Pacific, including the use of military bases by the United States.

MR. CHIFLEY said that the Australian Government had reviewed the
problem of defence in the South-West Pacific in the light of their
experience in 1942/43. In the past, Australia and New Zealand had
relied for their defence mainly on the military resources of the
United Kingdom. They recognised that in the future they must
themselves make a larger contribution towards the defence of the
British Commonwealth; and they believed that it was in the Pacific
that this contribution could best be made. The extent of their
contribution would depend on the proportion of their national
income which they found it possible to allot, in money and man-
power, to defence purposes; but he believed that in this area
Australia and New Zealand could make a substantial contribution.

He hoped, therefore, that it would be possible to devise a common
scheme of defence for this area after discussion, in the first
instance, between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia
and New Zealand, and thereafter with the United States Government.

At a later stage it might be possible to bring into the scheme the
Governments of France, Portugal and the Netherlands, all of whom
had possessions in this area. If such a common scheme of defence
could be agreed upon, it would be appropriate that its operation
should be controlled through the defence organisation in
Australia.

It was against this background that the Australian Government
viewed the United States' request for military bases in the
Pacific. Base facilities should, they considered, be conceded to
the United States only in return for the acceptance of defence
obligations under an agreed scheme. It followed that the United
States claims to sovereignty, or to exclusive rights, in certain
islands in the Pacific should be resisted. The aim should be to
agree upon joint use of all these bases in accordance with a
common plan for the defence of the area as a whole.

DR. EVATT said that discussions about bases had been proceeding
between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United
States since November 1945, and in the earlier stages of these
discussions the United Kingdom Government had been considering the
matter on a world-wide basis. From a memorandum by the United
Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, prepared in November last, which had not
reached the Australian Government until February 1946 [2], it
appeared that the question of Pacific bases was then being
considered against that wider background, with the implication
that concessions in this area might be balanced against the
demands which the United Kingdom wished to put for-ward in respect
of other areas. This was no doubt a natural approach for the
United Kingdom Government, which had to look at the picture as a
whole. It had, however, been somewhat disturbing to the Australian
Government, who were primarily concerned with the problems of
defence in the South-West Pacific; and he was relieved to find,
from paragraph 9 of their later report annexed to P.M.M.(46)3,
that the Chiefs of Staff now endorsed the view of the Australian
Government that requirements for bases should be considered on a
regional basis and as part of a regional plan for the South-West
Pacific.

At the outset the United States Government had sought to support
their request by putting for-ward claims to sovereignty over some
of these islands in the Pacific. It now seemed unlikely that they
would press this claim. They were now asking for exclusive rights
in Canton, Christmas and Funafuti, and joint rights in other
islands, some of which were under Australian mandate. Their claim
to exclusive rights at Canton, Christmas and Funafuti was based on
the ground that these islands were important stepping-stones in
the direct line of communication between the United States and
Australasia. But that was the very ground on which the Australian
Government could not agree that exclusive rights should be
conceded to the United States; for these islands were vital links
in Australasian communications to the United States-and the
islands were much nearer to Australia and New Zealand than they
were to the United States.

The Australian Government considered that this problem of bases
could not be taken in isolation, as the United States Government
desired, but must be viewed as part of the problem of securing a
common defence scheme for the area. In their view, military bases
were incidental to defence obligations assumed under a common plan
by the Governments interested in the defence of the area. The
first step should be to agree upon a regional defence scheme
consistent with Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations
Organisation; and the arrangements for the use of military bases
in the area could then follow the obligations undertaken by the
various countries under that regional scheme. The Australian
Government favoured the principle of joint use of bases, rather
than exclusive rights, for joint use was the natural corollary to
joint obligations under a common defence scheme.

The Australian Government also considered that this was a matter
in which the principle of reciprocity should be applied. The
United States Government had argued hitherto that there was no
question of reciprocity, since none of the Governments of the
British Commonwealth had incurred expense in establishing bases in
United States territory. This, however, was not what the
Australian Government meant by reciprocity in this context. What
they desired was an arrangement by which all the parties to a
common defence scheme should be enabled in case of need to use
each other's bases. Thus, if the United States Government obtained
a mandate over the Caroline Islands, it should be possible for
Australian forces to use base facilities in Truk.

MR. NASH said that the New Zealand Government agreed with the
approach to this problem which was suggested by the Australian
Government. He offered the following information about the
particular islands concerned:-

Canton Island-Agreement had been reached that there should be an
Anglo-American condominium of 50 years in this island. This seemed
to be a satisfactory settlement of the sovereignty question. The
island was a central point in Pacific communications and afforded
unrivalled facilities for civil aviation.

Viti Levu-It was important that Nandi airfield should continue to
be available to the British Commonwealth. The United States had
not in fact borne the whole cost of the installations for the New
Zealand Government had reclaimed only about half the expenditure
which they had incurred.

Christmas Island-With the concurrence of the United Kingdom
Government, the New Zealand authorities had made plans for civil
aviation installations here as far back as 1937. The rights
granted to the United States during the war were for military
purposes.

Funafuti-It was important that the British Commonwealth should
have joint rights in this island.

Johnston Island-While this was not mentioned in P.M.M.(46)3, the
United States Government had built up certain installations on the
island.

MR. BEVIN gave a short account of the discussions which he had
held with the United States Secretary of State about the desire of
the United States Government to secure bases in Iceland, the
Azores and the Pacific.

Mr. Byrnes had first raised these questions during the first
meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in September
1945. He had then put forward the suggestion that the United
States should secure a permanent base in Iceland. Mr. Bevin had
been afraid of the repercussions of this proposal, which might
have encouraged the Soviet Government to press for a base on
Spitzbergen. An exclusive American base in Iceland would also
directly affect the interests of the United Kingdom. We could not
accept a situation in which the United States had exclusive rights
there which we could not enjoy if we were involved in a war in
which the United States were neutral. He had therefore endeavoured
to persuade Mr. Byrnes to content himself with asking for a
renewal of the present lease for a stated period. Mr. Byrnes had
rejected this suggestion, but he had not yet secured a permanent
concession from the Icelandic Government; and, if the Communist
party won the forthcoming elections in Iceland, he might well fail
to secure his object.

Mr. Byrnes had also invited the assistance of the United Kingdom
in obtaining military air bases in the Azores. He had at length
been per suaded to agree that his purposes would be served by a
free base for civil aviation in the Azores. The United Kingdom
Government had undertaken to use their good offices with the
Portuguese Government to secure their consent to this proposal,
and negotiations were about to begin.

Subsequently, Mr. Byrnes had informed Mr. Bevin that it would
assist in securing Congress acceptance of the Loan proposals [3]
if an arrangement could be made for the United States to obtain
bases in the Pacific and on Ascension Island. Mr. Bevin had not
responded to this suggestion, but Mr. Byrnes had reverted to it
during the First Assembly of the United Nations Organisation. Mr.

Bevin had told him that the subject was not one on which the
United Kingdom could act except in co-operation with other members
of the Commonwealth who were intimately concerned. He had
therefore arranged for the discussion of the 22nd January between
Mr. Byrnes and Dominion representatives, a record of which was
contained in Annex I to P.M.M.(46)3. It had then been agreed that
there should be further discussions between experts in Washington.

The result[s] of these discussions were set out in the telegrams
from Lord Halifax reproduced in Annex II to P.M.M.(46)3.

Mr. Bevin said that he had tried to ascertain from the United
States authorities the scope of their requirements as a whole, but
he had failed to elicit a complete or satisfactory reply. His
suggestions for reciprocity, e.g., in the form of British
Commonwealth use of United States bases in Manila, had been
evaded. He had also been unable to learn precisely what facilities
were required by the United States on defence grounds as distinct
from facilities required primarily for civil aviation. Mr. Byrnes
had denied that considerations of civil aviation carried weight,
but it could not be overlooked that the force of civil aviation
interests in the United States politics was considerable.

On the 23rd April a message had been received from the United
States Government pressing strongly for some pronouncement on this
question with a view to facilitating the passage of the Anglo-
American Loan Agreement through Congress. Mr. Bevin hoped that he
might be authorised to inform Mr. Byrnes that, in order to meet
the wishes of the United States Administration, the British
Commonwealth Governments concerned had been considering these
issues and invited the United States Government to join them in a
Conference to discuss these and connected matters. In making this
suggestion he had taken into account the proposal in Article 34 of
the Australia - New Zealand Agreement of 1944. [4]

MR. CHIFLEY said that he agreed in principle that some such
communication should be made to Mr. Byrnes. He would, however, be
glad to have an opportunity for comment on the precise terms of
the proposed communication. He would prefer that the emphasis
should be on the need for a common defence scheme for the area, to
which the bases question would be a corollary.

MR. BEVIN said that he would circulate the draft of his proposed
communication and would welcome suggestions for textual amendment.

In further discussion the following points were made:-

(a) MR. CHIFLEY drew attention to the recommendation, in paragraph
30(b) of the report by the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff annexed
to P.M.M.(46)3, that 'the problem should be approached on a
regional basis in the light of a general appreciation of our
mutual requirements, but need not necessarily entail an overall
Regional Agreement'. What was meant by the last part of this
sentence?
LORD ALANBROOKE said that the Chiefs of Staff were in favour of
approaching this problem through a review of the defence
requirements of the whole area and not, as the United States
Government desired, by examining claims for base facilities in
particular islands. At the same time, they thought it might be
inexpedient to stipulate that there should be a formal Regional
Agreement. The United States authorities might find difficulty in
signing a formal agreement, which might have to be ratified by
Congress. And the conclusion of a formal agreement which had to be
notified to the United Nations Organisation might have the effect
of bringing other countries into the discussions.

(b) it was pointed out that the general approach which British
Commonwealth Governments wished to make to this problem was the
opposite of that hitherto favoured by the United States
Government, who had sought to deal with these matters in a series
of bilateral discussions with the interested Governments. Thus,
the United States had made it clear that they wished to deal
separately with the Australian Government in respect of islands
under Australian mandate, and would prefer that the United Kingdom
Government should not be brought into these discussions. It also
appeared, from paragraph 5 of the telegram dated the 10th April,
1946, from His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington (Annex 11 to
P.M.M.(46)3), that they intended to ask the French Government for
a joint base at Bora-Bora and the Dutch for joint bases at Biak
and Morotai; and they evidently intended that the progress of each
of these separate negotiations should, so far as possible, remain
unknown to the other parties.

There was general agreement that British Commonwealth Governments
should oppose this bilateral method of approach.

(c) It had been suggested in the discussion that the United States
Government had decided not to press their claim to sovereignty
over some of the islands. MR. BEVIN said that, while less emphasis
had recently been placed on the sovereignty argument, he doubted
whether these claims should be regarded as withdrawn. There was
some reason to believe that they might be revived.

MR. ATTLEE, summing up the discussion, said that the Governments
of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand were evidently in
broad agreement regarding the lines on which these United States
requests for bases in the Pacific should be handled. He hoped,
that within the next day or so, agreement would be reached on the
text of a formal declaration which the Foreign Secretary might
make to the United States Secretary of State during the course of
the forthcoming meetings of Foreign Ministers in Paris; and Mr.

Bevin would, in addition, take that opportunity of an informal
talk in which he could explain to Mr. Byrnes the difficulties
which Commonwealth Governments would find in dealing with these
requests on the basis on which they had been put forward by the
United States Government. He would, in particular, make it clear
that we should find special difficulty in conceding the claim to
exclusive rights in Canton, Christmas and Funafuti; and that we
considered that facilities for the joint use of military bases
should be granted as part of an agreement involving the acceptance
of common obligations for defence in the area. Mr. Bevin would no
doubt be able to report the result of his discussions with Mr.

Byrnes before the Dominion Ministers left London; and it might be
possible, if that became necessary, to arrange for Mr. Byrnes
himself to discuss these matters with Dominion Ministers before he
returned to the United States.